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Abstract
This thesis examines the political transformation and radicalisation of Ireland 
between the outbreak of the First World War, August 1914, and Sinn Fein’s 
landslide electoral victory in December 1918. My hypothesis is that the 
repertoire of myths, memories and symbols of the Irish nation formed the basis 
for individual interpretations of the events of the Easter Rising, and that this 
interpretation, in turn, stimulated members of the Irish nation to support radical 
nationalism. I have based my work on an interdisciplinary approach, utilising 
theories of ethnicity and nationalism as well as social movements. With these 
theoretical tools, I go on to categorise the Easter Rising as a ‘cultural trigger 
point’: an event or series of events that creates a sense of agency and urgency in 
the face of what is perceived by the members of the nation as an injustice. These 
perceptions were reflected through the prism of Irish national myths, memories 
and symbols of the preceding three hundred years, including the Penal Laws and 
the Famine. My method here is to compare the condition of popular Irish 
nationalism before and after the Easter Rising in order to assess the impact of 
this event and its aftermath on the Irish nation. I trace, in particular, the impact 
of the Great War on cultural and religious nationalism and its role in the decline 
of moderate nationalism and the rise of radical Irish nationalism. The analysis of 
this process of radicalisation is accomplished through an examination of various 
contemporary sources such as personal journals, letters, Government 
Intelligence Reports, Episcopal letters, Diocesan Archives and Newspapers.
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Introduction
I vividly remember sitting as a six year old in my Grandmother’s 
upstairs parlour, in Cedarhurst Long Island in front of the television. The news 
came on, and the main story was about the Republican Hunger Strikers. My 
Grandmother called me over, and told me a story about her parents who had 
emigrated from West Cork and outside of Athlone in the 1870’s. When they did 
not bow or curtsy deep enough to the local Landlords they were beaten with the 
riding crop. She would later elaborate on these stories with tales of family 
members forced to flee from West Cork after vigorous acts of ‘agitation,’ 
distant ancestors who had been Ribbonmen, replete with bloody descriptions of 
severed ears, and of a Grandmother she had herself never met. She also would 
go on to tell me other stories, of the fear and trepidation that accompanied any 
summons to the ‘Big House.* I had been given a sectarian inheritance, which 
she herself had received from her parents, as she had been bom and raised in 
Cedarhurst. These stories, despite being over a century old, were being told to 
me as though they still had contemporary pertinence.
When at University I studied history, anthropology and sociology, and 
thought back on my personal experience of culture and history, and the power 
of this situation struck me. The stories my Grandmother had told me had not 
been updated for at least a century, and they referred to a different world at a 
different time. Yet my Grandmother had related this important set of myths and 
memories to me, to provide a context for her grandson to make sense of the 
events unfolding in Northern Ireland, given our shared background and 
ancestry. She was, in this way, imparting a worldview. Here truly was the power 
of culture in action -  and unchecked and unquestioned it surely would have
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come to provide the only basis by which I would ever make sense of these 
events.
After taking a course in Nationalism at Swarthmore College, I was 
fortunate enough to have participated in a Peace Studies Mission to Northern 
Ireland in the spring of 1995. This was during the IRA ceasefire, and was during 
a period when the inhabitants of the far North-Eastern comer of the island of 
Ireland were beginning to dare to dream of life without the ‘Troubles.* Phrases 
such as ‘peace dividend* were being regularly used, and it was a heady period of 
romantic optimism that there might emerge a permanent solution to the 
perennial problem caused by the partition of Ireland. However, despite the 
palpable change in mood and outlook, the attachment to the old stories and 
symbols, Unionist and Nationalist, Protestant and Catholic, was still there. 
These were the same sorts of stories as my Grandmother had told me, married to 
new forms and new images, yet often demonstrating an element of continuity in 
theme and content. Important cultural themes such as martyrdom and the 
Catholic religion had been translated for new generations and contemporary 
situations, and this translation was obvious in displays such as the murals 
depicting Bobby Sands, Christ-like in his gauntness and suffering.
Having seen the power of culture and politics in my own life and on the 
ground in Northern Ireland, personal and intellectual curiosity about these issues 
brought me to the London School of Economics in the autumn of 1998 to study 
with Professor Anthony D. Smith. Smith’s work on ethno-symbolic approaches 
to nationalism were based, in large part, on the idea that myths, memories and 
symbols were important in the maintenance and development of some ‘older’ 
nations, and/or a necessary element for the construction of ‘new’ nations. This
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theoretical orientation meshed well with my initial work in the field. It was 
readily apparent that while some scholars had examined the links between 
culture and political action, these were often times written from an un-nuanced 
‘primordialist’ standpoint. Others had dismissed any power in such links, rather 
emphasising the instrumental use of culture by dominant elites to achieve their 
personal political ambitions. Other scholars overlooked these links entirely, or 
took them for granted in pursuit of various institutional or structural 
explanations of group political behaviour.
As this project began to take shape and come into focus, the lacuna in an 
explanation for the popular appeal of radical nationalism specifically in the 
wake of the Irish Easter Rising of 1916, became apparent. A group of 
previously unpopular, and in many cases, little known radicals had walked into 
the General Post Office in Dublin and simply declared the existence of an Irish 
Republic. The ensuing insurrection was short lived and a total military failure. 
The leaders of the Rising were arrested and shot or interned. In the wake of their 
executions and the draconian implementation of martial law in Ireland, the ideas 
of this minority of radical nationalists caught on at the grass roots level 
throughout Ireland.1
Scholars, such as Lyons, Lee, Foster, Garvin, Fitzpatrick, O’Day, Boyce, 
Augusteijn, Hart and Hennessey have, in various ways, accounted for the 
‘revolution* in Irish nationalism through changing political, economic or
1 It should be noted that this diesis has concentrated entirely on the perspective of the Irish 
nation. By no means, however, is this a reflection on a particular claim of greater legitimacy for 
this group over any other, especially the Unionist Community or British Government. While for 
the sake of brevity this thesis has concentrated on the Irish national perspective, a natural 
companion piece to this thesis would be an analysis of the cultural trigger point, and repertoire 
of myths, memories and symbols which made the Unionist struggle against Home Rule and for 
the exclusion of Ulster seem rational, reasonable, and just to Unionists throughout Ireland, and 
especially in Ulster. Such a study might include conceptions of religious identity, loyalty, etc. 
which underpinned Unionist participation in and sacrifice for the United Kingdom, especially in 
light of the events of the time, such as the Battle of the Somme, etc.
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structural factors in Irish society. Such factors included an emerging Catholic 
middle class, changes in rural social structures, changes in a variety of 
economic factors, the effects of Catholic emancipation, etc. There exists, 
however, a gap in the literature on role of the popularly held myths, memories 
and symbols of the Irish nation in the radicalising effects of the Easter Rising. 
Only one account, written in 1967, explicitly attempts to unpack the effects of 
the Rising in terms of the power of the content of cultural nationalism to 
stimulate a popular reaction. Thompson’s The Imagination o f an Insurrection 
argues that the action of Pearse and the other leaders of the Rising had tapped 
into a rich vein of potent nationalist symbolism. Other works, such as those o f 
Dudley Edwards and Moran, deal with Pearse and ‘The Triumph of Failure* or 
‘The Politics of Redemption.* These works analyse the role that cultural 
nationalism plays in Pearse’s own actions, thereby concentrating on the role of 
culture, but from an elite perspective. Hutchinson’s Dynamics o f Cultural 
Nationalism also demonstrated the important role of cultural nationalism in the 
broad project of Irish nationalism, over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, in the periods of Gaelic revival. None of these works, 
however, elaborate on how the events of the Rising and its aftermath account 
for the popular and mass transformation of sympathy in Irish nationalism, from 
moderate to radical.
This thesis therefore represents an attempt to fill this gap. How could the 
transformation in popular support from moderate constitutional to radical and 
violent nationalism be explained in the wake of Easter Week? Is there some sort 
of ‘process’ or phenomenon that explains how this ‘radicalisation* occurred?
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My contention is that the Easter Rising and the events that occurred in its 
aftermath constituted a cultural trigger point that accounted for this new 
popular sympathy for radical nationalism in the wake of the Rising. This 
concept of the cultural trigger point is based on aspects of social movement 
theory, in so far as it defines a moment or set of events that bring together a 
self-aware group to react with a sense of agency and urgency to a perceived 
injustice. This concept is also based on an ethno-symbolic approach to 
nationalism, in so far as the group, i.e. the Irish nation, and what it perceives as 
‘unjust’ is underpinned by a repertoire of national myths, memories and 
symbols. Even what is deemed by the group as a reasonable response to this 
injustice is, in part, determined by this repertoire. The Easter Rising and its 
aftermath constituted just such a cultural trigger point for the Irish nation. In this 
way, the myths, memories and symbols that spoke to the Irish national 
perception of the Anglo-Irish and Protestant-Catholic relationships were 
unleashed, and informed interpretations of and reactions to the Rising, 
providing a basis by which a grassroots radical nationalist movement emerged 
in the political vacuum of legitimate parties and leaders in the wake of the 
Rising.
This hypothesis can only be confirmed by demonstrating that the Irish 
national myths, memories and symbols did have a significant and definitive 
impact on the political behaviour of individuals in the Irish nation in the 
aftermath of the Easter Rising. It must therefore demonstrate:
1) the lack of popular support for radical nationalism before the Rising 
despite the presence of the relevant repertoire of Irish national myths, memories 
and symbols.
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2) the transformation from support for moderate constitutional nationalism 
to a variety of violent radical nationalism that occurred as a direct result of the 
Rising and its associated events, and
3) the ensuing emergence of a grass-roots movement of support for radical 
nationalism resulting from a reliance by individuals on the Irish national 
repertoire of myths, memories and symbols to make sense of these events.
In order to accomplish this, the thesis charts contemporary popular responses to 
the Rising and compares pre- and post-Rising attitudes towards radical 
nationalism, Home Rule, and the outbreak of the First World War, as well as the 
content of religious and cultural nationalisms.
The methods utilised to support this hypothesis are limited by being 
applied to a historical case study. As these events occurred over 90 years ago, 
this ruled out the possibility of conducting interviews with those who 
participated in these events. Instead, I have consulted a variety of archival 
sources. Letters and diaries, such as those in the collection of the National 
Library of Ireland (NLI) have provided many contemporary accounts of these 
events and the attitudes towards them. The intelligence reports of the Crimes 
Special Branch (CSB) section of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), which 
are available in the National Archives of Ireland (NAI), are not complete, but 
provide some helpful insight in to the activities of radical and moderate 
nationalists. The intelligence reports of the County Inspectors of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC), which can be found at the Public Records Office (PRO) 
Kew are much more complete and extensive, and provide evidence for actions 
and ideas amongst a broad range of members of the Irish nation during this 
period. Archbishop Walsh’s Papers, generously provided by the Dublin
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Diocesan Archives, proved a veritable goldmine for contemporary accounts and 
analysis of events in Ireland and especially in Dublin from 1914-1918. In 
particular, the combination of Monsignor Michael Curran’s statement to the 
Bureau of Military History (MS. 27728), available in the NLI, with the 
Archbishop’s papers provided real elucidation of many events which would 
have otherwise remained shrouded in the mists of forgotten history. Many 
historical works about this time, including those of Kee, Hennessey, and 
Fitzpatrick, have also provided invaluable insight into debates over the 
exclusion of Ulster and the partition of Ireland, the events of the Rising and its 
aftermath, and the downfall of John Redmond and the Irish Party.
Despite its reliance on historical works and archival sources, this thesis 
has not attempted to provide a general history of the Rising nor of the critical 
period of the Great War or of constitutional or indeed of radical nationalism. 
My focus is exclusively on the relationship between radical nationalism and the 
myths, memories and symbols of the Irish nation, as these had been handed 
down and elaborated over the last few generations or possibly earlier. Various 
other scholars have carried out these other tasks ably, charting the various 
intricacies that accompanied this turn of events. Furthermore, this thesis has not 
attempted to explain the transformation of Ireland in terms of economic or class 
factors over the course of the ‘long nineteenth’ century. Space and time have 
placed limitations on my ability to demonstrate the effects of various structural 
transformations in Irish society which might have accounted for the eventual 
shift in popular sympathy from moderate to radical nationalism in reaction to 
the Rising. Limitations in time and space have also prevented me from being 
able to chart the role played by a variety of geographic factors, in this
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transformation, in terms of a particular county or region’s attachment to a set of 
myths, memories and symbols as a potentially interesting line of enquiry. 
Rather, I have concentrated on the role played by popularly held and resonant 
national myths, memories and symbols in determining the political behaviour o f 
individuals in the Irish nation as a result of the Easter Rising and its aftermath.
In order to accomplish this, the thesis has been broken down into three 
parts, which are further broken down into ten chapters. The shortest of these 
parts is the first, comprised of just the first chapter, which proposes the 
theoretical underpinnings of the phenomenon of the cultural trigger point, and 
establishes its strengths and limitations as an explanatory phenomenon. Part two 
is comprised of three chapters, the first of which, chapter 2, considers popular 
attitudes towards radical nationalism before the Rising. Chapter 3 examines 
attitudes towards the outbreak of the First World War, and the recruiting efforts 
o f the British Army. Chapter 4 sets out the content of Irish cultural and religious 
nationalism before the Rising, exploring several important and pervasive 
cultural themes in the repertoire of Irish myths, memories and symbols in the 
run up to the Rising.
Part three of this thesis details the situation in the Irish nation after the 
Easter Rising. The first chapter of the second section, chapter 5, lays out the 
events of the Rising, and popular reactions to these events as they unfolded. The 
next chapter, 6, provides evidence of how the Rising constituted a cultural 
trigger point. Chapter 7 demonstrates the decline of moderate nationalist 
political institutions in the wake of the Rising, and the final chapter, 8, 
establishes the rise in popularity of a reorganised Sinn Fein, culminating in their 
sweep to power in the General Election of 1918.
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Chapter 1:
Ethno-Symbolism, Memory and 
Social Movements
18
Introduction
Though a great deal has been written on theories of nations and 
nationalism and social movements, a lacuna exists regarding individual 
participation in a movement of sustained radical collective action based on the 
nation -  how it is that the nation, through processes of personal attachment, 
identification, interpretation etc. actually inspires individuals to become radical 
in their political outlook, and account for why they would choose to participate 
in collective political actions based on this radicalism. In this way, I propose to 
show in this thesis how culture, bound in the social conception of the nation, 
can come to causally affect the political behaviour of the individual, acting 
simultaneously in a collective manner. The central concern of this thesis is to 
understand why it was that radical and violent nationalism emerged in the wake 
of the Easter Rising. As such, it seeks the causes that triggered individuals to 
believe that a variety of radical violent nationalism was not just one of many 
possible options in reaction to the Rising, but the most appropriate option.
This chapter proposes a mechanism by which the nation becomes the 
primary source of individual identity, and how this identity becomes the basis 
for agency in a social movement. The national repertoire of myths, memories 
and symbols becomes a filter or context for an individual's interpretation of 
contemporary events. This filter, in turn, is a factor that causes a sense of 
agency resulting in collective political action. The chapter moves from an 
explanation o f collective political action based on the nation to what 
membership o f the nation entails, through the individual’s encounter with myth, 
memories and symbols of the nation. This accounts for the impact of the
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collective (nation) on the individual’s perception of contemporary events, and 
acts as a determinant of what are perceived as appropriate and accepted 
responses to these events.1 The chapter will then show how these individual 
perceptions, based on the nation, triggered a response amongst the majority of 
individuals in the Irish nation. This triggering mechanism is part of a proposed 
phenomenon which will be called the ‘cultural trigger point.’ The cultural 
trigger point will be defined as an event (or series of events) that triggers a 
radicalisation in identity, a sense of injustice, and a perception of agency 
thereby accounting for a shift from a popular sympathy for and participation in 
constitutional nationalism to radical nationalism. In this thesis, it is 
hypothesised that the Easter Rising, as a resonant and meaningful event for 
individual members of the Irish nation viewing these events through the shared 
repertoire of national myths, memories and symbols, created the basis for 
sympathy with, and participation in radical Irish nationalism.2
In summary, in this chapter, I will firstly examine Social Movement 
Theory and the phenomenon of the nation, especially in light of theories of 
ethno-symbolism. Secondly I will examine the phenomena of myths, memories 
and symbols of the nation, a repertoire which is delimited in scope and content 
by collective memory, accounting for the impact of the collective phenomenon 
of the nation on the individual. Thirdly I will propose and examine the 
phenomenon of the cultural trigger point, explaining how these myths, 
memories and symbols trigger a radical shift in a given context. The chapter
1 Tilly, 1978
2 In this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, the use of the term ‘Rising’ will refer not only to the 
6 days of action/insurrection carried out in Dublin and other locations in Ireland, but also to the 
aftermath of the Rising -  namely the executions of its leaders, the introduction of martial law 
afterwards, and the general policy of repression of radical Irish nationalism during this period of 
time between April 1916 and the execution of Sir Roger Casement in August 1916.
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will end by showing how the cultural trigger point serves as a basis for the 
radicalisation of sympathy with and participation in Irish nationalism. The 
chapter will ultimately show how it is that culture, national myths, memories 
and symbols, collectively formed but residing in the individual, causes a 
radicalisation in collective political action -  in this case accounting for 
individual participation in a radical violent nationalist movement based on the 
Irish nation.
Definitions: Nation, Nation-State, Nationaiism
The nation will be defined after Smith, though slightly modified, as ‘a 
group of human beings, possessing common and distinctive elements of culture 
... citizenship rights for all members, a sentiment of solidarity arising out of 
common experiences, and occupying a common territory.’3 The nation 
encompasses a common culture, history, territory and destiny and a political 
self-awareness that distinguishes it from other forms of collective political or 
sociological organisation. The nation entails an awareness of rights, privileges, 
and responsibilities which are a condition of membership in it. Nationalism is 
defined as the movement for the attainment of a state on behalf of an existing or 
‘potential’ nation.4 Nationalism is a collective movement by the nation, its elites 
and masses, to gain congruence between the institutions of the state and the 
identity of the nation. The nation-state is defined after Giddens and Tilly as the 
territorially bordered container of legitimate violence, with the powers to tax, 
raise armies, etc. The nation-state, nationalism, and the nation are related 
phenomena as they tie the state to the nation through the use of ‘a myth of
3 Smith, 1998,188
4 Smith, 1998, 188 It should be noted that nationalism and nationalist movement are used as 
interchangeable terms throughout this chapter and thesis.
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origin, conferring cultural autonomy upon the community which is held to be 
the bearer of these ideals.’5
Theories of nations and nationalism are generally split into three main 
streams, though there are many scholars’ works that bridge the divide between 
these streams, or cannot be easily categorised within them. These three streams 
are those of modernism, perennialism and primordialism. Modernist orthodoxy 
dictates that the relationship between the state and the nation is an instrumental 
one, whether intentional or accidental.6 The institutions of the state, resulting 
from various processes of modernity, a need for armies, factories, taxes and 
unified linguistic populations, centre/periphery conflicts and blocked upward 
mobility are all proposed, in varying and combined degrees, as being the 
rationale behind the state’s drive to create a coherent and unifying political 
identity. In this model, the nation and nationalism serves to amalgamate 
disparate populations to the infrastructure of the state.7 In this theory, 
nationalism creates a reason why people should fight and die for each other, and 
pay taxes and it ultimately creates a mechanism by which to ‘imagine’ the 
nation.
Modernist theories of nations and nationalism are often compared and 
contrasted with primordialist accounts of nations and nationalism. 
Primordialism suggests that the nation is either part of a persistent pattern of 
human cultural, social and political organisation, or that the nation is based on
5 Giddens quoted in Smith, 1998, 72
6 This ‘orthodox modernism’ represents an amalgamation of modernist approaches, and 
admittedly does not do justice to the depth of complexity and nuance within the various 
modernist approaches to nations and nationalism. However, for the sake of brevity, this 
presentation of ‘orthodox modernism’ represents an attempt at the distillation of this vast body 
of excellent theory. The modernist orthodoxy, as described above, does not exist as such. It is an 
amalgamation of theories as put forward by Hobsbawm, 1992; Gellner, 1983; Breuilly, 1993; 
Mann, 1995; Naim, 1977 and others.
7 For an extensive analysis o f ‘orthodox modernism’ see especially Smith, 1998.
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various socio-biological conceptions of genetic fitness and/or ‘otherness.* This 
primordialist approach suggests that the persistence of cultural or political 
patterns or conceptions of genetic fitness account for the political and/or 
social/cultural organisation of the nation. Primordialism deems the pre­
modem/modem divide irrelevant, in so far as it fails to account for the 
emergence of political and social organisations in the nation, or the conceptions 
of the genetic fitness that underpin the nation and nationalisms.8
There is a third approach between modernist and primordialist accounts 
of the nation. Perennialist theories of nationalism propose that the nations are 
immemorial and exist or recur throughout history, but they are not part of the 
human condition as such, not part of ‘nature,* but rather or recorded history. 
Some nations reach back to these myths and memories of the collective from a 
pre-modem era in order to (reconstruct, (re)invigorate, or transform this 
community into the modem phenomenon of the nation. In this way, some 
nations can be seen to bridge the pre-modem/modem divide. Other nations, 
competing with these ‘pre-modem’ nations seek to demonstrate their claims of 
political, social, cultural, etc. legitimacy and authenticity through a process that 
requires extensive processes of (re)discovery, (re)appropriation, (re)affirmation, 
and (re)imagination in order to complete their transformation into a nation.
All of these theories have been used, with varying degrees of success to 
explain the existence and persistence of nations and nationalism. While there is 
clearly a debate to be had as to the antiquity or ‘authenticity’ of the myths and 
memories held by individuals as regards the Irish nation at the time of the Easter 
Rising, the factual reality of myths, memories and symbols has little to do with
8 See authors such as Shils, 1995; Van Den Berghe, 1995; Grosby, 1995; and Geertz, 1963.
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the broad hypothesis of this thesis that the repertoire of national myths, 
memories and symbols were resonant and popular amongst members of the Irish 
nation. To adequately investigate such a hypothesis, this thesis must show that 
myths, memories, and symbols of the nation were demonstrable causal factors 
in the interpretation of the Rising, and that they also helped individuals to 
determine how to react to the events of the Rising. It is not necessary to 
determine the historical legitimacy or authenticity of the repertoire of national 
myths, symbols and memories -  it will be enough to prove their contemporary 
perception as legitimate and meaningful. The ultimate measure of the success or 
failure of this theoretical approach lies in the presence of evidence that myths 
and memories did matter in the period between March 1914 -  December 1918, 
rather than the discovery of evidence that these myths and memories were ‘true* 
or factually correct, or that they were the core of an Irish nation that emanated 
from a ‘pre-modem’ past.
Defining nationalism -  a  social movement?
A social movement is a collective struggle by a group of individuals 
who come together with a common purpose and solidarity to challenge groups 
of elites, opposing collectives and authorities.9 To achieve its objective, a social 
movement mounts disruptive actions against elites, authorities, other collectives 
and cultural codes in the name of common claims against these opponents.10 
The basis for the collective action is rooted in feelings of solidarity or collective 
identity, and sustained action on the part of this collective constitutes the basis 
for a social movement.11 While participation in a social movement inherently
9 Tarrow’s definition in Klandennans, 1997,2
10 Klandermans, 1997,2
11 Klandennans, 1997,2
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signifies sympathy for its arguments and intentions, many individuals may 
sympathise with aims, ambitions and actions of the movement without "taking 
the leap* into actual participation. Some reasons for having sympathy for a 
movement but foiling to participate may be fear of repression or alternatively 
the ‘free rider’ dilemma.12
Participation in a social movement is motivated by three key factors. 
The first of these factors is a sense of injustice - a sense of ‘moral indignation’ 
concerning what individuals feel to be collective grievances - which often takes 
the form of ‘outrage* about the way that the authorities are treating a problem 
that affects the collective.13 Secondly, a sense of collective identity must be 
present for the emergence of a social movement, where the motivating sense of 
injustice is shared by the collective and therefore equally informed by shared 
beliefs and senses of what actually constitutes the injustice itself.14 The third 
factor that must be present for the emergence of a social movement is a factor of 
agency, a belief that one can, in so for as she participates in sustained collective 
action, alter conditions and politics through the mechanisms, institutions and 
actions of the social movement.15 These conditions emerge in response to 
various contextual factors and may also be cultivated by participants in the 
movement trying to persuade potential sympathisers of their take on these three 
factors. The emergence of shared perceptions of injustice, the reinforcement of 
the collective identity, and the sense of agency occur at different levels of 
society, at different rates and in differing contexts.16 Socialisation may, in part, 
help to account for certain shared ‘common’ aspects of these factors, but so too
12 For an extensive review of the debate on the ‘free rider’ dilemma see Klandennans, (1997)
13 Klandermans, 1997,17-19
14 Klandermans, 1997,17-19
15 Klandermans, 1997,17-19
16 Klandermans, 1997,17-19
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do the institutions of these movements and the efforts of participants to organise 
and persuade others of their cause.17 Participation in the sustained collective 
action of a social movement social action can also ‘dramatically’ change an 
individual’s perspective on the merits of participation. One may be socialised or 
persuaded into sympathy for a social movement, but the experience of a specific 
action or event, especially an experience of repression carried out by the 
challenged ‘opponents’ of the social movement, may cause an individual to 
cross the threshold from sympathy to participation.18 Repression not only serves 
to locate and reify a conception of the collective grievance, but it helps to 
clearly define the available political opportunities to try to rectify this 
grievance.19
The similarity in the outlook of a social movement can be seen not only 
as a result of a common identity but also as part of the collective response to 
institutions which the social movement is trying to change.20 A social 
movement’s encounters with opposing and especially repressive institutions are 
crucial. As a social movement confronts various institutions, this confrontation 
comes to affect the adoption and adaptation of strategies and tactics on the part 
of the social movement, depending on the regime type or forms of repression 
generated by the confronted institutions, thereby affecting what myths, 
memories and symbols seem pertinent, potent and salient in relation to the 
movement’s context. Social movements develop their own ‘cultures’ in 
response to the organisations, groups, authorities, codes, and institutions of their 
opponents, and are therefore reflexively defined by the struggle in which they
17 Klandermans, 1997,52
18 See Klandermans’ discussion of these factors, Klandermans, 1992, 52
19 White, 1989,1281
20 Swidler, 1995,38
21 Swidler, 1995,37
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are engaged.22 Therefore, the political actions and reactions as well as 
ideological formulations of confronted institutions directly affect the strategies, 
tactics, form and content of a social movement.
Ethno-Symbolism
Ethno-symbolists broadly recognise that the nation is a modem 
phenomenon, but some nations’ cultural and/or political antecedents pre-date 
the modem era. Such nations are based on pre-modem cultural, political and 
ethnic groups which are reconstituted in a modem period as nations. The 
repertoire of this shared ethnic past stems from the ethnic group or ethnie. An 
ethnie is defined by Smith as ‘a named human population with shared ancestry, 
myths, histories and culture, having an association with a specific territory and a 
sense of solidarity.’23 In this argument, the core of ethnicity -  the ‘myth-symbol 
complex’ and the mythomoteur -diffuses the myths, memories and symbols of 
the group contemporarily through the ethnic group and across generations, 
preserving and maintaining the form of the group, and the content of its identity 
over the longue-duree -  i.e. those myths, symbols, values and memories that 
make the ethnie distinct and separate.24 The nation emerges from this ethnie in 
response to the pressures and needs of a modem world, to changes in trade, 
administration, the rise of secularism and mass culture and education. An 
ethnie that did not participate in the initial move towards nationhood finds itself 
burdened by its subject status in an empire, and non-recognition of its cultural, 
social, political and economic claims for legitimacy, authenticity and autonomy 
in relation to other more established nations. Such sentiments contribute to a
22 Swidler, 1995,37
23 Smith, 1998,191
24 Smith, 1986,15
25 Smith, 1986, See Chapter 2
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collective sense of injustice at the hands of an opponent perceived to be holding 
back the development of the ethnie. In light of these burdens, the intelligentsia 
of the ethnie seeks to turn it into a political nation in order to stake out the 
autonomy of the community in the contemporary inter-state and international 
order, thereby providing legitimacy and authenticity to its various cultural and 
political claims. In this framework, the elites and/or intelligentsia of the nation 
are not only involved in furthering individual power and authority, but they are 
also concerned with gaining recognition for the claims of the community. It is 
therefore difficult to distinguish the personal ambitions of the elites and the 
needs of the nation in nationalism. The intelligentsia are therefore actively 
engaged in a process of reinforcing collective identity, persuading those that are 
sympathetic of the injustices being perpetrated on the ethnie/nation, and 
convincing those around them that a nationalist movement is the form of agency 
that would permanently and completely remedy these injustices.
The ‘ethnic roots’ of the nation, the process of reaching back into the 
past in order to provide the bases for the nation and the essential myths of 
common descent, homeland, and golden age -  a shared history, destiny and 
territory -  provided a set of processes, the myth-symbol complex and 
mythomoteur, by which to bring about the nation.27 They lie at the heart of all 
three factors of identity, injustice and agency. In this way, nationalism is not 
separable into clearly and easily delimited constituent elements of political and 
cultural phenomena, but they are rather dynamic and reinforcing, appearing at 
points when either one avenue or the other are perceived to have failed.
26 Smith, 1986, see Chapter 7
27 The phrase ‘to construct the nation’ has been avoided here, so as not to give the impression 
that this is denoting a necessarily instrumental process.
28 Hutchinson 1987
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Nationalism is ultimately typified by a shared sense of identity and common 
purpose found in myths, memories and symbols in some cases stemming from 
an ethnic past, and mobilised in order to gain the congruence of the nation and 
the state, while simultaneously being a process which unifies individuals under 
the banner of the nation.
Nationalism as Social Movement
It then follows that the process that accounts for an ethnie becoming a 
nation, and the movement of a nation to gain control of the state, i.e. 
nationalism, is by definition a social movement. It is a challenge by a 
collectivity, the nation, with a common purpose, to gain control of the state. To 
achieve this aim, nationalism is engaged in sustained confrontation with 
opposing elites, institutions, and authorities. The Irish nationalist movement in 
its various guises, whether radical or constitutional, mounted disruptive actions 
against British and Protestant elites and authorities, and their legal and cultural 
codes over the course of at least two centuries. Irish nationalism, in its various 
guises, shared common claims against these opponents, that Ireland as a nation 
went unrecognised and lacked political power due to its status as a Catholic 
nation, and its identity as Irish. The means by which this could be rectified, i.e. 
what types and degrees of collective action would be necessary, was hotly 
disputed within the Irish nation at the time of the Rising. This sense of injustice 
at the hands of their opponents was rooted in the collective identity of being a 
member of the Irish nation -  an identity that was not easily separated from 
being a Roman Catholic. As the collective notion of injustice and the sense of 
agency in response was sustained over the course of the 19th century, from 
O’Connell to Redmond, via Young Ireland and Parnell amongst many others, it
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may be understood as being a form of sustained collective action, and therefore 
by definition a social movement.
This broad sympathy with, and often participation in the social 
movement of Irish nationalism should not be confused with sympathy for or 
participation in radical Irish nationalism. The politics of Sinn Fein, of Griffith 
and later Pearse and others were indeed radical, in so far as the radical 
nationalist programme was denoted by claims, programs, self-descriptions and 
descriptions of others which were different than those of mainstream and 
popular nationalism prior to the Rising, typified by the Irish Party and 
Redmond.29 It is, of course, the purpose of this thesis to account for the popular 
departure from the status quo of constitutional nationalism in Ireland to the 
arrival for mass sympathy with and participation in radical nationalism in the 
aftermath of the Rising. Towards this end, if nationalism is accepted by 
definition as a variety of social movement, then what accounts for a transformed 
collective and shared sense of injustice, identity and agency in the wake of the 
Rising?
In short ‘memories and symbols play an important role in defining the 
nature and history of the nation, and in securing the attachment of many people 
to particular nations.’30 In this way, some nations ‘reach back* to cultural myths 
and symbols which have served to maintain boundaries between ‘ethnies* that 
may come to be contemporary nations.31 Myths, in the context of ethnic groups 
and nations, serve to ‘establish and determine’ its foundations and systems of 
values, creating a set of beliefs put forward as a narrative about the group
29 Definition of radicalisation taken from McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, 162
30 Smith, 1998,180
31 Smith, 1998, 182; Armstrong, 1982, Barth, 1969
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itself.32 Those outside of the umbrella of the national myth, who neither ‘tell it* 
nor participate in its ritual practice are ‘excluded’ from the nation.33 The nation 
is a process that unifies its members, while simultaneously defining who is to be 
excluded from the community. The process of self-definition and exclusion is 
carried out through the maintenance and transfer of the nation’s myths, 
memories and symbols.34 Myths, memories and symbols constitute the form and 
content of the collectivity of the nation -  ultimately accounting for identity and 
a shared sense of injustice.
In this way, social movement theory can be seen to account for how the 
culture of larger society is imported, processed and used within the movement’s 
own system of symbols, how the subculture of a social movement in turn 
impacts upon the larger society, and how it is that the ‘cultural stock of 
movement symbols and speech’ are used to mobilise individuals within the 
social movement.35 This is to say that a national movement ‘makes 
opportunities* by framing and packaging relevant myths, memories and symbols 
of the nation, promoting a relevant ideological package emphasising the 
primacy of the nation, and creating a model by which collective action can be 
understood as well as carried out. While national myths, memories and 
symbols are chosen by elites, they must also be resonant and relevant not only 
within the context of the collective memory, but also perceived to be directly 
salient to the situation.
32 Schdpflin in Schdpflin and Hoskings (eds), 1997,17
33 Schdpflin, 1997,20
34 See Schdpflin, 1997 for a description of this process.
35 Johnston and Klandermans, in Johnston and Klandermans (eds) 1995,14
36 See Swidler, in Johnston and Klandermans, 1995
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Myths and Symbols of the Nation
Myths, memories and symbols of the nation must have meaning and 
potency or they fail to unite or excite, politically or culturally, the nation.37 The 
value of national myths, memories and symbols comes from their being 
‘founded on living traditions of the people (or segments thereof) which serve 
both to unite and to differentiate them from their neighbours.’38 They can be 
persistent and are observable phenomena within the longue-duree, but this does 
not denote an historical or factual continuity in the content of the myths, 
memories and symbols of the nation. Myths, memories and symbols are 
dynamic and constantly being re-cast or re-invoked to maintain contemporary 
pertinence and meaning. The national repertoire of myths, memories and 
symbols are therefore recast and invoked by the nation -  either as a project of 
the nationalist elites, or through a grassroots movement -  in order to address the 
needs of the collectivity of the nation. In this way nations, either in terms of 
elites, or as an expression of a grassroots movement, use certain ‘types’ of 
myths to affirm their foundation, and ensure their transference and 
maintenance. Through the application of the repertoire of myths, memories 
and symbols they are maintained to demonstrate a high degree of salience and 
potency in contemporary situations. As a function of this process, the ‘myth- 
symbol complex’ serves to unite disparate individuals to the collective 
phenomenon of the nation through the shared meanings and values attached to 
the myths, symbols and memories of the nation. This repertoire underpins what 
all members of the nation are able to collectively recognise and identify as
37 Smith, 1998,198
38 Smith, 1998,46
39 See especially Smith, 1986 and Schfipflin, 1997.
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injustices and grievances perpetrated against the individual as a member of the
40group.
Of course a symbol that exists in the national repertoire is not thought 
o f interpreted or understood by one single brain, or in one single context alone. 
There is a danger of reifying the nation, and national myths, memories and 
symbols in such a manner as to treat them as a ‘unitary empirical datum.’41 In 
this way, myths and memories of the Great Hunger in Ireland in 1848 may have 
different connotations for a member of the Irish nation living in Dublin as 
opposed to Skibbereen, as each area was affected differently and experienced 
this event in light of different internal and external contexts. Broadly speaking, 
however, and in the longue-duree, both parties, despite their geographical 
separation, would recognise the invocation or use of the myth/symbol of the 
Famine in a national context and the attached conceptions of suffering, guilt and 
injustice to their use 42 This occurs despite the variations in class, geographic 
location, age, gender etc. of individuals interpreting the national myths, 
memories and symbols and engaging in a process of contextualising the use o f 
the symbol of the Famine. An individual member of the nation recognises it as a 
mechanism which assigns meaning to these symbols. Common myths, 
memories and symbols create a ‘consistency* through communication and 
action (ritual) even when they may be conflicting.43 The myths, symbols and 
memories of the nation are individually experienced, yet communally shared.
40 White, 1989,1294
41 Klandennans, 1997, 3
42 Dnimm, 1996; See chapter four for a further discussion about die repertoire of myths, 
memories and symbols attached to the famine.
43 Schdpflin, 1997,21
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Explaining ‘R esonanceElites vs. Masses
While the existence of myths and symbols is not easily rejected, 
establishing a mechanism that accounts for the popular resonance of this 
repertoire is a difficult task. To what extent are the factors of identity, injustice 
and agency constructed? To what extent do they emerge as artefacts of the past 
engaged in a process of maintaining contemporary salience and pertinence? A 
main point of contention amongst scholars concerns the role of elites in the 
(re)discovery and/or (re)appropriation of national myths and symbols. Are elites 
instrumentally choosing national myths, memories and symbols to promote 
personal political power and economic gain, or are elites instead ‘Weberian 
switchmen,’ who provide ideology and imagery recognised and therefore 
‘chosen’ by the demanding masses?44 In some approaches the masses are 
portrayed as a tabula rasa, on to which the wills, desires and ambitions of the 
elites can be imprinted 45 In this perspective, the masses are easily coaxed and 
prodded, instrumentally manipulated to act through a series of conscious and 
orchestrated efforts on the part of a driven group of elites. An instrumentalist 
account often fails to adequately note the phenomenon of popular resonance. A 
myth, memory or symbol is resonant when it strikes a common chord in the 
nation, denoting a common or universal significance for members of the nation. 
Resonance occurs when personal experience, whether real, vicarious or 
imagined, corresponds to these myths, memories or symbols in the repertoire of 
the community, in this case the nation. The process of (re)discovery or 
(re)appropriation of an ethnic past is limited in the scope and content of their
44 See Weber as quoted in Swidler, in Johnston and Klandermans (eds), 1995, 25-6
45 See the accounts for this process in Breuilly, 1993 and Hobsbawm, 1992
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message by the confines of ethno-history, and the popular conceptions of 
history, myth, and symbols.46
‘Popular resonance’ creates a balance between the individual desires of 
elites and the needs of the masses and the nation. Popular resonance underpins 
the myths, memories and symbols of the nation as bases for a collective identity 
and the ‘authenticity’ and ‘legitimacy’ of the community.47 Popular resonance 
justifies a study of reactions to the Rising from the perspective of the nation 
rather than from the perspective of the atomised individual -  despite the 
possible shortcomings inherent in a reification of the nation, and the creation of 
an overly monolithic interpretation of events in Ireland between 1914 and 1918. 
The phenomenon of the popular resonation of various Irish national myths, 
memories and symbols represents evidence that the factors which define the 
nation as a collectivity can be causal factors in the shaping and informing of an 
individual’s views on, and interpretations of a contemporary event, and help to 
determine how to react to this event. In this way an individual’s assessment of a 
contemporary event, and the process of determining the appropriate course of 
response to this event, such as the Easter Rising, is greater than an individual 
analysis of personal cost and benefit. It will be shown in this thesis that the 
national repertoire of myths, symbols and memories are extant, resonant and 
meaningful, and they provide a basis for the emergence of common perceptions 
of the Easter Rising, ultimately constituting a cause of the emergence of radical 
violent nationalism in the wake of the Rising.
46 See especially Hutchinson’s discussion of Archaeology in Ireland for a discussion of attempts 
in the Irish case to construct new and/or ethno-nationally encompassing identities, and the way 
that such processes are often included and re-interpreted in such a way as to maintain a ‘re­
interpreted’ and re-adjusted conception of the national status-quo. (Hutchinson, 2001)
47 Hutchinson, 2001
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Collective Memory
So far this chapter has established that the nation is the collectivity at the 
core of the social movement of nationalism. It has gone on to show that social 
movements, and by extension nationalism, emerge where there is a collective 
identity that informs a shared perception of injustice. The emergence of a 
nationalist movement also depends on a collective sense of agency -  that 
something can and should be done to ensure that the nation becomes congruent 
with the state. There must be a belief that organised political action, in this case 
radical and violent, will produce social change and ultimately achieve the aims 
of the movement.48 The collectivity of the nation is defined in form and content 
by various myths, memories and symbols. These myths, memories and symbols 
are located in the processes of remembering, interaction and performance on the 
part of an individual, but they are bounded and delimited in both form and 
content by the collectivity. Myths, memories and symbols are subject to 
processes of maintenance of salience and potency, and these processes, though 
carried out by elites, must retain their popularity and meaning amongst 
individuals in the nation. In the Irish case, immediately after the Rising, it is not 
novel to assert that an Irish nation already existed, or that there was a social 
movement to gain political power for the nation -  in the form of constitutional 
nationalism. The novel aspect of this case is the way that sympathy for and 
participation in this social movement was transformed, from a support for 
moderate constitutional to radical and violent nationalism in the wake of the 
Rising. Here this process of transformation is located in the cultural trigger 
point (CTP), a moment/event or series of events that triggers a radicalisation in
48 White, 1989,1294
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identity, a sense of injustice and perceptions of agency, therefore accounting for 
a shift from moderate to radical politics and political behaviour in the popular 
sympathy for and participation in an Irish nationalist movement.
The cultural trigger point, and the process by which this radicalisation is 
triggered in the Irish nation, is located especially in the myths, memories and 
symbols that underpin the collective identity, perceptions of injustice and a 
sense of agency. In the case of the Irish nation these myths, memories and 
symbols particularly relate to the Anglo-Irish/Protestant-Catholic relationship, 
especially the dramatic events of the Famine. In the aftermath of the Rising, the 
executions of its leaders and the regime of repression triggered a response that 
likened these events to the ethnocidal events of the Famine and in the context of 
the Penal Era, etc. thereby radicalising perceptions of identity, injustice and 
agency. In this case, the Famine is focal event for the Irish nation, because other 
events, such as the Penal Era, Tone’s Rising etc. were before the Act of Union 
of 1801 and therefore while commonly known and recognised were considered 
to be from a previous era. The Famine occurred at a time when the Anglo-Irish 
relationship was supposed to have changed, and when the fire of the ‘ancient’ 
disputes over Christianity had grown to ashes in the rest of Europe. The Famine 
was the focal event, because it translated these ancient Irish fears into 
contemporary times, through suffering that was not only ingrained in national 
memory, but was also tangible through living memory. Throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, the Famine was the event which spumed Irish 
nationalists such as Parnell and Butt onwards to achieve the political ambitions 
of the Irish nation beyond the emancipatory aims O’Connell. But to understand 
how the Rising constitutes a cultural trigger point, first it must be demonstrated
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that myths, memories and symbols can be causal factors in the emergence of 
sustained collective action.
The Existence of the Social?
While it is intuitively apparent that society has an impact on the 
individual, this impact is difficulty to prove, analyse and assess in a rigorous, 
quantifiable and scientific manner. When dealing with historical case studies, it 
is impossible to carry out surveys to ascertain the emotional attachment to and 
political, social and emotional effects of the nation on the individual. 
Furthermore, debates rage in the social sciences over culture as a cause o f 
individual or collective action. While society is the collection of interactions 
amongst individuals, can a ‘collection of interactions’ serve to determine the 
action of the individual? 49 Measurement of the impact of culture is difficult and 
while it is easier to observe the impact of culture on identity, it is difficult to 
observe its impact on collectively defined individual perceptions of injustice 
and agency. The existence and use of such myths, memories and symbols of the 
nation create rational and tangible benefits for those who accept and engage in 
meaningful interactions based on them, potentially accounting for their 
resonance. Though they may provide tangible benefits for the individual locked 
in the interconnections of their society, can these myths, memories and symbols 
be understood to be the basis for an individual assessing the benefits and 
potentially fatal costs of participating in radical nationalist movement?
49 For several interesting analyses of these questions and the general state of the field see 
especially Johnston and Klandermans highly stimulating volume, 1995. This question is of 
course part of many broader debates within the social sciences, such as Weber vs. Durkheim via 
Parsons and Geertz.
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Collective Memory as Causal Factor
The literature on collective memory, especially the works of Halbwachs 
followed by later scholars, looks at how social groups remember, forget or re- 
appropriate the past.50 Collective memory can be defined as ‘those memories of 
a shared past that are retained by members of a group, class or nation ... [it] 
refers to shared memories of societal-level events especially extreme, intense 
events that have led to important institutional changes.’51 Collective memories 
are based on oral stories, rumours, gestures or cultural styles, in addition to 
literature and institutionalised practices.52 Collective memory links an 
individual’s memory of collectively significant events from the past to the 
official, delimited and defined set of narratives of this event, as defined by the 
nation. Collective memory in so far as it relates to the collective construction o f 
meaning for past events will therefore be proposed as a causal factor in the 
interpretation of contemporary events. In this way the mythic, memorial and 
symbolic repertoire of the Irish nation, including successes, failures, disasters 
and golden ages, can be understood to tangibly and demonstrably affect an 
individual’s contemporary contextualisation of the Rising in light of the 
memories of experiences such as the Famine. This means that an individual 
makes contemporarily sense of an event within the rubric of the past in the 
‘national memory.*
Through individual remembering, collective memory serves to create a 
backdrop for and perpetuate the individual’s own identity in the context of the 
community.53 However, memory, at both the collective and individual levels is
50 Paez, Basabe and Gonzalez, 1997,148
51 From Halbwachs in Paez, Basabe and Gonzalez, 1997,150
52 Paez, Basabe and Gonzalez, 1997,150
53 Halbwachs, 1992,47; Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997,18
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dynamic -  as the needs of a society change in relation to contemporary events, 
situations etc., so too do individual memories. This change in individual 
memory occurs as the individual reassesses and re-places herself in the new and 
variable historical, political and social contexts. Whatever changes take place in 
the memory do so in the context of limitations placed by the society through its 
repertoire of collective memory on an individual, and in response to changing 
personal circumstances and situations. In this process of reassessment and re­
placing ‘our imagination remains under the influence of the social milieu.’54 In 
this way, according to Halbwachs,
‘Society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought 
previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to 
complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are 
exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess.55
The question emerges, however, to what extent can one talk about an individual 
remembering in the face of the monolith of ‘society’ demanding the re-touching 
and reassessment of these memories. This is to say, does everyone in the nation 
remember an event in the exactly same manner? Halbwachs does not deny that 
there is individual memory, and that there is variation in this individual 
memory, it is simply that
‘individual memory is nevertheless a part ... of group memory since each 
impression and each fact, even if it apparently concerns a particular person 
exclusively leaves a lasting memory only to the extent that one has thought it 
over -to the extent that it is connected with the thoughts that come to us form 
the social milieu ... In this way the framework of collective memory confines and 
binds our most intimate remembrances with each other.. . ,56
Halbwachs therefore proposes a binding relationship between the collectivity 
and the individual. The collective memory of the nation is dynamic and subject
54 Halbwachs, 1992,49
55 Halbwachs, 1992, 51
56 Halbwachs, 1992,53
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to degrees of differentiation and variation due to not only individual perspective 
and context, but the needs of the collectivity, ultimately accounting for 
variations and deviations in collective memory over time. The collective 
memory serves to form the basis for a collective identity and impacts on the 
individual’s process of interpretation of contemporary events.
The Purpose o f Collective Memory
Through collective memory, society ‘represents the past to itself in
*7
order that it might modify its current conventions to suit present needs. In this 
way, collective memory serves not only to ‘nourish our thought’ but pronounces 
judgements on individuals and events, reflecting the thoughts of the society as a 
whole.58 Within this process, the collective past is construed in light of the 
present.59 Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, and to paraphrase Halbwachs, 
there is no national thought that is not an idea of an atomised individual and that 
is not at the same time composed of a series of recollections, of images or 
events or persons located in space and time and delimited and bounded in form 
and content by the nation.60 The purpose of collective memory is therefore to 
ensure that knowledge -  the content of culture as practiced in the transference of 
memory and ritual -  is transmitted across time and built upon by successive 
generations of the nation. It ensures that a nation’s experiential gains -  through 
success and suffering - can be consolidated and rendered into a single coherent 
narrative so as to anchor the moral compass of the collective, even if this anchor 
is subject to changes over the longue-duree.
57 Halbwachs, 1992,173
58 Halbwachs, 1992,175
59 Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997, 6
60 Halbwachs, 1992,179
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The nation, again to paraphrase Halbwachs, can live only if there is a 
sufficient unity of outlooks among the individuals and groups comprising it - 
therefore accounting for the phenomenon of the popular resonance of various 
national myths, memories and symbols. Social movements flourish where 
individuals believe that their fellow members in the community are 
experiencing similar cognitive processes and changes.61 In this way, the 
existence of a collective memory of the nation demonstrates that certain 
symbols, memories and myths communicate a singularly understood meaning 
and message despite their myriad atomised interpretations. When the needs of 
the nation change, or the perceived needs of the nation diverge, the collective 
memory adjusts or the nation splits. In response, those in sympathy with or 
participating in the social movement must redefine their own beliefs to make 
them congruent with organised collective political action. To this extent, 
according to Halbwachs, ‘as soon as each person ... and historical fact has 
permeated this memory, it is transposed into a teaching ... or symbol and takes 
on a meaning ... it becomes an element of the society’s system of ideas.’ For a 
society to exist, it must not only possess unity in outlook, but these memories 
and ideas must be constantly repeated and re-enacted, so that they retain their 
meaning -  accounting for a moral anchoring ensuring the salience of the content 
of collective memory for the individual and the persistence of the collective 
memory in the longue-duree, in form if not in content.64 Collective memory can 
therefore be said to offer a ‘normative view of the past that guides present-day
61 White, 1989,1281
62 White, 1989,1281
63 Halbwachs, 188,1992
64 Shils in Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997,7
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behaviours ... it allows one to defend the positive image of the ... collectivity, 
using social identity ... retrospectively.’65
Selective Memory?
Of course not all events from the past are passed on in the collective 
memory. It is retrospectively, through a process of (re)casting and 
(re)assessment, that the long-term impact of an event determines the contents of 
collective memory.66 The events that form the repertoire of the collective 
memory need not only be glorious and successful, referring to the golden age of 
a nation. Myths of disasters, tragedies and thorough and utter defeats often form 
the foundations of national myths, memories and symbols 67 There are some 
occasions too, where events and occurrences that form part of the basis of the 
nation’s collective memory are forbidden to be re-enacted or actively 
remembered, in the guise of the collective memory of silent events, or are 
actively repressed by the community’s ‘opponents.* Repression of collective 
memory can occur through the nation’s own sets of institutions and structures, 
or by the application of repression by external and opposing forces wishing to 
suppress these specific memories.68 Such ‘silent events’ can be very potent in 
the formation of collective memory, and it increases their likelihood to ‘display 
aggression and initiate fights with friends and acquaintances.’69 If the 
expression of this collective memory takes the form of protest activity
65 Igartua and Paez, 1997, 81
66 Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997, 5
67 Smith 1986; Smith, 1999
68 Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997, 10 -  in this case, the British state had tried to suppress the 
practice of Roman Catholicism from the disestablishment, and the theological and cultural 
content of this religion was repressed by various state institutions until the repeal acts of the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, the official narrative of the Famine, when combined with 
survivor’s guilt encouraged by the Cullenisation of the Catholic Church (Drumm, 1996) served 
to create a silent collective memory which manifested itself in other forms of commemoration 
and remembrance. -  see chapter four for a more detailed discussion.
69 Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997,11
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(especially peaceful protest) and this activity is repressed by the movement’s 
opponents, then it is highly likely that more protest and political violence will 
result.70
Commemorations of past events and rituals of the nation based on the 
collective memory of events, are often based on myths, memories and symbols 
of an ethnic or national disaster. Such commemorations can be based on 
‘distinctly emotional sources* within the collective memory of the nation, and 
these emotional sources emanate from experiences such as repeated periods of 
suffering, prolonged anxiety about one’s fate and the fate of one’s family, loss
*71of family, imprisonment under threat of life, and torture. The effects of these 
repressive experiences are permanent, creating unsolved problems and 
incorrigible expectancies, permanently undermining a belief in a ‘just’ or ‘safe’ 
world and potentially aiding in the cultivation of a collectively shared 
perception of injustice.72 Towards this end, public commemoration of events 
remembered in the collective memory can be thought of as forms of ‘social
TXsharing of emotions’ in which ‘emotions are shared mutually or collectively.*
In this process of sharing, the bonds of the community are strengthened and 
reinforced, contributing to seeing and experiencing national myths, memories or 
symbols over a broad spectrum and further underpinning the mutually shared 
phenomenon of national identity.74
Accounting for the Cultural Trigger Point
To summarise the argument thus far -  the nation is a modem 
phenomenon that can be rooted in the pre-modem phenomenon of the ethnie. In
70 White, 1989,1281
71 Frijda, 1997, 106
72 See the extensive discussion of Holocaust survivors in Frijda, 1997.
73 Frijda, 1997,123
74 Frijda, 1997, 123
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the process of transition from ethnie to nation, some myths, memories and 
symbols transcend the pre-modem/modem divide, and form the basis for 
collective national perceptions of history, destiny, territory and common culture 
and political self-awareness. The repertoire of national myths, memories and 
symbols associated with various stages of transformation in the nation, are 
informed by a process of elite manipulation while simultaneously subject to 
popular resonance. Where the community of the nation is struggling against 
authorities, institutions, elites and other groups (‘opponents’) to gain a level of 
political power congruent with its perceived status as a nation, most often in the 
form of a state, it may be understood that a social movement of nationalism has 
emerged. In this type of movement, the nation and its repertoire of myths, 
memories and symbols can be understood to inform a collective sense of 
identity, injustice and agency accounting for the emergence of a social 
movement, and this repertoire infused, in content and form, with the nation’s 
collective memory of past events. The context of the emergence of this 
nationalist movement matters, in so far as the participants in the nationalist 
movement find themselves in conflict with other groups, authorities and/or 
institutions, and the need emerges ‘to separate allies from foes and ... to turn 
general predispositions into specific decision structures on ideological debate;’ 
which helps to account for the polarisation of a conflict, and the emergence of a 
unified agenda or ‘voice’ within a social movement.75
While a nationalist movement is an action of the collectivity, it is 
comprised of individuals who must singularly assess whether to sympathise 
and/or participate. The interpretation of national myths, memories and symbols
75 Swidler, 1995. 35-79
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is a process affected by the remembering of past events considered socially 
relevant. Where expressions of the collective memory are repressed, or where 
senses of identity and injustice are polarised against and in conflict with an 
opponent and their agenda, there is a high likelihood of further protest and 
potential for the outbreak of political violence. In the Irish case, there was a 
nationalist movement in place throughout the 19th century, though the content 
varied in response to the context. It was therefore variously characterised by its 
engagement with issues such as Repeal, Land Reform, Feinianism etc. In the 
movement of Irish nationalism, various contenders attempted to mobilise the 
nation by making exclusive claims to political control.76 The task at hand is to 
understand why the form of Irish Nationalism that had the most appeal in the 
wake of the Rising was radical -  why, in Tilly’s words, there was ‘a rapid 
increase in the number of people accepting those [radical] claims and/or rapid 
expansion of [its] coalition.*77
The Argument
My main hypothesis is that the events of the Easter Rising, especially the 
actions and extent of repression in the British response to the Rising, led to a 
radicalisation of the Irish nationalist movement because of the way that 
individuals in the Irish nation interpreted the repressive actions on the part of 
the British authorities, institutions and opposing groups. In the wake of the 
Rising moderate constitutional nationalists failed to react in a way that was 
interpreted by members of the Irish nation as being adequate and/or appropriate 
and hence did not resonate widely in the circumstances. There was an anxiety 
that while an injustice had occurred, little had been or could be done by
76 Tilly, 1978,216-19
77 Tilly, 1978,217-19
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moderate constitutional nationalism to rectify the perceived injustices of the 
executions of its leaders and internment of its participants. The sense of 
injustice was so great, that it was deemed the culmination of a fundamental 
threat to the very basis of the Irish collective identity. In this period of crisis and 
confusion, individual interpretation of these events became directly informed by 
their engagement with the collective memory -  and the Irish collective memory 
was particularly marked by memories of repression, at the individual and 
collective levels, often in sectarian experiences and memories of proselytism at 
the hands of the Anglo-Protestant ‘other.’
The added external social pressures of the First World War, fears o f 
conscription amongst the members of the Irish nation, and an apparent Irish 
ambivalence towards the British war effort, as well as the unfinished but 
dramatic and violent sectarianism of the Home Rule question, had already 
served to heighten the fears of the Irish nation, or more accurately its sensitivity 
to any event amongst its component individual members. The events of the 
Rising, when interpreted through the Irish national collective memory, and in 
the context of these tensions, triggered a shift towards radical perceptions of 
injustice at the hands of Anglo-Protestant controlled and dominated elites, 
authorities and institutions. This radicalising shift was informed by the 
collective identity of members of the Irish nation, who in the wake of these 
events latched on to the existing and re-organised set of radical nationalist 
institutions in the guise of Sinn Fein, the IRA etc. The organisations that lie 
behind radical collective political action had been in place since Griffiths had 
created the Sinn Fein League in 1905, though his efforts were initially ignored 
as they lacked agency and popular support. It took the events of the Rising to
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trigger members of the Irish nation to personally acknowledge, sympathise with, 
and/or participate in the radical nationalist institutions, support the radical 
nationalist leaders and carry out actions under its specific, unifying rubric. The 
specific Irish taxonomy of myths, memories, and symbols was accessible and 
mobilised by a radical nationalist movement because it demonstrated already 
existing perceptions of:
1) the binary opposition of radical Irish nationalism, in its core senses of 
identity, injustice and agency, to the Anglo-Protestant opponents of the Irish 
nationalist movement and
2) what has to be proved in this thesis -  the relative strength of the popular 
resonance of the Irish national collective memory because of the Famine, and 
the manner in which all previous and subsequent ‘national’ events are broken 
down through this defining experience.
In short, the case of the Easter Rising is marked by a sense of injustice arising 
out of the executions and other policies carried out by the British in the 
aftermath of these events. This sense of injustice was stoked at regular intervals 
after the Rising, by policies of repression such interment, censorship and 
physical oppression, accounting for a sustained movement of collective political 
action in the form of radical Irish nationalism. Repression on the part of the 
Anglo-Protestant opponents of Irish nationalism had the ultimate effect of 
ensuring that Irish nationalism was galvanised in its pursuit of national freedom 
outside of the British Imperial framework, and seemingly confirmed the more 
extreme content of the national collective memory. It is therefore the moment of 
the Rising, inclusive of the repression in its aftermath, which can be said to 
cause a radicalisation in individual sympathies with, if not participation in Irish 
nationalism.
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Chapter 2:
Reactions to the Outbreak of War
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Introduction
The War brought about a massive set of transformations in Ireland, 
politically, economically and culturally. What is more was that this massive 
effect of the War affected everyone in Ireland, nationalist and unionist, radical 
or moderate of all classes and in all geographical locations. Initially, it was 
believed that the War would be over by Christmas, and therefore these dramatic 
effects were surprising and unforeseen. Contemporary experiences of War, for 
example in South Africa had not prepared Britain or Ireland, government or 
population, for this War’s devastation. Ultimately, however, even for moderate 
nationalists recruiting and conscription can to be issues analysed and broken 
down through the prism of the myth, memories and symbols that lay at the heart 
of the Irish nation.
The effects of the First World War in Ireland can be categorised into five 
broad themes: 1) recruiting into the Army, 2) conscription and its application to 
Ireland, 3) the initial enthusiasm for the War, 4) the emergence of sectarian 
division, and 5) the eventual emergence of a sense of regularity and weariness 
as to the pursuance and suffering associated with the War. This chapter will 
attempt to demonstrate the presence of these themes, and examine their effects 
on the Irish nation before the Rising. This will come to provide a basis for 
comparison to demonstrate the transformation in attitudes towards these issues 
after the Rising.
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Irishmen in the British Army
The outbreak of the War came as a great shock. While there were some 
general reports of the troubles in ‘Servia,* and regular reports about the 
overthrow of the King in Albania, there was no contemporary evidence of in- 
depth analysis of these events in newspapers which saw these events as leading 
directly or imminently to a possible war between the great powers of the time.1 
There was, however, contemporary evidence of militarization. In Ireland, there 
had been a clear ‘militarization’ of politics on the Island, with the arming of 
paramilitary groups. In Britain there had been a build up of forces, in reaction to
tfiImperial competition and events on the continent since the start of the 20 
century. As has been shown, the build up of the British Army was important 
enough to be noted in British intelligence reports, prior to the outbreak of the 
War in August 1914. These make constant references to recruiting efforts and 
the endeavours of Sinn Fein and other radical nationalists to undermine them. 
This indicated that even before the outbreak of the War, the issue of recruiting 
and enlistment was a contentious one in Ireland.
After the outbreak of the War, the reporting of events on the continent as 
well as Nationalist politics shaped attitudes amongst the Irish nation. Reporting 
of War news was severely curtailed in a policy of secrecy, which often served to 
exacerbate pre-existing anxieties.2 It had the effect of adding oxygen to the 
flame of rumour. Rumours abounded as to the location of Irish regiments, and 
as to what exactly they were up to. All such rumours were tempered with the 
belief that ‘the Irish regiments are always the first into and the last out of any of
1 See various contemporary Newspapers such as Daily Freeman, Evening Herald, Independent, 
etc.
2 Taylor, 1964
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Britain’s wars.’ This anxiety put further pressure on individuals to decide how 
to accommodate loyalty to the nation and the Empire in light of the outbreak of 
the War.
Attitudes towards the outbreak of the War were mixed. On the one 
hand, there were many reports of the dissipation of sectarian tension. There are 
many stories of the National Volunteers providing ‘emotional’ send offs for 
Protestant/Unionist recruits as well as their colleagues. The intelligence reports 
from the period make explicit references to the transformations brought about 
by the outbreak of the War; it ‘worked a revolution in the state of party feeling 
... which was shown by the turning out together of the Ulster and National 
Volunteers with bands to escort troops during the mobilisation of the Army.’4 
This particular report is not unique, as over and over again, there are references 
to the ‘strong patriotic and anti-German feeling, irrespective of creed and 
politics in giving a hearty send off to reservists and recruits.’5 This enthusiasm 
was tempered by a sense of trepidation, as there was a recognition of a sense of 
‘grimness’ in Ireland, which demonstrated ‘none of the confidence and self- 
assurance now as ... at the time of the Boer War.’6
Overall, pro-War and pro-British propaganda abounded, and there was a 
great deal of support, excitement and enthusiasm accompanied the outbreak of 
the War. There was a sense that this was something different from the Boer War 
or the ‘little Wars such as occur twice or thrice a year in India.*7 Along with the 
realisation, that this War was to be an undertaking of unknown proportions, 
there was some accompanying anxiety, ‘The Great War may “fizzle out” - it
3 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 12 Aug 1914 MS. 9260 NLI
4 Co. Inspector’s Report, 1914 CO 903/19, PRO Kew
5 Co. Inspector’s Report, 1914 CO 903/19, PRO Kew
6 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 7 August, 1914 MS. 9260 NLI
7 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 5 Aug 1914 MS. 9260 NLI
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may be Armageddon. No one knows.’8 The image of Armageddon with the 
outbreak of the War is a common one. The Daily Freeman reported that with 
the outbreak of the War ‘We are confronted by an Armageddon as the climax to 
all our boasted modem progress ...’9 It is hardly surprising that a religious 
concept, such as Armageddon, should be used to help contextualise the events 
of the War, as the constant merging of the cultural, religious and political was a 
recurrent element in the Irish nation.
The support for Britain and the British Army was strong even amongst 
those who had been ready to confront it over the Home Rule question a month 
or two previously. According to the intelligence reports of the period there was 
a strong patriotic and an anti-German sentiment.10 There are various accounts of 
spontaneous demonstrations of support for soldiers, the singing of God Save the 
King by Nationalist Volunteers, and vast crowds that were generally 
enthusiastic in their support of England, all of which were an ‘unheard of thing 
hitherto among our nationalists.’11 The calling up and reporting of reservists 
was described as being accompanied by ‘scenes of great enthusiasm’, where the 
National Volunteers accompanied the troops to railway stations and recruiting 
centres, and in the North, there was even astonishment that the Ulster 
Volunteers ‘fraternised* with reservists and the National Volunteers to give the 
men a ‘good send off.*12 In the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey stated at 
the outset of the War that things had for once and all dramatically changed in 
Ireland, and that ‘The general feeling throughout Ireland ... does not make the
8 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 5 Aug 1914 MS. 9260 NLI
9 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 3 August 1914
10 County Inspector’s Report, 1914 PRO CO 903/17 PRO Kew
11 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan* 6 Aug 1914 MS. 9260 NLI
12 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 3 August 1914
53
Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account
>13
Other reports make specific mention of the fact that prior to the outbreak 
of the War, sectarian and political tension had increased on a daily basis, but 
after the start of the War, ‘matters quieted down considerably and the political 
tension was relieved.’14 Another report on Co. Tyrone details the way the 
outbreak of War ‘worked a revolution in the state of party feeling*; a revolution 
shown by the ‘turning out together of the Ulster and National Volunteers with 
bands to escort troops during the mobilisation of the Army.’15 In Tyrone, the 
report continues that ‘amongst all people in the country the feeling against 
Germany was very strong ... party politics being eschewed for the time 
being.*16 The Irish Catholic believed the outbreak of the War had put an end to 
radical politics in Ireland and that ‘if there are any persons crazy and criminal 
enough to imagine that they could in any degree benefit Ireland by creating a 
disturbance within our shores...when the Empire is fighting for its existence we 
can only say that small show of sympathy will be extended to them if they are 
compelled to pay the penalty of their folly’.17 Interestingly, the dissipation in 
sectarian tensions may not have been as spontaneous as it appears to be -  
Orange marches and contentious demonstrations were banned during the War, 
in order that they might not affect recruiting levels in Ireland.
Though sectarian and political tensions seemed to dissipate in the face of 
the new crisis, all sources point to an anxiety still being expressed over the fete
13 Sir Edward Grey on Ireland and the European War, in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,167
14 County Inspector’s Reports, 1914 PRO CO 903/17 PRO Kew
15 County Inspector’s Reports, 1914 PRO CO 903/17 PRO Kew
16 County Inspector’s Reports, 1914 PRO CO 903/17 PRO Kew
17 The Irish Catholic, 10 October 1914
54
of Home Rule.18 The County Inspector’s reports make mention of the fact that 
while ‘party feeling died down to a considerable extent, a good deal of anxiety 
was evinced on both sides as to the fate of Home Rule’.19 Archbishop Walsh 
expressed similar anxieties to his secretary, Msgr. Curran; he felt Redmond’s 
entire pro-recruiting strategy to be indicative of the ‘Irish Parties subservience 
to the Liberals* , as opposed to a strategy predicated on gaining the full 
implementation of Home Rule for Ireland.
Recruitment
As an issue, recruitment demonstrates some of the inherent splits 
between British political institutions and Irish young men. Support for, or 
opposition to British Army recruiting in Ireland was not a matter that simply 
emerged in response to Kitchener’s drives at the beginning of the First World 
War. Indeed from the 1790*s onwards, recruitment into the British Army was a 
political and nationalist issue.21 The Boer War had seen the issue of recruitment 
come to the fore in Ireland. During this period, it had been generally the policy 
of the Irish Party to discourage recruitment, though it often raised the issue of
A A
the welfare of Irish soldiers in the Army. Of course, the Boer War had special 
significance to physical force nationalists in Ireland, as it was seen as broadly 
demonstrative of how “minority” nations throughout the Empire could mobilise 
an effective military insurrection against the impaired military juggernaut. John 
MacBride, later a major figure in the Irish Volunteers who was executed for his 
participation in the Easter Rising, had led a Brigade comprised mainly of Irish-
18 See especially County Inspector’s Reports, 1914 PRO CO 903/17 PRO Kew for reports on 
this anxiety.
19 County Inspector’s Reports, Belfast, 1914 CO 903/17, PRO Kew
20 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
21 Denman, 1994,208
22 Denman, 1994,211
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Americans against the British in South Africa.23 The Boer War was also of 
particular importance, because it saw Irish participation in armed conflict, not 
only in the British Army, but also in an Irish Brigade in support of the Boers 
fighting against the British. Indeed, some constitutional nationalists were, while 
not in explicit sympathy with their cause, broadly sympathetic to or proud of 
this Irish Brigade.24
By 1905, the shame that nationalists attached to recruitment into the 
British Army had developed into being a plank of radical nationalism in Ireland. 
For the newly formed Sinn Fein League in 1907 anti-recruitment was a full 
blown policy of radical nationalists in Ireland.25 The power that the issue of 
recruiting had for Irish nationalists was not lost on the relevant British 
authorities. In the run up to the War, activities that did not overtly support 
recruiting efforts were treated by British intelligence reports as being seditious 
and disloyal.26 During the Home Rule crisis, reports regularly mentioned 
Unionist and Protestant church leaders making statements considered to be 
‘disloyal* to the Crown. However, these reports rarely if ever mentioned 
specifics of who, where or when such statements were being made. In contrast, 
during this same period the intelligence reports of nationalists discouraging 
recruiting include specific details, such as the names and addresses of 
Nationalists and Catholic Clergy, and especially the contents of sermons or 
statements which were considered not to explicitly support recruitment, or were 
explicitly anti-recruiting in character. Such reports and concerns were not
23 Kee, 1982,2
24 Denman, 1994,214
25 Denman, 1994,225
26 See the various reports from Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) Crimes Special Branch 
(CSB) Files in NLI and various Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) Police Intelligence Reports in 
CO 903/7-24 at PRO Kew.
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without some merit. So much of the anti-recruiting and anti-Army sentiments 
prior to the War, and even after its outbreak, came from cultural nationalist 
institutions such as the GAA and Gaelic League.27 In February, 1914, well 
before the outbreak of the War Archbishop Walsh of Dublin had refused to 
bless the colours of the City of Dublin Cadets, on the grounds that the prayers 
used at this event were ‘unsuitable.’28 That this refusal could occur at this (elite) 
‘official’ level, illustrates the power, resonance and potentially polarising effects 
that the issue of recruitment possessed.
The intelligence reports regularly indicated the origin of British Army 
recruits, both in terms of religion, and ‘volunteer’ orientation. (Table 1) These 
figures allowed the Military and British Government to assess the effects of 
their recruiting efforts, and to see whether or not they were successful amongst 
Catholics and Nationalists. Even if such data was kept for innocuous purposes it 
served to consistently reify the differences that existed between Nationalists and 
Unionists, Catholics and Protestants, Irish and English. The figures kept are 
indicated below by 1915.
Table 1: Recruits into the British Army, 1915
Irish (National) 
Volunteers
Ulster Volunteers N/A TOTAL
10,794 8203 23,144 51,151
Reference: Intelligence Reports, CO 903/8 PRO, Kew.
27 Denman 1994,228
28 Letter from Walsh to Captain Cunningham, 14 February 1914 Archbishop Walsh Papers, 
384/5
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Figure 1 Recruits, by Volunteer affiliation in the British Army, 1915
National Volunteers 
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■  National Volunteers
■  Ulster Volunteers 
□  NIA
Ulster Volunteers 
19%
Source: Intelligence Reports, CO 903/8 PRO Kew
Table 2: Religious Denomination of British Army Recruits, 1915
Roman Catholics Protestants Total
31,412 19,729 51,141
Figure 2 Religious Affiliations amongst British Army Recruits, 1915
Protestants
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■  Protestants
Roman Catholics 
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majority of recruits were Catholic, the ratio o f40/60 was by no means reflective 
of the religious makeup of Ireland. In fact, from the perspective of the British 
Army the question of recruitment demonstrated the problematic nature of Irish 
participation in the War effort. The Army’s attitudes appeared to be sectarian, 
so was the response.
In feet, scepticism about recruitment emanated from Kitchener’s 
perceived snub to the National Volunteers. While the Ulster Volunteers were 
accepted en masse as an entire division in the British Army, no such honour 
befell Redmond's organisation. This snub, and the lack of any special badges 
and regalia for Irish troops serving in the British Army, the failure to establish 
an adequate Catholic Chaplaincy Corps, to exempt the Episcopal 
correspondence with Rome from being censored, and the failure to facilitate the 
awarding of Army Commissions for any Irish nationalists, did little to inspire 
confidence in Redmond’s pro-British, pro-imperial policies.29 The lack of 
priests was a significant blunder on the part of the British Army and War Office, 
and constituted what the Irish Catholic called ‘a new display of War Office 
stupidity.’30 Recruiting from moderate nationalists was also not helped by the 
simultaneous appeals made by Unionist leaders to members of the Ulster 
Volunteers and other Unionist groups on the grounds that those who would 
remain behind would ‘be strong enough and bold and courageous enough to 
keep the old flag flying ... while you are away we are not going to abate ... our 
opposition to Home Rule ... you will come back just as determined as you will 
find us at home.’31 General Richardson, an ex-Indian Army officer, commanded 
the Ulster Volunteers and urged Ulstermen to join the Army because the British
29 McBride, 1991,181; Kee, 1983,229
30 Irish Catholic, 26 September 1914; also see Leonard, 1986 and Fitzpatrick, 1998.
31 Speech cited in Kee, 1983,229
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Army had ‘come to the help of Ulster in the day of trouble, and would do so 
again,* i.e. that the Army had undertaken the Curragh Mutiny to protect the 
Ulster Unionists.32 Nor had recruitment benefited from the British Army’s 
actions at Bachelor’s Walk in the summer of 1914, an event that was heavily 
played upon in an Irish Volunteer hand bill distributed on the anniversary of its 
taking place, in July 1915.33
The prevailing popular depiction of Irish soldiers in the British 
mainstream as drunken, lazy, irrational and stupid, fits broadly into traditional 
sectarian stereotypes.34 One of the chief proponents of this stereotype was 
Rudyard Kipling, who managed to distil all of the images and fears that came 
from the British Imperial elite, not only managing to encompass the less than 
complimentary characteristics above, but also to express the fear that these 
drunken louts could not be trusted -  that they might ‘prove to be susceptible to 
Nationalist subversion.* This was despite the Army’s recognition of their 
dependence on Irish manpower regardless of religion. This dependence, 
however, did nothing to reduce the expression of sectarian tensions.
Recruiting Propaganda in Ireland
In order to overcome Nationalist reluctance to enlist, the British Army 
employed a vigorous recruiting campaign in Ireland. There were four broad 
kinds of propaganda which were used in Ireland by the British Army and its 
agents to promote recruiting, 1) exaggerated German atrocities, such as stories 
of the raping of Nuns and destruction of Catholic Churches in Belgium, 2) the 
‘spectre’ of German occupation, often relayed in Ireland as the threat of
32 Kee, 1983,229
33 Irish Volunteer Handbill, ‘The Present Crisis’ in MS 31137, NLI
34 See Denman, 2000
35 Denman, 2000,167
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Lutheran domination, 3) real German atrocities, such as the sinking of the 
Lusitania, and 4) the fears of a 1798/Wolfe Tone style rebellion.36 This last 
variety of pro-recruiting propaganda specifically referred to the atrocities 
committed by the 'Hessian* mercenaries, and raised the potential for the same 
kinds of things to occur again, despite the fact that these Hessians had been 
deployed by the Anglo-Protestant forces in Ireland, therefore making it a 
problematic theme for propaganda for obvious reasons.37
This propaganda tapped into pre-existing ideas about Irish national 
morality and bravery and these were regularly apparent in cultural outlets for 
popular expression. In early June 1914, pages of newspapers such as the Irish 
Catholic proclaimed with pride that the Irish youth had not succumbed to the 
'anti-patriotic poisons of anti-militarism* and that 'the children of a soldier race 
are as ready as they ever were of yore to risk all in defence of the constitutional 
liberties and rights of the motherland.’ Of course, while this referred to the 
establishment of the Irish National Volunteers, it served broadly to underpin the 
later themes of propaganda employed in the British recruitment drive. Such 
statements were double edged -  on the one hand they referred to the ‘bravery’ 
and patriotism of the Irish National Volunteers, on the other hand it was this 
same language that was deployed by British propaganda about Ireland being the 
‘defender of small nations’, which was deployed to attract recruits from 
Redmondite Volunteers.
From as early as 7 August, there had been reports of the heroic deaths of 
French priests, shot for ringing Church bells to warn of an impending German
36Novick, 1999,130-3
37 Novick, 1999
38 The Irish Catholic, 6 June 1914,
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invasion. This report appeared the day after the first recruiting advertisement 
appeared in the pages of The Daily Freeman’s Journal.40 Stories about corpses 
of naked, mutilated and violated girls hanging in trees were common. By the 
15th of August, some two weeks after the onset of the conflict, reports were 
already appearing describing German ‘treachery’ in Belgium with the discovery 
of German spies disguised as nuns.41 This sacred imagery was potent, 
combining the treachery of espionage with the perversion of the Catholic 
religion. Overall, German atrocities were almost always described in the pages 
of Irish papers in terms of their denigration of the Catholic Church.
These stories, officially reported in the press, sparked a variety of 
rumours amongst nationalists in the Irish nation. One diary mentions the rumour 
spreading through Dublin about a young girl, who had been brought over from 
Belgium with her hands and ears cut off, to prevent her from struggling against 
her ‘Hun* abductors, and there were many other stories of rape and murder 
circulating.42 Other headlines in the Daily Freeman, the organ of the Irish Party, 
point out the ‘Horrors of War -  German and Austrian Atrocities.’43 Such 
atrocities included ‘Old People Murdered’, the rape and mutilation of Belgian 
women and children, the especially ‘heinous’ atrocity of the raping and 
mutilation of the nuns, the firing on the Red Cross and White Flags, and, most 
powerfully a priest being shot and then interred without a coffin.44
The stories about these atrocities in foreign lands, however, were 
thought not to be enough to get young Catholic and nationalist men to enter the
39 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 7 August 1914
40 First Recruiting advertisement appeared in The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 6 August 1914
41 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 15 August 1914
42 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 8 October 1914 MS. 9260 NLI
43 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 26 August 1914
44 See descriptions from The Daily Freeman’s Journal throughout the War, though especially in 
late August -  November, 1914.
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British Army. To reinforce the cultural and political sympathy of Irish 
nationalists, beyond the constant stories of ‘Hun atrocities’ against Nuns and 
Catholic Churches, the fight for land reform was also used a recruiting tool. In 
October 1914, the Irish Catholic ran a story stating the way that the German 
Kaiser was looking for possessions in distant lands ‘in order that he may find 
homes therein for the surplus Lutheran-Socialist population of his fatherland.’45 
By some strange twist, were the Germans to gain possession of Ireland, the Irish 
Catholic asserts that:
It would be a comparatively simple thing to so alter the provisions of the tenant 
purchasers acts as to make the positions of the tenant purchasers hopeless, and 
then to evict them and transplant Lutherans .. ,46
Such propaganda or analysis served to touch upon all the fears that had
historically dogged the Catholic nation, that they would be replaced by
Protestants on their land again, this time not just Protestants, however, but
socialists as well. The idea that they would be removed from their land refers to
the way that the Catholics were removed from the land during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries by the plantations in Ulster and the English
disestablishment of the Catholic Church. The idea that the Kaiser intended to
send over settlers -  socialist and/or Lutheran settlers -  to Ireland in order to
provide them with land at the cost of driving out Irish Catholics was of course
ridiculous. Yet, at this time, an author thought such a story not only worth
recording but one consumable by an Irish reading public. Nor were these kinds
of references unique. Bishop Browne of Cloyne was quoted in the Daily
Freeman in April 1916 saying that Irishmen were fighting in the British Army
to ensure that Ireland would not be ‘made like unfortunate Belgium or Poland,
45 The Irish Catholic, 3 Oct 1914
46 The Irish Catholic, 3 Oct 1914
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the battle ground of the mighty legions of Europe.*47 Irishmen were therefore 
expected to fight off the ‘heathens’ -  and the fates of the two Catholic nations of 
Belgium and Poland, were mentioned to spur them on.
Within these headlines and descriptions, the intent of the recruiting 
propaganda was to appeal to Irish nationalism to exploit the linkage between 
religion and the myths, memories, and symbols of the Irish nation. To this end, 
German militarism was ultimately described as the ‘negation of Christianity’ by 
one priest, while another poster depicted the spirit of St. Patrick hovering over a 
burning Belgian Catholic Church, with a strap line urging an Irish ploughman to 
enlist.48 The title of this poster was ‘Isle of Saints and Scholars.’49 In fact, the 
religious quality of the Irish soldiers was used to account for the great bravery 
in the Irish soldiery; as, for example ‘there is a blend of piety and militarism 
which makes [an Irishman] an effective soldier.’50 This moral cleanliness was 
even equated to corporal cleanliness, with one advertisement for soap in an Irish 
paper claiming British Army soldiers were ‘the cleanest fighters in the world.*51 
Of course such depictions stood in direct contrast to Kipling’s portrayal of the 
Irish soldiery.
There were also some appeals to Irish nationalists that represented a 
more overt attempt to mobilise nationalist support for the War in light of 
political, rather than cultural, sensibilities. Regular references mention the 
‘nobility’ of Redmond’s pledging of the National Volunteers to the defence of 
Ireland, as it freed up the British Army to go to Belgium and France so that they
47 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 11 April 1916
48 Ellis, 2001, 12
49 Ellis, 2001, 12
50 MacDonagh, 1916 cited in Ellis, 2001,13
51 Advertisement cited in Codd, 1986,22
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might more effectively defend the rights of small nations.52 In this way, the 
argument was presented that Ireland should support the British efforts to liberate 
Belgium, because if they wanted freedom as a small nation, so too should they 
fight for the freedom of the small Catholic nation of Belgium The War was 
described at times as a ‘War of Liberation,’ with a victory for the Allies being a 
victory ‘for causes of the same nature as Ireland’s own.’53 In this way it was 
thought that working class men, left behind in Ireland and up to no good, should 
join the Army and go to the front ‘to get plenty of fighting’ because ultimately 
‘Duty obliges us to join England ... [who] had not always justice on her side, 
but in the present case she and Ireland are mutually interested in keeping the 
Germans at Bay.’54 In this view there was no alternative other than to participate 
fully and happily in the conflict on the Continent, as ‘No nation that is free or 
hopes to be free or to maintain its freedom can escape the fortunes of this 
conflict.’55 There was some sense of irony that here was a ‘small nation’ 
struggling for its own freedom, answering the call of an Imperial power, its 
larger and often oppressive neighbour. However, any concerns were broadly 
mitigated by Redmond’s strategy of Ireland proving its worthiness of Home 
Rule by supporting the Imperial War effort.
There was some contemporary recognition that these stories were often 
second, third or fourth hand, and this is admitted and noted in newspapers and 
diaries. Such stories were more than likely examples of the ‘black arts’ of 
propaganda, and despite the pro-War frenzy amongst members of the Irish 
nation, there is some evidence that these stories were recognised as such. The
52 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 11 August 1914
53 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 19 August 1914
54 Newspapers, March and August, 1915 cited in Codd, 1986,23
55 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 3 August 1914
65
heady mixture of religion, sexual violence, and treachery was a consistent point 
of reference for the pro-recruiting forces in Ireland and, whether or not 
propaganda, touched on sensitive issues in the repertoire of Irish national myths, 
memories and symbols. This meant that even though the exaggeration was 
recognised, it still stimulated a response such as “I admit that many of these 
stories were probably the exaggerations of fear -  but enough, too much remains 
solidly established. The corpses are there they cry to God and to men, too, for 
vengeance against the terrorists.”56
Redmond’s Strategy
Redmond’s commitment to this strategy went beyond simple 
encouragement, stating that he would feel ‘personally dishonoured if I did not 
say to my fellow countrymen ... that it is their duty ... to take their place in the 
firing line in this contest.*57 In this way, Redmond not only committed the 
National Volunteers to the Imperial War effort generally, but also urged them to 
serve ‘wherever the firing line extends in defence of right and freedom and 
religion in this war.’58 As part of this effort, the Central Council for the 
Organisation of Recruiting in Ireland (CCORI) had been founded by 
constitutional nationalists to show how Ireland could carry out recruiting 
methods ‘by their own methods in their own way.’59 In this way, they aided in 
recruiting drives, replete with pamphlets, posters, etc. with a distinctly Irish 
‘flavour.* These efforts of course went hand in hand with Redmond’s 
conception of recruitment in Ireland -  as a function of the nation establishing its 
trustworthiness and merit to receive Home Rule. Recruiting themes of CCORI-
56 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 25 August 1914
57 Redmond in Parliamentary Debates cited in Boyce, 2004,94
58 Redmond’s Speech in Wicklow, 20 September 1914 cited in Boyce, 2004, 95; Lyons, 1985, 
329-330
59 Ellis, 2001, 10
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based drives therefore included ideas of reconciliation, recognition and 
Christian Brotherhood which was reflected in the culmination of the granting of 
Home Rule.60
Redmond’s political gamble, that an Irish commitment to the War would 
ensure their receipt of Home Rule, meant for him that, whereas in the past 
Ireland had been ‘estranged’ from Britain, now there were ‘altered views of the 
democracy of this country towards the Irish question, and I believe that ... 
Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every 
trial and every danger that may overtake it . . .’61 As part of this project, the 
National Volunteers were ‘the great rampart of defence against any attempt to 
defeat or delay Home Rule ... ’ and were therefore physically and 
metaphorically Redmond’s lever by which to show Ireland’s worthiness for 
Home Rule. In light of the ‘new standing* and equal footing of Ireland given 
the passage of the Home Rule Act, Ireland was just as ‘morally compelled’ as 
England to respond to the plight of small nations in peril, such as Belgium.
Contemporary attitudes towards these recruiting drives must be 
understood within the context of the Home Rule question. The pages of the 
Freeman’s Journal often include small political laments, such as ‘How 
differently we should have all confronted this situation ... if we had been given 
the chance to confront this prospect as a free nation of brothers in arms.’ 
Redmond’s own statement in the House of Commons served to further reinforce 
these ideas. The statement refers to the historical estrangement of Irish 
nationalists from England and Britain, but that in the current crisis ‘Ireland will
60 Ellis, 2001,11
61 Redmond, Speech to Commons cited in Kee, 1983, 219
62 Kee, 1983,218-220
63 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 3 August 1914
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turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country, in every trial and 
every danger that may overtake it.’64
Wavering Enthusiasm
As the War progressed support became mixed. Rumours, stories and 
concerns about personal tragedies, such as the death of loved ones, all belied a 
gradual resumption of a wartime status quo. Journal entries at the time become 
more irregular, not because of the stress and pressure of war, but rather because 
the events became part of a new ‘status quo’. In part this was a function of the 
‘secrecy’ of the conduct of the War.65 The Wartime status quo was punctuated 
from time to time with personal tragedy, such as that of Moylan who describes 
the death of his cousin at the front. Such events led observers to question what 
and who the War was for and about.66 Indeed Moylan returns to the same 
images of wailing horns, remembering the day that 11,000 had left in August 
1914, but by Christmas 1915 the excitement had passed. Moylan states, ‘War 
had lost all its glamour.*67 This sense of general malaise was in part due to the 
disappointment that the War had not ended by the Christmas of 1914, and was 
now punctuated by moments of high anxiety on the home front about possible 
Zeppelin attacks.68
Perhaps because it was a major point of political contention for all types 
of Irish nationalism, the response to the recruiting drives dropped off after a 
period of official enthusiasm, and those that had been ‘left behind’ were much 
more reticent to enlist. Therefore after the dissipation of the original enthusiasm
64 Redmond’s Statement in the House of Commons, 3 August 1914 in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 
1989, 167
65 Taylor, 1964
66 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, 31 May 1915, MS. 9260 NLI
67 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 22 December 1915 MS. 9260 NLI
68 Letter from Walsh, 22 February 1916, Walsh Papers, 385/3
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for the War, the push for Irish recruitment into the Army grew more pointed. 
One observer blamed the dissipation of support for recruitment on the fact that 
Ireland was ‘so remote from battle that recruiters could not make lads believe in 
it at all’69 though as late as April 1916 there were still regular references to the 
fact ‘Catholics should fight for liberation and liberty* -  and that such a fight was 
a ‘great’ one and a unifying one.70 Yet, even amongst the National Volunteers 
there was a notable ‘decline in enthusiasm’ from when the movement had first
71started. Redmond was still pushing the fact that despite the problematic 
history between Ireland and England, ‘the passing of Home Rule was a vital fact 
that had materially altered the situation.’72 Redmond was doing everything he 
could to maintain ‘an atmosphere favourable to recruiting’ in Ireland and as part 
of this effort courted the press and relied on the leadership of the Irish Party to 
disseminate the message as the initial grassroots enthusiasm began to 
disappear.73
On the ground, in provinces, counties, regions, cities and towns, 
attitudes towards recruitment were heavily influenced by politics and parish. In 
fact, overall recruitment in Ireland was a failure, although no more so that in 
Britain and throughout the Empire.74 Attitudes towards recruiting became 
increasingly unsympathetic, though this was highly dependent on where one 
lived. For example, over 52% of the recruits into the British Army in County 
Wexford, Redmond’s home county, would come from the ranks of the National 
Volunteers, between the outbreak of the War and March 1915, and this
69 Letter of Ismena (Rhodes), 21 May 1916, MS 15415, NLI
70 Daily Freeman’s Journal, 8 April 1916
71 County Inspector’s Report, Belfast, 1915, CO 903/19 PRO Kew
72 Daily Freeman’s Journal, 10 April 1916
73 Ellis, 2001,10
74 See Boyce and O’Day, 2004; McBride, 1999; Novick, 1999; Fitzpatrick, 1998
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represented a clear sympathy with Redmond’s pleas to enlist.75 However, even 
in the pages of sympathetic papers such as the Daily Freeman, the departure of 
new recruits was described as being very ‘affecting’, and included images of 
wives and friends crying, as well as noting the devastation that the departure left 
in the leadership structure of the National Volunteers.76 While not explicitly 
anti-recruiting in its nature, this type of article shows that even recruiting was 
having a significant and sometimes depressing impact on the Irish Nation.
The Response o f the Catholic Church
Initially, the Roman Catholic Church throughout Ireland generally 
supported recruiting efforts and the British Army.77 This was not least in 
reaction to the stories of the ‘German atrocities’. By 1915 however the Roman 
Catholic Clergy, even beyond the outspoken Archbishop of Dublin, were 
generally thought to be ‘lukewarm* on recruiting and the War.78 Part of this 
transformation was due to the apparent lack of concern or urgency about the 
role of Catholic clergymen in the British Army -  an issue that not only 
concerned the institutions of the Church, but also was regularly apparent in the 
pages of newspapers. This concern was typified by not only a desire for equality 
of status in the Army as a whole, but also as part of the perception that Irish and 
Catholic soldiers would be without pastoral care in the absence of Catholic 
Priest, and preferably an Irish Catholic priest.79
The Archbishop of Dublin, William J. Walsh, who from the outset did 
not support the Irish Party, was vehemently opposed to recruiting and
75 Codd, 1986, 21
76 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 14 August 1914
77 Miller, 1987,196
78 Miller, 1987,197
79 For an in depth discussion of the issues of the Catholic Chaplaincy in the British Army, see 
Leonard, 1986
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particularly the propaganda that accompanied it. Walsh refused to allow Red- 
Cross or military recruiting drives, solicitations or posters either inside or 
outside of the churches in his Archdioceses.81 He was sceptical of British 
intentions, regarded these drives as new labels for British militarism, and openly 
and explicitly refused to engage with anything he perceived to be 
propagandists, believing that collection money for Belgian refugees and 
churches were sent to England, but the only thing gained in return were ‘great 
numbers of refugees.’82 While Walsh and the Church did, at first, support relief 
drives for the Belgian refugees, later references are peppered with references to 
England shirking her own duty to these individuals. Such statements include 
notions that if Belgian clergymen were religious then they would remain in 
Belgium, in order to provide ministry to the suffering. Indeed the persistent and 
lengthy, endless even, efforts on the part of English Bishops, British 
Government, and British Military to gain Walsh’s support and sympathy for the 
War cause, especially by utilising the Belgian situation, only seemed to harden
o<>
Walsh’s opposition to these drives and his antipathy for the War effort. In this 
context, Walsh had made clear that rather than continuing collections for the 
British upkeep of refugees, he was now ordering collections ‘for the unfortunate 
Belgians who are suffering so heavily at the present in their own devastated 
country.’84 Indeed Walsh regularly clashed with other members of the Catholic
80 For a description of Archbishop Walsh, and his place in the Catholic scene in Ireland at the 
end of the 19th century beginning of the 20th, see Miller, 1987
81 Letter from Department of Recruiting to Archbishop Walsh, Walsh Papers, 385/6 and 
Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI, and 
Walsh’s papers are replete with curt, almost rude responses to requests from Military authorities 
for his assistance in recruiting drives.; de Weil, 2003
82 Letter from Walsh to Bishop Murphy in London, 4 November 1914, Walsh’s Papers, 384/5
83 See also Walsh’s Papers, 384/5 14th February 1914 Letter from Walsh to Captain 
Cunningham on the Blessing of the Colours of the Dublin Cadets and 4th November 1914 
Walsh’s response to a letter from Bishop Murphy of London.
84 Letter from Walsh to Bishop Murphy in London, 4 November 1914, Walsh’s Papers, 384/5
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hierarchy, resisting the calls of colleagues such as Bishop Browne of Cloyne to 
publish the amounts raised by the Belgian relief fund to show those who ‘are 
opposed to us in religion or political sentiment ... the generous contribution of 
our poor people.’85 Of course such sentiments went well with Redmond’s 
strategy to prove Irish loyalty to England and Ulster.
There was definitely an element of sectarianism associated with Walsh’s 
rejection of these drives, in that the British Military elite, and the British ruling 
classes, English Protestant elites, who were behind these drives, were detached 
from the business of his Catholic Church. Walsh was particularly infuriated 
with what he perceived to be British arrogance at the use of his own, and other 
clergyman’s sermons to promote recruiting efforts. In the Spring of 1915, Walsh 
received a poster already drafted and printed intimating his belief that the 
sinking of the Lusitania was ‘That Horrible Massacre’ and encouraging young 
men to join an Irish Regiment in response. Walsh threatened to sue, and more, 
for the ‘great liberty taken’ in quoting ‘some words spoken last Sunday.’86 
Walsh’s disapproval went beyond his own efforts at dampening the recruiting 
efforts, and there are several accounts of parish priests being before the Vicars
on
General for making speeches on recruiting.
Conscription
Beyond the recruiting drives and their various attempts to use nationalist 
imagery, conscription loomed large as a symbolic concern of the Irish nation. If 
implemented, it would result from the nation’s failure to heed the calls to enlist, 
and therefore would represent a failure of Redmond’s strategy for Ireland to
85 Walsh Papers, 1914, 384/4, Statement by R. Browne, Bishop of Cloyne, 31 December 1914
86 For a full description of this exchange, see Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to 
Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI, and Walsh’s personal papers.
87 See Notes of Vicars Generals meetings in Walsh’s Papers, and Statement of Monsignor 
Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
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provide it with Home Rule. It would also emphasise Ireland’s precarious 
political position -  in so far as while Ireland had apparently gained Home Rule, 
Britain continued to override fundamental Irish sovereignty. Therefore Irish 
fears of conscription dogged Redmond from as early as October 1914.88 This 
fear was significant enough for Count Plunkett to lead the calls for the 
formation of the ‘All Ireland Public Meeting Against Conscription’ at the end of
O Q
1915. On the one hand, Redmond and the Irish Party opposed conscription 
because it was undemocratic, and on the other hand they recognised the harm 
that such a policy would inflict on the constitutional nationalist movement in 
Ireland.90 They therefore tried to sail a middle path, demonstrating their loyalty 
to Empire, and trustworthiness to induce Home Rule through encouragement for 
Kitchener’s recruiting drives, while at the same time opposing a policy of 
conscription in Ireland, to the great anger of the Unionists. Finnan points out 
that opposition to conscription was not unique to Ireland, as conscription had 
barely been passed in Canada, and resulted in great hostility in Quebec. 
Australia’s conscription referendum failed, twice, and conscription was never 
even proposed in South Africa.91
Rumours of conscription were rife, in personal and journalistic accounts 
of this period. These fears culminated with the debates on the possible extension 
of the Derby Act to Ireland, in April/May 1916. There was anxiety and 
opposition to the application of conscription to Ireland, tinged with an 
acceptance of its inevitability. One diary states ‘Personally I think conscription 
is bound to come ... I am ready to do my share if I am called ... If we are all to
88 Finnan, 2000,185
89 Letter from Plunkett to Walsh 10 December 1915, Walsh Papers: Special Papers/Political 
Papers
90 Finnan, 2000,185
91 Finnan, 2000,190
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do our bit well and good. But until then, I remain where I am.’92 This reaction 
was typical, a sense of inevitability combined with latent hostility towards the 
prospect of serving in the British Army. The radical pamphlet, The Spark, 
quoting from a sermon by Father O’Reilly in Tang, Westmeath, proposes that 
when the ‘man-stealers, the conscriptionists make their appearance just send a 
deputation of snipers, composed of your ten best shots to meet them.’93 He 
assured people that this welcoming committee would ‘put the lid on the 
conscriptionist coffin in a very brief space of time.’94 This same article makes 
reference to Britain’s claim to be the ‘Champion of Small Nationalities* in light 
of their desire to now call upon the men of Ireland to people their army.95 
Various examples of radical nationalist paraphernalia, such as handbills, 
regularly make reference to a ‘right of resistance to any scheme of compulsory 
military service under any authority except a free national government.*96
Of course not all anti-conscription measures were so radical, with Count 
Plunkett’s All Ireland Public Meeting Against Conscription being one example. 
When writing to Walsh, Plunkett requested that Walsh join with this group 
because ‘it is incumbent upon them to give public expression to the undoubtedly 
universal detestation of any such measure in Ireland.’97 When conscription was 
being debated in January of 1916, it was clear that it had become a new issue to 
fight the old sectarian battles, as ‘the Unionists are pressing conscription in the 
hope that nationalists will refuse it to the detriment of the fate of home rule,
92 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 6 May 1915 MS. 9260 NLI
93 The Spark, 14 November 1915, Vol. II No. 41
94 The Spark, 14 November 1915, Vol. II No. 41
95 The Spark, 14 November 1915, Vol. II No. 41
96 Irish Volunteer Hand Bill, ‘The Present Crisis’ in MS 31137, NLI
97 Special/Political Papers from Archbishop Walsh, letter from Plunkett to Walsh, 10 December 
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which is already in a pretty bad way.* 98 By March 1916, attitudes had not 
changed dramatically, but conscription was viewed within the confines of a 
zero-sum Nationalist/Unionist view of politics, and broken down through the 
prism of sectarianism. When conscription was not applied, the Irish Party took 
credit, while Unionists were described as rolling ‘the whites of their eyes and 
thanked the Lord that they were not as other men, that they would wish for 
nothing better than that they should be compelled to serve willy-nilly’.99 
Ultimately recruitment and conscription was not an issue of loyalty or even 
strategy to Irish nationalists, but yet another indication and symbol of sectarian 
allegiance -  denoting where one stood on the Volunteer or the Home Rule 
questions.
Conclusion
Catholic and nationalist anxiety about the role of Ireland in the Imperial 
project was manifested in the politicisation of issues such as recruitment and 
conscription even prior to the Rising. Despite some popular misgivings evident 
in the lack of response to the recruiting drives, Redmond’s support for the 
Imperial War Effort made strategic sense to the bulk of moderate nationalists. If 
the War was a short one, than the commitment of the National Volunteers to 
service in the British Army seemed a small price to pay in order to secure Home 
Rule by Christmas 1914.
However the uncomfortable nature of the Irish relationship in respect to 
the War effort showed that while initial reactions were jubilant and ‘strongly 
patriotic’, the emergence of a Wartime normality meant a fear of conscription
98 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 5 Jan 1916, MS. 9260 NLI
99 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 1 Mar 1916 MS. 9260 NLI
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and a desire to stay well away from the muddy trenches of Europe. Ultimately, 
fear of conscription was at least as strong as outrage over rumours of German 
atrocities and a desire to defend small Catholic nations, and they led to 
questions over the Anglo-Irish political relationship apparent in questions over 
the extension of the Derby Act to Ireland. Of course, the irony that recruitment 
propaganda provided, in terms of Britain’s role as ‘Defender of Small Nations’, 
was not lost on nationalists of all hues. Nor were the past actions of the British 
Army, at the Curragh and Bachelor’s Walk.
Ultimately, what this chapter bears out is a highly charged Irish nation 
which displayed excitement, support and scepticism for the War simultaneously 
and independently. Perhaps this charged nature is the most significant aspect of 
all. For while sectarian and political tensions over the question of Home Rule 
may have appeared to fade in the heady days of August 1914, these same 
sectarian tensions apparently continued to fester under the surface of Irish 
society -  directly affecting the interpretation and analysis of members of the 
Irish nation of the War, conscription and recruiting. This meant that initial 
interpretation of the events of the Rising and its aftermath would be carried out 
in the context of the myths and memories of the Anglo-Irish relationship, and 
that later radicalisation would occur more easily because of the accessibility of 
this set of political myths and memories.
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Chapter 3:
Radical Politics in Ireland prior to
Rising
11
Introduction
They think that they have pacified Ireland They think that they purchased half of 
us and intimidated the other half They think that they have foreseen everything, 
think that they have provided against everything; but the fools! the fools! the 
fools! -  they have left us our Feinian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, 
Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.
- Patrick Pearse, Rossa’s Funeral Oration.1
The above statement, made by Patrick Pearse during his funeral oration 
for O’Donovan Rossa, has been interpreted as being prophetic and indicative of 
the undercurrent of radical nationalism in Ireland that would come to burst forth 
some eight to nine months later in the Easter Rising. In this interpretation and 
hypothesis, the forces of latent radical nationalism were biding their time, 
always present though not quite manifest. Pearse’s oration has been seen as 
laying down a marker, a declaration of intentions. But what was the state of 
radical politics in Ireland on the event of the Rising? Was the Rising some sort 
of purgatory -  an all soul’s day with the spirits of physical force nationalism 
passing through the contemporary Irish world having completed their penance 
for past failures?
The following chapter will point to some of the elements of radical 
nationalist politics in the run-up to the outbreak of the First World War, and the 
Easter Rising. In order to provide a comparative basis for analysis, I will 
examine radical nationalist politics in this chapter, concentrating on its effects, 
or lack thereof on Irish society immediately before the Rising. Towards this 
end, I will initially examine Sinn Fein -  attempting to understand its ‘raison 
d’etre’ and impact. Secondly I will look at the ‘Arming of Irish politics’ through 
the establishment of first the Unionist ‘Ulster Volunteers’ and later the
1 1 August 1915 in O’Clery, 1986, 48
78
Nationalist ‘Irish Volunteers.* Both of these paramilitary organisations operated 
outside the official British political and institutional structure -  and both relied 
on an ability to generate emotion and images rather than their tactical abilities. 
The analysis of these Volunteer bodies also includes the different treatment of 
each by the British authorities. For Unionists, non-interference with the landing 
of weapons at Lame, and the support inherent in the Curragh Mutiny seemed to 
suggest toleration, if not tacit support for their anti-Home Rule project. For 
Nationalists, the fiasco of Bachelor’s Walk, with the death of protestors in the 
wake of the Irish Volunteer’s landing of arms at Howth seemed to objectify the 
difference between British treatment of each body, especially in terms of the 
attitudes of the military and police. Such events pushed Ireland to the brink of 
Civil War in 1914 -  and intensified sectarian political tensions in such a way as 
to poison pro-British/Imperial war efforts on the part of moderate/constitutional 
nationalists such as Redmond.
The Ulster Volunteers, Landing of Guns at Larne and 
Curragh Mutiny
The arming of Irish politics and drilling of Unionist and Nationalist 
Volunteer bodies added a new and explosive dimension to the Irish sectarian 
political scene. The Home Rule crisis dominated every aspect of politics in 
Ireland. It is difficult to overemphasise the scale of Unionist opposition to Home 
Rule, spilling out of Westminster and the pulpits of Churches into the Orange 
Order, Unionist Clubs, the Ulster Volunteers and ultimately the streets of 
Belfast and the rest of Ireland. Passions were running so high that the most
2 As stated in the introduction there naturally follows from the discussion of Irish nationalist 
cultural trigger points, an analysis and discussion of Unionist ones -  such that their opposition 
to Home Rule is ‘rational and reasonable* to the same extent as the Nationalists demand for i t  
This was especially the case as the Unionist community felt, and would come to feel even more
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loyal subjects of the Empire were prepared to jeer the national anthem -  a 
previously unthinkable demonstration o f ‘disloyalty.’3
The organisation of the Ulster Volunteers in early 1913 was presaged by 
a protest march of over 100,000 Ulster Protestants in April 1912, two days 
before the introduction of the 3rd Home Rule Bill.4 By early 1912 it had become 
inevitable that a new Home Rule Bill would be introduced, and there were 
clamours for an Ulster based resistance to Home Rule ‘if the quarrel were 
wickedly fixed upon them.*5 The recently appointed leader of the Tories, 
Andrew Bonar Law, called on a force ‘stronger than a parliamentary majority’ 
and such strength should include ‘no length of resistance to which Ulster can go 
that I should not be prepared to support them.*6 By late September 1912, the 
Ulster Solemn League and Covenant was signed. It tapped into a rich historical 
vein, as a Solemn League and Covenant had been signed by Scots and English 
opponents of Charles I, to preserve and advance the Reformation and ultimately 
establish Presbyterianism.7 The Solemn League and Covenant of 1912 was 
signed by the vast majority of Ulster Protestant males, some of who signed in 
their own blood, with a similar document produced for and signed by women.8 
The Covenant called for the defence of ‘our cherished position of equal 
citizenship in the United Kingdom and in using all means which may be found 
necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in 
Ireland.’9
strongly (after the Somme), that the contribution of their sons to the War effort merited a high 
degree of respect and deference from the British Army and Authorities.
3 County Inspector’s Intelligence Reports, 1914 CO 903/17 PRO Kew
4 Hepburn, 1980, 75
5 From Smith, Conservative MP, Speaking in Liverpool, O’Clery 1980, 37
6 Bonar Law, quoted in Hepburn, 1980, 75
7 Connolly, 1998, 519
8 Lee, 1989, 6
9 From the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant, in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,136
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The Ulster Unionists were aided in the formation of a Volunteer body to
oppose Home Rule by a close relationship with the British military, both active
and retired. Former Army officers assisted in the organisation and drilling of the
Ulster Volunteers. The next step was to arm the members of the Ulster
Volunteers, beyond a collection of antiquated Italian hunting rifles that had been
imported during previous introductions of Home Rule Bills, in 1886 and 1893.
Addresses by dignitaries such as Randolph Churchill and Lord Londonderry at
mass rallies throughout 1913 helped to provide an organisational boost for the
Ulster Volunteers. One account from a mass rally in late March 1913 talks of
Lord Londonderry, ‘In addition to the usual resolutions pledging resistance to
Home Rule ... the universal topic at these meetings was the Ulster Volunteer
Force which all Unionists were urged to join ... ’10 Such exhortations did not fall
on deaf ears -  by April the Ulster volunteers were 41,000 members strong.11
Even amongst radical nationalists, there was a recognition that with the
formation of the Ulster Volunteers “armed men in the North have threatened -
1 ^
and without a shot being fired there has resulted panic and disruption.” This 
recognition, certainly amongst moderate nationalists in the South, was of great 
concern. The Ulster Volunteers became a body of political leverage -  with The 
Evening Herald espousing the opinion that “Ulster is getting what she wants 
[partition and exclusion from Home Rule] simply because she has threatened to 
riot.”13
Weapons bound for the Ulster Volunteers were landed at Larne, County 
Antrim in what was hailed as a publicity coup by Unionists. In reality, the bulk
10 County Inspector’s Reports, 1913 CO 903/8 PRO Kew
11 County Inspector’s Reports, 1913 CO 903/8 PRO Kew
12 An Gaedal April 1914, No. 42
13 The Dublin Evening Herald, 18 April 1914
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of the weapons were landed at several other, more secure and less public 
locations. However, the landing of guns at Lame was carried out with an eye for 
publicity, and it was not coincidental that this event fundamentally transformed 
Irish politics and the Home Rule question.14 Even prior to the landing of guns at 
Lame, the Ulster Volunteers had shown their desire to become an armed body. 
The Dublin Metropolitan Police Special Branch, illustrating a keen awareness of 
the potential for arming the Ulster Volunteers, had already sought a legal 
opinion from the Attorney General by March 1912 on what to do if they caught 
Unionists trying to import arms. The response from the Attorney General was 
that:
The importation of the arms under a false description and in quantity so large as 
not to be explained by any legitimate purpose than in connection with speeches 
inciting rebellion may afford very strong evidence of sedition .. .15
The arms arrived in late April, 1914, almost two years to the day before 
the outbreak of the Easter Rising. 25,000 thousand rifles and three million 
rounds of ammunition were shipped from Germany. While the above statement 
likens the landing of arms to sedition, the official British stance on the arming 
of the Ulster Volunteers is difficult to pin down. At one of the landings of these 
weapons, the RIC was called in, but instead of interfering, the detachment
... beyond noting the proceedings ... took no steps to interfere with the illegal 
landing of the arms under their eyes ... they did not even warn the persons of die 
illegality of their actions or enter a protest at the threat... that any action on their 
part would meet with resistance.16
Such actions on the part of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) caused 
some consternation in Britain as well as in Ireland. When taken in combination
14 See post cards of landing of weapons at Lame and other locations, in Rees, 1998 and at 
http://www.lol.1960.50megs.com/photo.html
15 CSB Files, 3/716/24 NAI
16 County Inspector’s Intelligence Reports 1914CO 903/17 PRO Kew
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with the dedication of former military officers to the drilling and organisation of 
the Ulster Volunteers, the inaction of the RIC was perceived as indicating the 
links between the Ulster Volunteers, Unionism, and the ruling and military 
classes of the Empire. Even in the high echelons of traditionally conservative 
institutions such as the Catholic Church there was a recognition that in this 
situation “constitutional methods to achieve reform were utterly useless.”17
By the time of the gun-running at Lame, the Ulster Volunteers were 
around 85,000 members strong, so the landing of weapons in Ulster did not put 
a gun in the hands of all of its members. In fact the Ulster Volunteers were not a 
great fighting force, its tactical ability and proficiency being in many ways 
secondary. It was subject to absenteeism and at times suffered from apathy 
amongst Unionists, who tended to show up at ‘grand marches’ and to meetings
1 fion public holidays rather than to regular meetings. Indeed, intelligence 
estimates of arms in the Ulster Volunteers’ possession were only at 17,051 at 
the end of 1913, and by the beginning of April around 25,000 weapons, so less 
than 30% of the Ulster Volunteers were actually armed.19 The formation of the 
Ulster Volunteers, and the gun running at Lame rather served as Unionist 
propaganda, loudly proclaiming a broader Unionist agenda to the British 
Government and Public as well as a declaration of intent in Ireland. One caption
in the Daily Freeman refers to the Unionists having formed a unit and armed it
0(\with cameras, saying that the camera was their best weapon. Such humour at 
the expense of the ‘theatrical’ Ulster volunteers was quite common in the pages 
of the Daily Freeman. The gun running at Lame served to put the Home Rule
45 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
18 Bowman, 2001; Bowman, 1995
19County Inspector’s Reports, CO 903/19 PRO Kew
20 Daily Freeman’s Journal'x 12 March 1914.
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question at the top of the British and Irish political agendas, and heighten 
sectarian tension in Ireland. Their formation and agitation was seen and 
recognised by Irish nationalists in the context of earlier events, such as the 
signing of the covenant -  an event previously described as ‘theatrical rather than 
dramatic.’21
Rumours abounded, that the Army would be used to forcibly disarm the 
Ulster volunteers, and to shut them down. The pages of most newspapers of the 
time were full of reports of troop movements, fuelling rumours and speculation 
as to the Army’s moves and tactics.22 Regular comparisons were made between 
contemporary events and the beginning of the War in South Africa. The 
Government perceived the situation so grave as to see it as an undeclared state 
of war.24 In March 1914, 60 cavalry officers stationed at the Curragh resigned 
their commissions en masse rather than face the prospect of enforcing orders to 
disarm or quell the Ulster Volunteers. Debates raged as to the purpose of the 
movements of officers and troops at the Curragh Base -  was it a simple 
exercise, or the decisive order to disarm and quell the Unionist threat?25 Bonar 
Law made a dramatic political point in the Commons out of this confusion, 
pushing the Government to explain what had happened, and what their 
intentions had been -  the ultimate impact having been to further sectarian fears 
and tensions in Ireland.26 General Paget, the Commander-in-Chief of forces in 
Ireland, in a response to the War Office stated that any movement of troops
21 Evening Herald  ^6 March 1914
22 Daily Freeman and Evening Herald’ March 1914
23 See An Gaedal, March 1914, No. 41 as well as Redmond’s speech, 15 September 1914, on the 
passage of the Home Rule act, comparing the way that Botha and Smuts were transformed from 
‘bitter enemies’ into ‘loyal comrades and fellow citizens .. .’ from Redmond’s speech to 
Commons, in O’Clery, 1986,48
24 See Evening Herald, Sat 21 March 1914
25 Evening Herald, 21 March, 1914
26 Bonar Law as quoted in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989, 156
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would ‘precipitate a crisis’ in Ulster, such were the existing tensions.27 In fact 
officers from regiments throughout Ireland had demonstrated their sympathy 
with the officers at the Curragh. When the Army was about to be deployed, the 
Commander in Chief of Ireland gave the order that officers domiciled in Ulster 
would be permitted to disappear rather than take part in the actions that they 
found to be so distasteful.28 The result was convoluted. The War Office refused 
to accept these resignations, and it gave an undertaking that the Army would not 
be used to disarm or quell the Unionists in Ireland. This assurance was given 
without the permission or knowledge of the Prime Minister, resulting in the 
resignations of the Secretary of War and Chief of General Staff. Although this 
assurance was rescinded by Prime Minister Asquith, the Army was rendered 
useless in terms of operations in Ulster, and its loyalty and intentions had been 
called into doubt. The event was reported as demonstrating a struggle which in 
reality was between ‘Tory Officers and the Liberal House of Commons.”29 The 
Ulster Volunteers had achieved its objective, and Unionists could now 
apparently act as they wished in Ireland with little concern for any ramifications 
in the broader British political context. By May 1914, not only had the ranks of 
the Ulster Volunteers swelled, as well as the members of Unionist clubs, but the 
situation was described in the intelligence reports as being a ‘very grave’ one,
-1 A
on account of organised and developed Unionist opposition to Home Rule.
The pages of the Irish Catholic in early May of 1914 reveal the fact that 
the Ulster Volunteers were receiving weapons from Germany, and their purpose 
was of clear importance and concern. These events, ‘fully warranted] grave
27 Paget, 14 March 1914, in O’Clery 1986,44-5
28 Connolly, 1998,130
29 See The Evening Herald 25 March, 1914
30 County Inspector’s Reports 1914 CO 903/8, PRO Kew
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suspicions as to sinister possibilities in the future.’31 The historical parallels o f  
the landing o f arms were not lost either, as there are clear and repeated 
references to the landing o f arms prior to the Rising o f 1798.32 Even amongst 
the intelligence reports o f  the period, there is a recognition that the Home Rule 
question ‘being to a large extent a religious one aroused a very bitter sectarian 
feeling’ -  such feelings were heightened and made manifest by the close 
relationship between the Ulster Volunteers and the Orange Order.33 In this way 
then, the formation and arming o f  the Ulster Volunteers not only heightened 
distrust o f  British authority, with the inaction o f the RIC, the participation o f ex­
military officers in the Ulster Volunteers, and the Curragh mutiny, but it also 
heightened and highlighted pre-existing sectarian tensions.
Figure 3. Ulster Volunteer Members in Ireland, Jan 1913 - Feb 1915
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31 Irish Catholic, 2 May 1914
32 See Irish Catholic, Evening Herald, Freeman’s Journal etc. from March 1914.
33 County Inspector’s Reports CO 903/8 PRO Kew
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The graph above demonstrates the meteoric rise of the Ulster Volunteers, from 
non-existent in 1912, to their height of almost 85,000 members immediately 
prior to the outbreak of the First World War. The fall in its numbers, by the 
Spring of 1915 is indicative of its members heeding Kitchener’s call to enlist in 
the British Army. Before the events of the War overshadowed events in Ireland 
politicians throughout Britain and Ireland were alarmed at events in Ulster.
The formation of the Ulster Volunteers had three main effects on the 
Irish political scene. The first is that their very formation indicated the extent to 
which Unionists rejected Home Rule, and the lengths that they would go to fight 
against any kind of Home Rule solution. The second is that the Ulster 
Volunteers were ultimately an effective tool of political propaganda rather than 
an effective (para)military organisation. This is not to take away from the great 
effect that this propaganda had, or from the well organised nature and huge 
resonance of the Ulster Volunteers. Thirdly, the events of the Curragh, and the 
questions hanging over the Army’s willingness to actually confront the Ulster 
Volunteers, the inaction of the RIC at Lame, the assistance of retired military 
offices in drilling the Ulster Volunteers, and the broad support of the Tory 
Party, demonstrated the close relationship between the British authorities, Tory 
Party and Unionists. The perception of these strong ties created fear amongst 
Irish nationalists of all shades, as well as within the Liberal Government, who 
were unable to estimate accurately the strength of this relationship and the 
lengths to which the Unionists might actually go to prevent Home Rule. In this 
way, Carson’s claim that Ulster had a ‘strong right arm’ rings true -  as Ulster 
Protestants, in so far as they desired exclusion from any Home Rule settlement,
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looked fearsome and threatened to ‘regardless of the consequences go on ... to 
the end with their policy of resistance.’34 Overall, the formation of the Ulster 
Volunteers would have big and tangible effects on the Irish political scene prior 
to the Rising, and played into perceptions and fears about what would actually 
transpire after the War with the implementation of the Home Rule Bill. This 
means that the formation of this paramilitary body was a feet that would have 
coloured and contextualised the events of the Rising and their interpretation.
Sinn Fein and Radical Nationalism
Sinn Fein was the radical nationalist party established by Arthur Griffith 
and Bulmer Hobson in November 1905 as an umbrella organisation for radical 
political groups and individuals who fell outside traditional political parties and 
organisations in Ireland. Its stated purpose was to achieve ‘National Self- 
Determination through the recognition o f ... the rights of citizenship ... and not 
looking outside of Ireland for the accomplishment of their aims.* By design 
and coincidence, Sinn Fein was a party that served as an umbrella for those who 
felt that the Irish Party was not radical enough, and others who did not fit into 
the ‘politics as usual’ of Ireland -  i.e. feminists, pacifists, and vegetarians.
Sinn Fein took in and amalgamated disparate radical nationalist 
organisations, such as the Dungannon Clubs.36 These were clubs formed by 
Bulmer Hobson in 1905 to promote ‘advanced’ or radical nationalism, and were 
particularly involved in campaigns against recruiting into the British Army.
34 Carson, February 1914 in Hepburn, 1980,82
35 ‘Invitation to join Sinn Fein’, in O’Day and Stevenson, 1992,143
36 Connolly, 1998,513
37 Connolly, 1998, 165 Their name referred back to the ‘Dungannon Conventions’ a series of 
public gatherings in the late 18th century where ‘Volunteers’ from Ulster sought a series of 
reforms in to secure Catholic rights and the primacy of the Irish Parliament’s legislative 
authority.
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The emergence of Sinn Fein mirrors the fate of contemporary radical 
nationalism in Ireland, especially in the wake of the double failure of Home 
Rule, in 1886 and 1893. Whereas Parnell, as leader of the Irish Party had been 
able to unite the disparate forms of Irish nationalism, Redmond was unable to 
unite radical and moderate nationalists under a single intuitional structure. The 
failure of this ‘Redmondite-Feinian* nexus meant that by as early as 1900 splits 
in Irish nationalism were becoming deeper and more explicit.38 Radical 
Nationalists were increasingly being forced to ‘go it alone* -  not unlike their 
moniker of 1905 -  ‘Sinn Fein.’39 Prior to this split, though these factions of Irish 
nationalism may have differed in their objectives and methods, there was a 
degree of solidarity in their efforts to achieve a devolved Ireland. The collapse 
of the ‘nexus* could be seen as resulting in the emergence of a younger, more 
vehement, aggressive and more independent strain of radical nationalism.40
Sinn Fein was distinct from their moderate counterparts in the promotion 
of an ‘Irish-Ireland* platform. Cultural nationalists, political nationalists, radical 
nationalists, amongst others made up the radical fringe of Irish politics, and it 
was this radical fringe that fell under the umbrella of Sinn Fein. Some scholars 
have attempted to differentiate the constitutional politics of the IP and the 
radicalism of Sinn Fein, by assigning Sinn Fein a cultural/romantic nationalist 
ideology and purpose as distinct from the Irish Party’s constitutional/moderate 
and/or pragmatic approach. However, two things become clear about Sinn Fein 
-  at first it had no singular policy ambition (other than an ‘Irish-Ireland’) and its 
approach was opportunistic. By 1906, John Dillon, deputy leader of the Irish
38 See Fitzpatrick, 1998; Garvin, 1987; Kelly, 2002
39 In this way Sinn Fein, variously translated as ‘Us/We Ourselves’ had a double meaning -  on 
the one hand denoting radical nationalist aspirations of a split with the United Kingdom, but 
also as a separate entity in the pursuit of nationalist politics in Ireland.
40 Kelly, 2002
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Party amongst others was well aware of Sinn Fein’s ability to make political 
headway at the expense of the Irish Party.41
Arthur Griffith was considered the founder and leading member of Sinn 
Fein, and he was the intellectual engine behind the party, giving voice and shape 
through his journalism to ideals such as the support of a dual monarchy of 
equals, between Britain and Ireland, and the promotion of an economically and 
industrially independent Ireland to foster this equality. A policy of passive 
resistance was to be deployed to bring about the conditions under which the 
‘sovereign independence of Ireland’ could be regained.42 This policy included 
abstention from Westminster of Irish MPs, the rejection of British institutions, 
such as the courts, on the part of the people, and in both cases the establishment 
of Irish alternatives. In order to foster his nationalist agenda, Griffith not only 
used his position as a journalist, but understood that the creation of Sinn Fein 
meant its emerging as an umbrella organisation under which ‘the disparate 
forms of advanced nationalism* could be amalgamated 43
Sinn Fein found especially fertile ground amongst those who rejected 
the Irish and Liberal Party’s propositions of a ‘step by step’ approach to the 
Home Rule Question.44 This was what made it radical. This step by step 
approach was reliant on piecemeal legislation on issues such as the land 
question, a labourers’ housing act, the repeal of coercion, changes to the 
personnel and attitudes on the Land Commission, action to aid evicted tenants, 
and financial and official promotion of the Irish language in education.45 Sinn 
Fein promoted and was active on a variety of agrarian and cultural issues,
41 Dillon in O’Day, 1998, p. 211
42 6 ’Duibhir, 1993, 15
43 Jackson, 1998, 185
44 O’Day, 1998, 209
45 O’Day, 1998, 207
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allowing it, as a small, fringe political body, to develop its own political niche. 
This niche broadly consisted of opportunistically attacking Redmond and the 
Irish Party on different fronts at different times. The issues surrounding the 
University question, the Land Commission, appointments to Dublin Castle, 
evicted tenants, and the scuppering of the Local Government Act provided Sinn 
Fein with political ammunition.46 It was recognised by contemporaries that Sinn 
Fein, as this amalgamated party of radical politics, was unified in its political 
views or opinions. Key players, such as Griffith, promoted and supported 
disparate social issues such as feminism and suffragism, for example, as long as 
they did not affect the one element that bound Sinn Fein together -  an ‘Irish- 
Ireland’ a brand of Irish radical nationalist politics 47 For other activists, such as 
Countess Markievicz, there was no difference between the social issues of 
suffragism and national freedom -  with the first step towards national freedom 
being ‘to realise ourselves as Irishwomen -  not just as Irish or merely as women 
but as Irishwomen, doubly enslaved with a double battle to fight.’48 One 
observation states that:
... the term Sinn Fein denoted every shade of Nationalism, from innocent 
enthusiasts for Gaelic literature and Gaelic sports at one end to red-hot Feinians 
at the other; so that to call a man a Sinn Feiner established nothing about him, 
until one knew to which section of Sinn Fein he belonged.. .49
In this way, there was a sense of confusion as to what Sinn Fein really stood for,
and whose voice and vision were really driving the party.
In part, the confusion over what Sinn Fein ‘stood for’ was due to its
opportunism -  it stood for what the Irish Party could not or would not. In part,
this stemmed from a sense of hopelessness and disappointment with the Liberal
46 See O’Day, 1998, Chapters 2,4, and 9 for a discussion of the political issues of this period.
47 Jackson, 1998, 188; For an elaboration on the rejection of the ‘step-by-step’ approach see 
Monney’s speech in Lyons, 1985,249
48 de Markievicz in O’Clery, 1986,35
49 Norway, 1999,92
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Party to produce meaningful reform and/or Home Rule and the Irish Party’s 
inability to push the Liberals along in this direction. When Dolan ran as the Sinn 
Fein candidate in a 1908 by-election (their only electoral campaign until 1917), 
he specifically states that his lingering belief in the Liberals was now ‘smashed’ 
and that continued attendance at Westminster meant ‘deceiving constituents and 
betraying the cause of Irish nationalism.*50 Furthermore Sinn Fein and other 
opponents of the Irish Party political machine regularly, and opportunistically 
attacked the close relationship between the Irish Party and the British 
Authorities, and especially the relationship between its leader John Redmond 
and the Irish Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell, in light of Irish Party patronage 
and appointment to jobs in Dublin Castle.51 Of course their antagonism towards 
the Castle, and Dolan’s assertion that participation in ‘politics as usual* meant 
the betrayal of his constituents dovetailed with Sinn Fein’s policy of abstention. 
This was an opportunistic method by which to politically outflank the Irish 
Party’s nationalist credentials. Abstentionism, non-participation in the British 
institutional rule of Ireland, would become a key plank of radical nationalism, 
leading to the ultimate establishment of the Dail Eireann in 1918.
Radical nationalists in Ireland were a tiny minority in Ireland. Despite 
the fomentation and growth of the radical niche, and the disparate political 
organisation of Sinn Fein, the Irish Party retained its ‘hegemonic role within the 
nationalist tradition.’52 Yet their small size did not make them complete 
unknowns. They were a familiar political body and often a familiar focus of
50 Dolan’s 1908 By-election Address, from Sinn Fein 22 February, 1908 in Mitchell and 6  
Snodiagh, 1989, 125; This kind of support for abstentionism becomes common currency after 
the rising, in particular during Sinn Fein’s by-election victories in 1917, see chapter 9.
51 McBride, 1991,148
52 Jackson, 1998,186
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political enmity.53 The existence of this radical political fringe, though skulking 
in the shadows and manoeuvring behind the scenes, was by no means hidden 
from public view. Characters such as Griffith, Pearse, Yeats, Francis Sheehy- 
Skeffington were all familiar characters on the Dublin scene, and all were 
involved to varying degrees and at different times with the radical nationalism 
of Sinn Fein. They met at various reading groups and lecturing societies, 
imbibing intellectual ideals and nationalist myths on a regular basis with the rest 
of Dublin ‘society.’
The relationship between Sinn Fein and the cultural nationalist 
movements such as the Gaelic League, or the Gaelic Athletic Association, is 
apparent if opaque and complex. They are linked not only by shared institutions 
and common individuals, but also symbolically in an ‘Irish-Ireland’/Gaelic 
Revival platform.54 Intelligence reports from the period recognise the 
relationships and links between Sinn Fein and these organisations -  especially 
as these nationalist bodies and their policies would affect recruiting into the 
British Army during the War.55 For an individual such as Griffith, who was not 
particularly gifted in the Irish language, and Pearse, who was fluent in the Irish 
language, the Gaelic League and organisations like the GAA fulfilled one main 
purpose in their radical nationalist agenda. They were a stepping-stone to the 
next level of radical nationalism. At times these organisations could serve as 
channels, funnelling members and sympathisers from one to the other and back 
again.56 However the extent to which these organisations were explicitly
53 See various reports in Newspapers such The Daily Freeman, The Irish Catholic, Irish Times, 
1912-1916.
54 See chapter 4 on Pre-Rising Cultural and Religious Nationalism, as well as Hutchinson, 1987.
55 See County Inspector’s Reports 1914, CO 903/8 and CO 903/17 PRO Kew
36 For more on this see Fitzpatrick, 1998 and Garvin, 1987 amongst others, and for the interplay 
between cultural and political nationalism see especially Hutchinson, 1987
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channelling individuals towards radical nationalism is unclear. Individuals such 
as Douglas Hyde, founder of the Gaelic League resigned as head of this 
organisation rather than allow the cultural nationalist movement to become too 
radical and/or political.57
With the outbreak of the War, Dublin Castle and the British Military 
expressed concern over the possible actions of this radical fringe, a condition 
further exacerbated by the split in the Volunteers. So too do diary entries and 
newspapers, the Irish Catholic proclaiming shortly after the outbreak of the War 
in early October 1914 that:
If there be any persons crazy and criminal enough to imagine that they could in 
any degree benefit Ireland by creating a disturbance within our shores at a 
moment when the Empire is fighting for its existence, we can only say that small 
show of sympathy will be extended to them if they are compelled to pay the 
penalty of their folly.58
From such comments, it is apparent that radical nationalism was identified as a 
potential liability. This liability was not only pertinent because of the 
heightened tensions of the War, but also more broadly fit into concerns over the 
Home Rule question. Correspondence between Dillon and Sir Matthew Nathan, 
Irish Under-Secretary, demonstrates the variety of opinions on the Sinn Fein 
movement. Dillon asserted that as long as the British Government did not 
acknowledge and act on the Irish Party’s and moderate nationalists’ suggestions 
for recruiting, he did not believe that ‘Sinn Feiners and Pro-Germans are 
making any headway in Ireland.’59 Nathan responded however by pointing out 
his belief that Sinn Fein leaders were active and recruiting new members -  that 
the strength of the ‘hatred party* may have been underestimated.60
57 Connolly, 1998,253
58 The Irish Catholic, 5 October 1914
59 Dillon as quoted in Hepburn, 1980, 89
60 Nathan as quoted in Hepburn, 1980,90
94
The bulk of Irish opinion was concerned that these ‘crazy and criminal’ 
characters would jeopardise the political victory of Home Rule, with or without 
the exclusion of Ulster, which Redmond believed to be, and asserted, was 
dependent on Irish loyalty to the Imperial effort. A failure of Home Rule 
because of some form o f ‘dis-loyalty’ would have had serious consequences. On 
the one hand it would lead to the political ruin of Redmond whose entire 
personal political career depended on its enactment. It also would have also 
meant ruin for his Party -  and perhaps even more symbolically potent, it would 
have meant the failure of Parnell’s dream. The fear of radical nationalism was 
not only based on personal political concerns, but also a sense that what the 
British authorities had given could always be rescinded. Between personal and 
political benefit and goals, and a real concern about the future of the Home Rule 
question, Redmond pledged the Irish Volunteers for the defence of Ireland, and 
made personal efforts on the part of the British recruiting drive after the 
outbreak of war.61 This support for the War gave Sinn Fein an opportunity to 
attack and meaningfully distinguish itself from the Irish Party, and especially 
the political ambitions of Redmond. It would also make them a more attractive 
choice when fears of conscription and dissatisfaction over the War began to 
creep into Irish politics.62 Participation, perhaps even sacrifice, it was hoped, 
would earn Ireland Home Rule. Redmond couched this new challenge as a ‘test 
of men’s souls’ -  as a war for the defence of the ‘sacred rights and liberty of 
small nations’ -  and as a war that would bring about the union of Irishmen of
61 See chapter 2
62 See chapter 2 for a description and analysis of issues concerning recruiting and the 
conscription crisis in Ireland.
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different backgrounds on the battlefield and that would ‘lead to a Union in their 
home so that their blood* may bring all Ireland together in one nation.’
Despite the fears and concerns of moderate nationalists over potential 
jeopardy to Home Rule, radical nationalists agitated against the Home Rule Bill, 
because of the proposed exclusion of Ulster. As the War progressed, Sinn Fein 
became more visible, both through their anti-recruiting efforts, and more 
broadly in terms of their ultimate political representation in the spectrum of 
nationalist politics in Ireland. As part of their political opposition, this anti­
recruiting campaign was phrased in such a manner as to discuss where 
‘Ireland’s Quarrel’ really lay -  with Germany or Britain. In this way, Sinn Fein, 
as Irish nationalists, had only one duty ‘to strive for Ireland’s interest, 
irrespective of the interests of England or Germany or any other foreign 
country.64 The Irish Volunteers represented the only cohesive group remaining 
after both the Ulster and National Volunteers were decimated by recruiting. On 
important issues of the day, such as the potential extension of the Derby Act to 
implement conscription in Ireland, Sinn Fein regularly claimed that their 
agitation prevented its extension. Diaries at the time make light of this stating:
Of course the Sinn Feiners say they frightened Redmond into opposing the 
application of the Derby act to Ireland. This section of our unhappy Island are 
praying for Germany to lick England; at the same time they hold that if Ireland is 
lost England smashes up automatically, and they therefore count on England 
hanging onto this isle and fighting for it like grim death ... one of the S.F.’s told 
me the other night that it would be a great thing for Ireland if the Germans had 
this country. There would be more work, more industry, and more prosperity ... 
we are a lazy bragging mean-spirited lot when it comes to doing anything real for 
our country.65
63 Redmond’s Manifesto on the War, in The Freeman’s Journal, 17 September 1914, in 
Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,171
64 ‘Sinn Fein Opposes the War’ in Sinn Fein, 8 August 1914, in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,
p. 168
‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, 1 March 1916, MS. 9620 NLI
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This statement demonstrates the way that Sinn Fein’s claims were not broadly 
recognised as reflecting reality, and the way that Sinn Fein and radical 
nationalists, were not equated with ‘doing anything real for our country.’ Sinn 
Fein were not a practical political alternative to the Irish Party, or to the 
Unionist/British grip on Ireland. Sinn Fein’s message, aims and objectives were 
unpalatable and unpopular during the initial rush of Imperial enthusiasm that 
accompanied the onset of war, but this fringe began to look not quite as 
unappealing, or even quite so radical immediately prior to the Rising. Their 
political opportunism and pursuit of a radical ‘Irish-Ireland’ form of nationalism 
began to pay off when the alternatives became less attractive. Once the initial 
rush of support for ‘John Bull’ and the British War effort had worn off, 
especially in light of high taxation, commercial restrictions, recruitment and the 
looming threat of conscription, the mainstream political outlook of the Irish 
nation moved towards the general direction of the radical fringe. From the 
radical nationalist perspective, this meant continuing to bear the Imperial yoke 
for not much benefit -  Home Rule with the exclusion of Ulster and a clear 
Imperial sectarian bias that showed no real possibility for abatement. In the 
binary opposition over these issues, it meant that ultimately there could only be 
one political victor -  though which party and strand of nationalism this would 
be was not apparent until the by-elections of 1917-18 and Sinn Fein’s electoral 
victory in the general election of 1918.
Ultimately attitudes towards Sinn Fein were typified by a lack of 
popularity evident in the absence of explicit references in the contemporary 
sources to the radical nationalist movement. Sinn Fein as a party was not taken 
seriously, especially after its defeat in the 1908 elections. Redmond’s success in
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the reintroduction of the Home Rule Bill, as well as in securing its passage on 
the eve of the War, helped to marginalise radical nationalists despite its delivery 
being marred by exclusion. The outbreak of the War ‘distracted* attention away 
from radical nationalist politics and more generally the Sinn Fein agenda. Given 
then, all of the mundane traumas in the build up to the Rising, the looming 
threat of conscription, telegraphs informing families of death after death of their 
sons, brothers, fathers etc., the passage but non-enactment of Home Rule with 
the looming potential exclusion of Ulster and the return to an unappealing pre­
war status quo, two key aspects of Sinn Fein and radical nationalism seem to 
stand out. Firstly in any official political capacity, the impact of this radical 
fringe was more or less minimal, their organisation more ineffectual than 
efficient. There is a clear danger of retrospectively assigning more causal power 
to pre-Rising radical politics in Ireland, in the guise of Sinn Fein, than this 
movement, and this party, actually possessed. Secondly, it was these same 
mundane traumas that engendered a shift towards radicalism in the Irish nation 
as a whole. The initial inertia that prevented a political shift towards radicalism 
had already been overcome during the Home Rule Crisis when, momentarily, it 
appeared as though Civil War in Ireland was not only a possibility but was 
likely. The outbreak of War sapped the momentum behind this shift ensuring 
that mainstream Irish nationalism was firmly anchored to a moderate position.
The Irish National Volunteers and the Landing o f Guns at 
Howth
In November 1913, the Irish National Volunteers were formed in Dublin 
at the behest of Eoin MacNeill. Their purpose was ostensibly to support Home 
Rule in the free of the armed opposition of the Ulster Volunteers. Between the 
threat of partition and fears over the Curragh Mutiny, the ranks of the Irish
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Volunteers had swelled to an excess of 150,000 by June 1914.66 Through late 
1913, Pearse had been calling for the arming of nationalists stating that ‘an 
Orangemen with a rifle is a much less ridiculous figure than a nationalist 
without a rifle* and that ‘a citizen without arms is like a priest without 
religion.’67 The manifesto of the Irish Volunteers called for their formation 
because ‘the menace of armed violence (is) the determining factor in the future
/■ o
relations between this country and Great Britain.’ The ultimate goal of the 
Irish Volunteers was to ‘secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to 
all the people of Ireland.’69 The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) was 
heavily involved in the initial formation of the Irish Volunteers, not just among 
the rank and file of the Irish Volunteers, but especially in its leadership. The 
infiltration of radical nationalists into the Irish Volunteers, individuals who 
supported the physical force tradition of Irish nationalism, made it difficult for 
Redmond and the Irish Party to initially lend support to the Irish Volunteers at 
their inception. This was especially the case because Redmond’s forerunners in 
constitutional nationalism had been so vehemently opposed to the use of 
violence to gain Home Rule, let alone any other nationalist objectives. The 
presence of this radical element was observed by the intelligence gatherers in 
Ireland from the outset, with the realisation that:
From the inception of the movement at the meeting in the Rotunda, the
Volunteer Organisation was under the control of a self-elected Provisional
Committee, the members of which, with few exceptions, belonged to leagues and
Associations of an Anti-British character. The majority of the members of the
Provisional Committee were hostile to the Irish Parliamentary Party, and lest
their influence in the country might be detrimental to national interests, Mr. John
Redmond, MP, in June 1914, addressed a letter to the Public Press, demanding a
70reconstitution of the Committee on representative lines ...
66 Lee, 1989,20
67 Pearse, November and December 1913 in Irish Freedom, in O’Clery, 1986, 42-3
68 From Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,148
69 From Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,149
70 County Inspector’s Reportsl914 CO 903/17, PRO Kew
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There is clearly some sort of dialectical relationship between the Ulster 
and Irish Volunteer movements but the extent to which it is causal is debatable. 
The sectarian climate of the time served to heighten pre-existing tensions. 
McNeill, often credited with coming up with the idea of the Irish Volunteers, 
did not see their formation as related to the Ulster Volunteers. McNeill was 
viewed as someone who, though committed radical nationalist ‘deplored the 
foolish speeches of hot headed extremists’ and as a result was not viewed as a 
firebrand in terms of the encouragement of others to rebel.71 McNeill’s vision 
was one in which the Irish National Volunteers would come together with the 
Ulster Volunteers and the Irish Citizens Army to form one unified Irish force, 
after the enactment of a Home Rule settlement.72 Yet the sense on the ground 
was that it was being armed and trained to fight Ulster.73 It is reported in 1914 
that ‘the feeling against Home Rule, and the determination to resist it were 
increasing [amongst Unionists] while on the other hand the Irish National 
Volunteers ... were alarmed at the attitude of the Unionists and were pushing on 
their movement so as to be able to resist any aggression.’74 In this way the Irish 
National Volunteers, like Irish nationalism as a whole, was subject to multiple 
pulls and pressures. On the one hand it had to be an organisation to counter a 
Unionist threat, on the other there was pressure to be seen as an aggressive 
organisation prepared to strike a counter-blow against the Ulster Volunteers to 
enact Home Rule. As opposed to the clear role of the Ulster Volunteers, the 
confused emergence of the Irish Volunteers and their muddled purpose, made it
71 Statement on Character of McNeill by Archbishop in Walsh Papers: Special Papers/Political 
Papers
72 Letter from Eoin Mac Neill to Mrs. Augustine Henry 29 Nov 1913 in MS. 7981 NLI
73 Carson, February 1914, in Hepburn, 1980, 82
74 County Inspector’s Reports, 1914 CO 903/17, PRO Kew
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appear as an also-ran organisation to Westminster politicians, and it was not 
structurally an equal counter balance to the Unionist threat.
Other examples of this perceived relationship between the organisations 
is evident in the constant descriptions of the Irish National Volunteers as 
following the example of the Ulster Volunteers in arming and drilling. Initial 
reactions, for example, on the part of the Archbishop Dublin were not 
particularly supportive of the formation of the Irish National Volunteers. 
However, according to his personal secretary, the Archbishop recognised that 
there was substantial justification for the formation of the Irish National 
Volunteers since the arming of the Ulster Volunteers had ‘frightened and 
coerced* the ‘weak* English Government.75 His opinion of the Irish National 
Volunteers, therefore, fluctuated from time to time, but he never believed that 
the movement would amount to much or succeed in its objectives.76 Both 
organisations were ultimately reactionary, mirroring each other in their fear and 
concern over the Home Rule question, and fundamentally opposed in their 
ambitions and actions. Regardless of each organisation’s abilities, tactical or 
propagandistic, it is evident that the existence of these armed paramilitary 
organisations had considerably heightened tensions in Ireland at this time, 
permanently and fundamentally changing the Home Rule crisis.
The inclusion of members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in 
the Irish National Volunteers, whom Redmond considered to be dangerous 
Feinians, some of whom had supported or participated in violent uprisings in the 
past, made it difficult for him to give his political blessing to this body, and 
therefore their popular appeal was initially checked despite heightened sectarian
75 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
76 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
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fears of the Ulster Volunteers. British intelligence reports make it quite clear 
that they perceived this radical nationalist element to be represented at the 
inception of the Irish National Volunteers, not only by members of anti-British 
associations such as the IRB, but also the GAA, the Gaelic League, and the Irish 
Transport and General Workers Union. In contrast, the intelligence reports note 
the absence of official representatives of less radical, or indeed constitutional 
nationalists, in the guise of representatives of the United Irish League or even 
the Ancient Order of Hibernians.77 There was, in general, a concern about the 
direction and leadership of the organisation, with the realisation that without 
moderation ‘the movement may lead to great trouble in the future.’78 In fact, it 
was then the main concern that ‘country people’ were being encouraged to think 
that they were being armed and trained to fight Ulster.79
In the pages of the Irish Catholic in June of 1914 there were expressions 
of support from eminent members of the Catholic Church such as the 
Archbishop of Tuam.80 Such support however was tempered with expressions of 
concern, that while it was an organisation of ‘great benefit to the National 
Movement’ it should be organised ‘under leaders whom the Irish people can 
follow.’81 Leaders whom the Volunteers should follow meant Redmond and the 
Irish Party, rather than radical nationalists, such as McNeill or members of the 
IRB, under whose leadership the Volunteers ran the risk of becoming ‘an 
instrument of destruction of our national hopes.’82
77 County Inspector’s Reports, 1914 CO 903/17 PRO Kew; Neither of these organisations were 
considered to be particularly placid or peaceful to begin with, however they tended to be the 
sharp end of the moderate nationalist stick.
78 Hickman to Moore, in Hepburn, 1980, 86
79 Hickman to Moore, in Hepburn, 1980, 86
80 Irish Catholic, 20 June 1914
81 Irish Catholic, 20 June 1914
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Redmond, concerned about the intentions of the Irish National 
Volunteers, and caught by surprise at their rise, threatened to dismember the 
Irish National Volunteers unless he could appoint 25 members to its Provisional 
Committee -  as many as were already sitting on the Committee. By late May 
and early June 1914, the absence of moderate nationalists had been addressed. 
After threatening to set up a rival volunteer organisation, Redmond had 
negotiated with the Volunteers to allow him to appoint these 25 additional 
members of his choosing to the Irish National Volunteer’s Provisional 
Committee. This would now establish the committee in such a way that it was 
considered, at least by Redmond and the Irish Party, to be along ‘representative 
lines.* He believed that this would ensure his ability to monitor and moderate 
the activities of the Irish National Volunteers. With this deal, Redmond threw 
the full weight of his personal support, as well as the political machine of the 
Irish Party and the Ancient Order of the Hibernians behind the Irish National 
Volunteers, and their membership rose to a number in excess of 150,000. 
Archbishop Walsh, amongst others, viewed Redmond’s manoeuvre to secure 
control of the Volunteers as ‘dishonest and typical of the [Irish] Party’s 
unconstitutional and underhand practices.’83 Some observers were aware of 
other reasons behind the political manoeuvrings on the part of Redmond, 
believing that his involvement was based on a fear that “they dare not remain 
aloof any longer, and that they were obliged to turn the movement to their own 
ends.”84 The concern must have been double -  to combat the growing political 
might of armed Unionists and to reign in radical nationalists -  as both groups 
were a real danger to Redmond politically, and to the Home Rule
83 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
84 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
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Just as the Irish Parliamentary Party and Sinn Fein had, each in their 
own way, struggled to create an umbrella under which to amalgamate disparate 
and distinct nationalist political tendencies, the Irish Volunteers encompassed 
different strands of nationalism and differing levels of military ability. There 
was some consternation in the press that Redmond and the Irish Party’s support 
for the Volunteers came late in the day -  with references to their (re)formation 
and popular support as being in a nick of time, etc.85 Such sentiments were an 
explicit expression of the fear that civil war could break out over the issues of 
the Home Rule Crisis. Despite Redmond’s efforts to control the radical 
elements of the Irish National Volunteers, the organisation remained factional 
and divided. The intelligence reports refer to the feet that even after the 
appointment of Redmond’s men to the Provisional Committee, the Irish 
Volunteers retained a ‘character detrimental to nationalist interests.’
The Bachelor’s Walk Incident
In order to arm themselves, the Irish National Volunteers sent 
representatives to Germany to purchase 1,500 rifles and ammunition. These 
weapons were landed in two batches, the first in early August on Wicklow 
coastline without incident, the second was made at Howth, in North Dublin on 
the 26th August, 1914. The date is quite significant -  as it was when War had 
just broken out on the Continent, and when tensions were running high not only 
over the Home Rule crisis but also concerning these events on the Continent. 
Whereas the Unionist landing of arms was subject to little interference, the 
events at Howth would leave several dead and many wounded at the hands of
85 See An Gaedal, The Daily Freeman’s Journal, and Evening Herald from 21 June -  17 July, 
1914 for evidence of this sentiment
86 County Intelligence Reports, CO 903/17 PRO Kew
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the RIC and British Army. The arming of the Irish National Volunteers was not 
only a practical necessity, but also needed to counter the success o f the 
Unionists at Lame. The landing of arms at Howth was carried out with public 
knowledge of the landing beforehand, and accompanying fanfare. It would be a 
propagandistic counter-strike to the Ulster Volunteer’s triumphal achievements.
Unlike the Unionists at Lame, the police and Army were dispatched to 
disarm the Volunteers. The initial actions of the Dublin Metropolitan Police and 
King’s Own Scottish Borderers led to tension and aggravation and were initially 
ineffective. The weapons were landed and were subsequently dispersed amongst 
groups of Volunteers. The King’s Own Scottish Borderer’s were then 
dispatched to disarm them, and as the Regiment made their way back to the 
barracks after failing to disarm the Volunteers, they were subjected to 
aggravation and taunting by the crowd. In response, the Borderers opened fire 
on the unarmed crowds at Batchelor’s Walk, killing three and wounding 38. The 
intelligence reports do not describe the effects of this event on the population in 
detail, however the events were deemed significant enough to necessitate an
o<7
investigation by a Royal Commission. Events at Howth, and the subsequent 
incident at Bachelors Walk are important in light of the sectarian competition 
between the Ulster Volunteers and the Irish National Volunteers, and evocative 
of the fears of Irish nationalists and the Irish Volunteers about the intentions of 
the British authorities.
The incident at Batchelor’s walk was seen as demonstrating the heavy
handedness of the Army, and the difference between the treatment of Unionists
and Nationalists. One diary states the way that these events and the general
87 See Report of the Royal Commission on the Landing of Arms at Howth on 26th July 1914 
available in The Irish Uprising, 1914-1921: Papers from the British Parliamentary Archive, 
2000.
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treatment of the Irish National Volunteers, as opposed to the Ulster Volunteers, 
was indicative of the way that ‘to trap a nationalist meant promotion; to trap a 
unionist meant perdition ... it accounts for a good deal of the irritation and the 
resentment against the existing system of administration and ... England.’88 The 
Irish Catholic reported the events in a matter of fact tone, blaming the crowd’s 
incitement on ‘rumours which had been circulating on [the King’s Own Scottish 
Borderer’s] conduct.*89 Such rumours were possible in the context of the 
understanding of the ‘usual’ or expected conduct and policies of the Army. 
Their reporting of the events at Batchelor’s Walk culminated with the 
announcement that all the bodies of the victims would be sent to the Pro- 
Cathedral for their funerals.90
The official Government report into the events describes the behaviour 
of the crowd as being of ‘insulting demeanour, language and behaviour* with 
‘some throwing of stones and other missiles.’91 The report blames rumours 
‘accompanied by falsehood and exaggeration* of military intervention as the 
impetus to the gathering of the crowd, and the cat and mouse tactics of 
protestors and Army as heightening the tensions between the two. The report 
does not think that the soldiers involved were without ‘great provocation,’ but, 
even so, they got ‘out of temper and partly out of hand’ going so far as to chase 
people into shops and ‘in one case a soldier drove a bayonet through a shop 
door.’93 The report of the commissioners found that the crowd itself was
88 ‘Experiences in Belfast by G.F.H. Berkeley’ MS. 7880, NLI Dublin
89 Irish Catholic, 1 August 1914
90 The Daily Freeman 4 August, 1914
91 Report of the Royal Commission on the Landing of Arms at Howth, 26* July 1914 in The 
Irish Rising, 1914-1921, 2000,11-12
92 Report of the Royal Commission on the Landing of Arms at Howth, 26th July 1914 in The 
Irish Rising 1914-1921,2000,12-14
93 Report of the Royal Commission on the Landing of Arms at Howth, 26th July 1914 in The 
Irish Rising 1914-1921,2000, 12-14
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excessively violent, and though perhaps mischievous, the commissioners did not 
believe that an occasion had arisen for using loaded firearms. The report found 
no fault with the officers, or their men, believing the officers never to have 
issued an order to fire, and their men having been subjected to the provocation 
of the crowds, ‘may have been productive in their minds of the misapprehension 
as to an order [to fire] having been given.’94 The result was some degree of 
unpopularity, especially of the Borderers in Dublin. One diary entry, dated a 
few days after the shootings, mentions that soldiers on trams were greeted with 
‘boos and groans -  an after effect of the shooting by the Scottish Borderers at 
Bachelors Walk on the previous Sunday week.’95 Boos and groans, though 
significant demonstrations of a Nationalist antipathy for the British Army at this 
moment, do not constitute evidence of support for radical nationalism in Ireland.
Despite the attempts of Westminster to cool the situation, the Bachelor’s 
Walk incident generated a great deal of tension between the residents of Dublin 
and the Army. It was an issue that would later have effects on recruiting 
attempts.96 It was also an event that retrospectively seems as though it could 
have potentially unleashed a great deal of popular nationalist unrest. Despite the 
high levels of concern about this incident, this unrest failed to materialise -  
meaning that while this event continued to ‘ratchet’ up the pre-existing tensions 
between Nationalists and Unionists or the British Government, it did not 
constitute an event that triggered a mass radical or violent nationalist 
movement.
94 Report of the Royal Commission on the Landing of Arms at Howth, 26th July 1914 in The 
Irish Rising, 1914-1921, 2000,12-14
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The Split o f the Irish National Volunteers
On the outbreak of the War, Redmond ‘declared it to be the duty of the 
Irish Volunteers to take foreign service under a Government which is not 
Irish.’97 This pledge did not sit well with the original and more radical members 
of the Provisional Committee, and it precipitated the split of the Irish 
Volunteers. British intelligence reports identify five different categories of those 
that split from the Redmond section and went on to participate in the Irish 
Volunteers. They are listed here in order of their size: 1) supporters of 
Redmond, 2) supporters of McNeill - a group of radicals who would go on to 
form the Irish Volunteers and a category which was itself split in two, between 
those 3) in Dublin and those 4) outside Dublin, as well as the supporters of 
Connolly in the 5) Irish Citizens Army. The analysis of the Archbishop of 
Dublin and his personal secretary, Monsignor Curran, was similar. They thought 
that the ‘vast rank and file abstained from the dissensions, neither completely
Q Q
understanding these splits nor wanting to aggravate them further.’ The 
intelligence reports describe the way that there was no ‘outward exhibition of 
disunion’ on the Provisional Committee, that the original members were 
members of anti-British organisations, and that the split between Redmond’s 
constitutional nationalists and these radicals had always been festering under the 
surface.99 The damning verdict on the Irish Volunteers was that it was ‘disloyal, 
seditious and revolutionary if the means and opportunity were at hand.’100
By mid-September 1914 the Home Rule Bill had been passed, placed on 
the statute book, and immediately suspended. The suspension of the bill
97 Redmond in F.X Martin as quoted in Hepburn, 1980, 87
98 County Inspector’s Reports, 903/17 PRO Kew
99 County Inspector’s Reports, 903/17 PRO Kew
100 County Inspector’s Reports, 903/17 PRO Kew
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removed the prospect of an enactment of the controversial item of legislation, 
therefore the prospects of alienating potential Unionist recruits into the Army 
and Unionist support for the War, while the passage of the Bill was seen as 
placating Nationalists, an encouragement to their participation in and support 
for the War effort. Redmond’s support of the War may have been part of a 
strategy to ensure the enactment of Home Rule after the conclusion of the War. 
His pledge of the Volunteers and support of recruiting was done, at least in part, 
to ensure the British Army and Government that the Irish nation was 
trustworthy and loyal.101 It is into this overall context that the split of the 
Volunteers must be placed.
This split in the Irish Volunteers came to a head upon Redmond’s pledge 
of the Irish National Volunteers to the British war effort. Redmond had 
envisioned the role of the Volunteers to be one of home defence of Ireland, and 
he lobbied for the Irish Volunteers to be taken as a whole Division into 
Kitchener’s new Army, like the Ulster Volunteers had been. Although Redmond 
pledged the Irish Volunteers to the War effort, and personally promoted Army 
recruitment, his main aim was to ensure that ‘the coast of Ireland will be 
defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons ... Is it too much to hope that 
out of this situation there will spring a result which will be good for, not merely 
the Empire, but for ... the Irish nation?’102 The much larger element of this split, 
the National Volunteers, remained loyal to Redmond, and many of those in the 
National Volunteers duly enlisted in the British Army, though not in a Irish 
Division, as envisioned by Redmond. For Redmond’s supporters, the split came 
as a ‘relief -  the radical elements, being described as unreasonable, bitter and
101 Redmond’s War Manifesto in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,171
102 Redmond, 3 August 1914, Statement to Commons in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989, 47; 
See Chapter 2.
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narrow minded, constituting a ‘danger to the youth of Ireland.’103 This role of 
home defence would prove that the Irish were capable of taking care of 
themselves within the confines of the Imperial setting. The Ulster Volunteers 
had been accepted more or less en masse into the British Army as the 36th 
(Ulster) Division, and would go on to fight in the trenches in Belgium and 
France -  suffering particularly heavy losses at the Somme.104
Diaries of the time express a great deal of doubt about Redmond’s plan 
for the entry of the Irish Volunteers into the British Army, especially if such 
entry meant serving outside of Ireland.105 This was not only because it was not 
popular amongst the volunteers themselves, who were not keen on the 
possibility of service outside of Ireland, but also because Kitchener himself did 
not ‘seem to be much enamoured with volunteers; his requirements being 
soldiers ready for service anywhere.’106 This attitude is indicative of the high 
degree of distrust on the part of the British establishment against Irish
1 ft7nationalists -  especially amongst the Army’s elite.
When Redmond pledged the Irish National Volunteers to the British 
War effort, the organisation split into two. The split occurred over concerns 
about the diminution of Home Rule, the exclusion of Ulster, and the 
unwillingness to participate in ‘foreign quarrels* and over antipathy towards 
Dublin Castle rule, especially in light of the events of Bachelor’s Walk, with the
103 The Irish Catholic, 3 October 1914
104 These heavy losses would become an important component of the Unionist repertoire of 
myths, memories and symbols, and underpin their belief that Home Rule in Ireland would be a 
betrayal of their sacrifice for the United Kingdom.
105 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ MS. 9620 NLI; ‘Experiences in Belfast by 
G.F.H. Berkeley’ Ms. 7880, NLI Dublin
106 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 12 Aug, 1914, MS. 9620 NLI
107 Denman, 2000
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radical Irish Volunteers calling for Castle Rule to ‘be abolished without delay
1 HRand that a National Government be established forthwith in its place.
The heeding of Redmond’s call to enlist accounts for the gradual fall in 
the numbers of moderate nationalist and Redmond supporting National 
Volunteers, apparent in Figure 2. The radical nationalist Irish Volunteers, 
comprised of followers of Mac Neill, though also inclusive of some members of 
the IRB and the members of Connolly’s Irish Citizen Army, would be the group 
that would go on to carry out the Easter Rising of 1916. In the second graph 
(Figure 3), we can see that while there is a gradual drop in membership of the 
National Volunteers, there is a gradual increase of membership in the Irish 
Volunteers. The drop in the numbers of the National Volunteers is due to the 
enlistment of individual members into the British Army. The increase in the 
membership of the Irish Volunteers can be accounted for by dissatisfaction with 
Redmond’s support of the War and with the resolution of the Home Rule 
question with exclusion, a general sense of concern and anxiety about the 
progress of the War, and a concern that conscription would be introduced in 
Ireland.109
108 Manifesto of Volunteers, in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989, p. 178
109 See Chapter 2
111
Figure 4. Redmondite Vs. Radical Sections of the Irish Volunteers
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Figure 5. National Volunteers vs. Irish Volunteers and ICA, May 1914-Apr 1916
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In terms of the indicative elements of the split in the Volunteer 
movement, figure 6 below helps to demonstrate the extent to which radical 
elements of the Volunteers were in the minority. Although they were clearly in 
the minority, they were a slowly growing group representative of nationalist 
concerns festering beneath the fafade of the Irish National Volunteers and the 
nationalist movement in Ireland as a whole. In October of 1914, shortly after the 
outbreak of the War, the split of the Volunteers, and Redmond’s committing the 
organisation to the British War effort, the radical element of the Volunteers 
represented just over 5% of the movement, according to contemporary British 
intelligence reports. This element grew steadily over the course of 1915, both in 
terms of an increase in its overall numbers (see graph above) and as a 
percentage of the overall nationalist movement with members of the National 
Volunteers enlisting in the British Army. The extent to which we can assign this 
growth to dissatisfaction with British Rule, opposition to Redmond’s leadership, 
an attraction to radical nationalism etc. are unknown. The ultimate consequence 
was that the more radical elements of the Volunteers not only became stronger 
numerically, but they also became a more visible and stronger element of Irish 
nationalism as a whole.
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Figure 6. Percentage of Radicals as a Segment of Irish Volunteer Movement, October 1914 - April 1916
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In retrospect Redmond’s vision for the Volunteers suffered from two 
miscalculations. The first was the belief that the British Imperial, especially 
military, establishment, would ever trust an Irish, Catholic and nationalist force 
to ‘protect’ Ireland, when it was representatives o f this same establishment that 
had helped to support, organise, arm and drill the Ulster Volunteers. It would 
have seemed like leaving the children home alone with an open cookie jar. The 
second major fault was the assumption that nationalists would immediately and 
permanently support the British war effort. One diary suggests that Redmond’s 
overestimation o f support led him to being blind to the initial formation and 
purpose o f  the Volunteer movement. It suggests that had Redmond known o f  
the ulterior reasons behind the formation o f the Volunteers, he would not have
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felt compelled, or believed it politically expedient, to have made the 
concessions of the exclusion of Ulster from Home Rule in March of that year.110
Diary entries describe the way in which the split dominated thoughts on 
events at the time -  ‘the one party submitting to Redmond, the other submitting 
to no control from him .. . ,nl Diaries at the time also make specific mention of 
the surprise felt at Redmond’s invitation to Unionists to join the Irish National 
Volunteer movement -  shock because of the events of the formation of the 
Ulster Volunteers, their sectarian connotations, the events of Lame, Howth and 
Bachelor’s Walk, and shock knowing that this would exacerbate the splits in the 
nationalist movement. There was also hostility to Redmond’s support of 
recruiting efforts on the grounds that it was not a demonstration of an organic or 
grassroots movement, or of a personal moral stance, but rather that ‘the Irish 
Party’s recruiting campaign ... [was] an inevitable result of their parliamentary 
subservience to the Liberals.*112 It demonstrated the weakness of Irish 
nationalism in Westminster, and the inability of the IPP to think beyond 
immediate political gains.
Various official British documents would later (after the Rising) detail 
the split in the Volunteer movement, not least the report of the Royal 
Commission. In retrospect, as with the contemporary accounts, it was 
Redmond’s attitude towards recruiting and the British Army that brought about 
the public split between the Irish and National Volunteers. The Royal 
Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland would later report that the split 
ultimately led to a force of Irish Volunteers enrolling an estimated 13,000
1,0 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, 5 July, 1914, MS. 9620 NLI
111 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’,8 October 1914, MS. 9620 NLI
112 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
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members, 2,000 of whom were in Dublin.113 The concern over the potential 
ramifications of this split is evident in the report presented by the Inspector 
General of the RIC, from 15th June 1914, as quoted in the Royal Commission’s 
Report. There was a recognition that the paramilitary phenomenon, 
constitutional and radical, Unionist and Nationalist, had altered ‘the existing 
conditions of life* in Ireland.114 This alteration was particularly problematic, as 
the Inspector General had reported that:
Obedience to the law has never been a prominent characteristic of the people. In 
times of passion or excitement the law has only been maintained by force, and 
this has been rendered practicable owing to the want of cohesion among the 
crowds hostile to the police. If the people become armed and drilled effective 
police control will vanish. Events are moving. Each county will soon have a 
trained army far outnumbering the police, and those who control the Volunteers 
will be in a position to dictate to what extent the law of the land may be carried 
into effect.1
So there was an explicit and conscious recognition that the Irish Volunteer 
movement was one that had the potential to force political issues and the Home 
Rule question to their ultimate end, and that the split in the leadership of this 
body, while not necessarily representative of the percentage of opinion of the 
members of the time, had the potential of forcing and implementing a radical 
nationalist agenda in Ireland. In a Dublin Metropolitan Police Report, just after 
the outbreak of the War in early September 1914, there is an explicit concern 
that radical elements of the Irish Volunteers in Dublin believed that they could 
‘establish control of the Government of Ireland before the present difficulties 
are over, and that they may attempt such an escapade before long.’116 An Irish
113 The Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland, 1916 in The Irish Uprising, 2000, 86-7
114 Inspector-General of the RIC as quoted in The Royal Commission on the Rebellion in 
Ireland, 1916 in The Irish Uprising, 2000,92
115 Inspector-General of the RIC as quoted in The Royal Commission on the Rebellion in 
Ireland, 1916 in The Irish Uprising, 2000,92
1,6 Inspector-General of the RIC as quoted in The Royal Commission on the Rebellion in 
Ireland, 1916 in The Irish Uprising, 2000, 93
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Volunteer Hand Bill from July 1915 makes the urgency as suggested by the 
DMP report even more palpable, in so far as:
Now, more than 1913, it is manifest that Ireland requires self-protection against 
‘the menace of armed force’ from whatsoever quarter. The future prosperity, 
perhaps the very existence of the Irish nation, may depend on the country being 
in a position to offer effective resistance to the imposition of a ruinous burden of 
taxation for Imperial purposes.117
This handbill goes on to describe, in detail, the nationalist project to attain a 
‘National Government ‘free from external political interference* as well as 
‘resistance to any partition or dismemberment of Ireland which would exclude a 
part of the people ... from the benefits of national autonomy.’118 The Hand Bill 
ends by making the point that the only rightful participation in the War is one 
made not under duress, and that therefore the Irish Volunteers would struggle in 
every capacity to ensure that conscription would not be brought to Ireland. Of 
course all o f these potentialities, the real and exaggerated fears o f radicals in 
Ireland on the part of Unionists, Nationalists and the British Government must 
be tempered by attitudes such as that of Edward Grey on the outbreak of the 
War. He claimed then that ‘the one bright spot in the whole of this terrible 
situation is that... the Irish question [not being] now a consideration which we 
feel we now have to take into account.’119
Conclusion
It is tempting to view the birth of Sinn Fein, and the formation and 
eventual split in the Irish Volunteers as predictive of an emerging popular 
radical nationalist movement and such an assessment would not be entirely 
correct. The split is more indicative of a long-standing antagonism in Irish 
nationalism -  between the traditions of Grattan, O’Connell and Parnell and
117 Handbill in Walsh Papers: Special Papers/Political Papers
118 Handbill in Walsh Papers: Special Papers/Political Papers
119 Grey in Mitchell and 6  Snodaigh, 1989,167
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Constitutional and peaceful nationalism, whereby change would be effected 
from within, and the radical physical force traditions of Young Ireland and the 
Feinians. In the moderate/constitutional tradition, the only ways which Ireland 
could make peace with its relationship with England, and benefit from its role in 
the United Kingdom was through a constitutionally managed political and 
economic relationship. The radical tradition saw the relationship between 
Britain and Ireland as fundamentally flawed under any condition -  and therefore 
rejected it -  whatever the proposals for economic or political management. All 
the ills of Ireland, symbolic, cultural and tangible, in terms of depravity, 
language and the Famine, were blamed on the Union.
Radical Nationalists of this period felt as though they were the true 
disciples of the Feinians, and that organisations such as the IRB would get the 
Irish National Volunteers off the ground. Rather than be indicative of an Irish 
predilection for radical nationalism, this simply showed that 1) radicalism had 
some resonant and popularly known antecedents, and 2) that though less than 1 
in 10 supported radical nationalism, it had political and cultural potency beyond 
its adherents. It provides a context through which the Rising may later be 
understood. This weight of purpose, if not numbers, has serious consequences 
when, in the power vacuum after the Rising, individuals in the Irish nation saw 
new ways to interpret these phenomena, and new institutions by which to 
express their political ideas and ambitions.
It was in the context of this long standing split that Sinn Fein 
opportunistically sniped at the Irish Party and Redmond on a variety of political 
issues. Initially, Redmond’s successful efforts to re-introduce, and the eventual 
passage o£ Home Rule seemed to reduce the already limited political potency of
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Sinn Fein. This was the case even in light of the unpopular aspect of exclusion. 
Sinn Fein, however, had never been popular -  its existence was marked by its 
inability to unite or be electorally effective, but this was balanced by its ability 
to offer a critique from afar. When Redmond’s policies were ultimately viewed 
as ineffective or inappropriate, on Home Rule and the War, Sinn Fein, by its 
mere existence -  and in the wake of the executions of the Rising’s leaders -  
would provide a meaningful narrative by which to interpret these events and 
organise effectively.
Overall, radicalism in Ireland can be said to be present -  evident to all if 
not popular. The Irish Volunteers and Sinn Fein would provide institutions and 
mechanisms in the aftermath of the Rising that would allow for the 
interpretation and organisation of radical violent nationalism. However without 
the cultural trigger point of the Rising, and in light of the evidence provided 
herein, it is impossible to talk of the inevitability of the emergence of radical 
nationalism, and a pre-determination of popular support for the Irish War of 
Independence. The various pieces may have been in place -  but a popular 
response had yet to be triggered.
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Chapter 4:
Religion and Cultural Nationalism
120
Introduction
In order to establish the role of cultural and religious nationalisms, this 
chapter will begin by examining and distinguishing cultural and religious 
nationalisms prior to the Rising. I will then examine cultural nationalism, 
drawing special attention to its distinctive philosophical and institutional 
elements, and then move on to examine several examples of Irish cultural 
nationalism in action. The chapter will then consider Irish religious nationalism, 
drawing attention to its distinguishing features, institutional and philosophical, 
and then examine religious nationalism in action, before concluding with 
several examples where little or no distinction can be made between the actions 
and sometimes actors in the cultural and religious nationalist movements. I hope 
to show how these movements were concerned with the regeneration and 
restoration of the Irish nation, and how this theme of regeneration demonstrates 
a sense of ‘organic cultural distinctiveness* in the Irish nation at this time. This 
is evidence of a latent sectarian tension in Ireland, in so far as sectarianism was 
present, but did not manifest itself in any mainstream or popular forms of 
nationalism or political behaviour prior to the events of the Rising. Rather, the 
presence of these latent themes comes to account for emergence of popular 
radical nationalism after the Easter Rising.
Religion and Cuitural Themes
Cultural and religious nationalisms in Ireland are distinguishable by 
institutions and elites, actors and actions, they are often indistinguishable in 
means, aims and end results. Irish Cultural and religious nationalists used a 
repertoire of myths, memories and symbols to achieve what they saw as the
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essential moral regeneration and expressions of the Irish nation in the wake of 
the devastation of the Famine.1 They also sought to fight changes in the Irish 
nation due to ‘Anglicisation’- literally the process of becoming, or being made 
‘English’. Though these nationalisms were distinct from their political 
counterpart, each contributed to the underlying political development of the 
nation, and therefore were part of the ultimate rationale of nationalism as a 
whole -  i.e. that there existed a religiously and/or culturally distinct Irish nation 
which deserved political recognition and a form of national self-determination. 
This line of argument had dogged understandings of the role of Ireland in the 
Union since its creation in 1801 -  and it was dominated by questions over the 
extent to which Ireland was an equal or junior partner in the affairs of the 
Crown, Westminster etc.
The difference between those who supported a Sinn Fein Amhain 
(Ourselves Alone) cultural nationalist outlook, and those who sought the 
regeneration of the Irish nation through the practice of Catholicism lies in a 
belief in the inherent importance of an Irish organic cultural identity and 
expression versus the practice of the ‘true’ religious doctrine as the cornerstone 
of the Irish nation. The Famine, which loomed large in both cultural and 
religious nationalisms, had a great unifying impact in form and popular 
recognition, yet for both of these varieties of nationalism it had distinct and
11 have used the word ‘Famine’ deliberately in this chapter and throughout the thesis despite the 
controversy over its use to define this event. A famine, by definition refers to a time when there 
was lack of food due to a failure to produce enough to eat for a given population. In the Irish 
case, there was enough agricultural production to have fed the population of the island of 
Ireland, but much of the food was exported and withheld. The crop which failed, the potato 
crop, was the one on which an entire section of the Irish population was dependent for economic 
survival (see Edwards and Williams, 1957) and accounted for demographic growth in Ireland, 
while the production of other crops and livestock continued unabated. In this way, the 
combination of the failure of the potato crop, British reactions to its failure, when combined 
with various proselytising efforts exchanging relief with religious conversion, constituted what 
some have described as a form of ‘ethnocide’ rather than famine.
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separate ramifications in practice. Whereas the long troubled history of the 
relationship between England and Ireland, Protestant and Catholic, in terms of 
the dis-establishment of the Catholic Church and the Penal Era was always in 
the background, it was the Famine that made these myths, memories and 
symbols come alive through the latter half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
centuries. For cultural nationalists, the Famine triggered concerns about the loss 
of Irish culture, which they believed lay at the heart of the nation itself. This 
fear was not only a function of Anglicisation, but also a result of the loss of 
cultural expression and knowledge that resulted from the reduction of the rural 
population of Ireland resulting from the Famine. For religious nationalists the 
Famine transformed the Catholic Church in its institutional form and religious 
content in terms of ritual and in terms of a massive Church building project in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Despite the fundamental and striking 
difference in the effects of the Famine on cultural and religious nationalism, and 
despite the creation of competing institutions, each of these Irish nationalisms 
sought to advance the nation through the pursuit of the Irish Language, Irish 
cultural expression and the fundamental moral regeneration of a "corrupted* and 
‘tainted* contemporary Irish nation, thereby restoring it to a ‘pre-English’ 
golden age.
The Catholic Church and its institutions were a natural location for 
cultural nationalist narratives. Regeneration and redemption were shared themes 
in religious and cultural nationalisms, reinforcing the nation and harmonising 
with historical memory in Ireland and religious practice. Hutchinson clearly 
identifies the myths that were being projected from the past on to contemporary 
Ireland -  the myths of migration, origin, settlement, a golden age, degeneration,
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regeneration and/or redemption.2 Such myths, as espoused by cultural 
nationalist elites such as Eoin MacNeill, identified Ireland as an ancient 
nationality, superior to its ‘British’ counterpart, though as the experiences of the 
Gaelic League suggest, these myths needn’t be religious.3 For religious 
nationalists, the religious element, as covenant and sacred communion were 
obvious, but Irish nationalism based in and around the Church was not the 
politics of the state or a movement struggling for the congruence of the nation 
with political institutions. Rather it sought to reinforce, (re)create, and 
(re)discover the untainted moral community of Catholics in Ireland -  i.e. the 
Irish nation. In this way, its aims and ambitions were not dissimilar from the 
Gaelic Revival of the late 19th century.
Theologically and culturally, the themes of degeneration, redemption 
and regeneration were fundamental components to the practice of the Roman 
Catholic religion and cultural nationalist expression in Ireland. The lives of the 
Saints, religious festivals such as Easter, concepts such as original sin and 
baptism, rites of reconciliation, etc. are all marked by their emphasis on the 
moral corruption of the human condition. From this viewpoint, the moral 
corruption of the human condition can only be rectified and regenerated through 
actions such as confession, communion and other religious rites practiced 
through, and espoused by, the Church in its theological outlook and institutions. 
These themes were echoed in ‘secular’ cultural nationalism, Douglas Hyde, 
proponent of the Irish Language, and founder of the Gaelic League, ascribed 
Irish ills to the process of Anglicization.4 The various invasions and incursions 
o f ‘outsiders’, of Vikings, Normans, Old and New English were all understood
2 Hutchinson, 1987,124-9
3 Hutchinson, 1987,127
4 McCartney, 1967,44
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to have driven Ireland from its ‘rightful Gaelic* path. There was a lamentation 
that Ireland had been driven from its path of ‘national evolution’ because before 
the ‘commercial massacre of the Tudors [Ireland] had reached a high degree of 
industry and wealth ... a flourishing commerce, a considerable culture and a life 
tempered by the arts.’5 After this ‘massacre’ Ireland necessarily became a 
colonial satellite of England, an evolution that culminated in the Act of Union 
of 1801.
The default identity of the Irish nation as Catholic not only had a myth 
of origin, but also had a clear myth of golden age, when Ireland had been a 
moral, untainted and uncorrupted land of Catholic faith -though to which period 
this golden age referred was always disputed (pre-Celtic, Celtic, Gaelic, 
Norman, etc.) One history book from the time states that Catholics “can be 
properly called the Irish people, the ‘natives.’”6 Such was the devastation of the 
memories of the Penal Era that ‘they are only but gradually freeing themselves 
from the idea that the Protestant is the master of Ireland ... that they are 
helots.’ The memories of the Penal Era were tainted by their perception as a 
‘persecution of religion ... an attempt to degrade and demoralise a whole 
nation.’8 The Church could be understood to be the “Mother of all the Catholic 
Churches in the Anglo-Saxon world.”9 The parishioners of the Church are 
especially fervent, as ‘few race characteristics are so profoundly marked as is 
the intensity of religious feeling in the Celtic races ... they would seem to have 
instinctively adopted the Catholic religion.’10
5 Green, 1908,463
6 Paul-Dubois, 1911,462
7 Paul-Dubois, 1911,463
8 Paul-Dubois, 1911, 39
9 Paul-Dubois, 1911,480
10 Paul-Dubois, 1911,491
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Degeneration, Debauchery and the Nation
Myths of degeneration are a prerequisite for myths of regeneration.
These were rife due to the experiences of the Famine. Meetings of temperance
societies, almost always sponsored by religious institutions, were often
accompanied by a description of how outsiders viewed drunkenness in Ireland.
Of course drunkenness, as an issue of morality, was associated with the moral
degradation of pre-Famine Ireland. The intemperance of Irish society was
described as being the result of ‘the debasing examples and influence of the
dominant class, who by force of arms had secured possession of all power and
of all property in their midst.’1* It was interpreted as part of the debasing effects
of foreign interference and something that had to be put ‘morally’ right to gain
national redemption. In this description of the reason behind drunkenness in
Ireland, we see how even those who were against drink did not blame Irish
drinkers themselves, rather the Irish nation’s experiences of colonial 
1domination. This is a good example of an historicist vision of contemporary 
ills in Irish society, utilising history and myth to explain and understand 
contemporary situations in Ireland in 1914. Yet the Irish nation’s redemption 
was necessarily attached to cultural and religious practice. In this way, 
nationalists and Catholics were able to assess blame for their subservient 
position and the sectarianism that they were railing against, and encourage a 
maintenance of ethnic boundaries in order to protect their own communities.
11 Irish Catholic, 4 July 1914,
12 For a discussion of drunkenness, especially in light of the puritanical nature of radical 
nationalists, see Garvin, 1986
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Part I: Cultural Nationalism
In the Irish case, cultural nationalism was particularly important in 
crystallising and disseminating national myths, memories and symbols. This 
section will define cultural nationalism, look at its history as a movement in 
Ireland, identify various culturally nationalist myths, such as those of origin, 
golden ages, degeneration and redemption and examine how they were 
disseminated and maintained.13 It will look at the role of the Famine in cultural 
nationalism, and the degree of popularity in this movement, and examine how 
these myths, memories and symbols were institutionally disseminated. This 
section will conclude by examining how cultural and political nationalisms 
formed complementary movements under the broad umbrella of Irish 
nationalism.
Cultural nationalism, as a phenomenon, is a variety of nationalism 
independent from, though associated with, political nationalism14 It is a variety 
of nationalism that reinforces the role of historical memory in defining the 
community of the nation.15 Cultural nationalists are sometimes described as 
‘inventors of tradition’, but are better understood as ‘challenging established 
social identities, [and promoting] a novel historical vision of an integrated and 
distinctive political community.’16 Cultural nationalists contribute to 
nationalism by providing a repertoire for the crystallisation of the nation,
13 An entire thesis could be written on cultural nationalism in Ireland in its various forms and 
guises, and how countless institutions and individuals played a role in its dissemination and 
reinforcement in Irish society. For reasons of brevity, this chapter has identified three archetypal 
cultural nationalist institutions in Ireland, the Catholic Church, the Gaelic League (Conradh na 
Gaelige) and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). It is intended that despite the brevity of the 
analysis herein, it will provide a benchmark by which the reader may be able to judge pre- 
Rising attitudes towards the Irish cultural nationalist movement
14 Hutchinson, 1987,9
15 Hutchinson, 1987, 9
16 Hutchinson, 1987, 20; For a further discussion on cultural nationalists as inventor’s of 
tradition, see Hobsbawm, 1992.
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providing the myths, symbols and memories that unite the rubric of the 
community of the nation Cultural nationalists provide a framework for 
understanding and interpreting the nation’s path of historical and cultural 
development, especially as this path of development renders their nation
17separate from other foreign, and often dominant, nations.
For cultural nationalists, the state, its institutions etc. are "accidental’ 
because the nation is an organic entity -  a self which becomes clothed in the 
institutions and powers of the state as a result of the processes of modernity.18 
The institutional framework of the state grows around the distinct and pre­
determined entity of the nation because ‘nations are then not just political units 
but organic beings ... [founded on] the passions implanted by nature and 
history.*19 From this perspective, it was thought that ‘had Ireland been left to 
herself, [it] would have succeeded ... along a path of modem progress.’20 
Cultural nationalists are therefore engaged in efforts to document the pre­
modem myths and memories of their organic unit, establishing national 
legitimacy and authenticity while attempting to achieve a state congruent to the 
nation. To remove external influences and/or to return to an organic status quo 
was perceived to lead to the expression of equality amongst the members of the 
Irish nation. Cultural nationalism, as with all types of nationalism, attempts to 
guarantee political rights for members of the nation through the (re)generation, 
(re)discovery, (re)emphasis, and (re)creation of the moral community of the 
nation in the contemporary era.21
17 Hutchinson, 1987,38-40
18 Hutchinson, 1987,13
19 Hutchinson, 1987,14
20 Paul-Dubois, 1911,13
21 Hutchinson, 1987,15
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Irish Cultural Nationalism
An examination of cultural nationalism in Ireland prior to the Rising 
exposes basic assumptions of the Irish nation’s ‘givenness’ and distinctiveness 
in this process of legitimising and authenticating. Irish cultural nationalist elites 
saw the Irish nation as tainted by factors such as modernity and ‘Anglicisation.* 
Cultural nationalism in Ireland repackaged and disseminated national myths, 
memories and symbols deemed by cultural nationalist elites to be 
simultaneously moral, popularly resonant amongst the nation, and given to the 
organic national self.22 Cultural nationalists assert the perennial nature of the 
nation, but their actions represent active and conscious attempts to disseminate 
and crystallise the repertoire of national myths, symbols and memories that 
form the cultural content of the nation. In this way, for cultural nationalists, the 
nation is subject and object, creator and creation (though not ex-nihilo\).
Prior to the Rising, cultural nationalism in Ireland was a movement that 
stressed the distinctiveness of the Irish nation above everything else. The 
contemporary phrase ‘Irish-Ireland’ often appears as a political project of 
cultural means.24 Cultural nationalism’s main effect was to establish and 
maintain the primacy of an Irish and Catholic historical memory in the Irish 
nation prior to the Rising.25 There exist many versions of the Irish national 
myths, memories and symbols, which have been (and continue to be) espoused 
by numerous competing cultural nationalist elites. The resonance, and ultimate 
success of these competing visions was determined in part through processes o f
22 Of course this raises the problem that if these components of the nation are organic, popular 
and timeless, why do they have to be actively repackaged and disseminated by cultural 
nationalist elites and their movements? This section does not deal with this question, rather it 
accepts this as the process as it appears to occur on the ground.
23 Pesata, 1999, 3
24 Paul-Dubois, 1911
25 Smith, 1998, 178 Catholic here refers to an ethno-national identity rather than a set of 
theological beliefs or practices, see Coakley (2002).
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trial and error. Relevance and resonance were contextualised through a 
determination of political need and necessity, which helped to give shape and 
content to the myths, memories and symbols of the Irish nation.26
Cultural nationalism depends on ‘resonance’ -  not necessarily 
contemporary instrumental political needs.27 A myth, memory or symbol is 
resonant when it strikes a common chord in the nation, denoting a common or 
shared significance for members of the nation. Resonance occurs when the 
personal experience of individuals, whether real, vicarious or imagined, 
corresponds to these myths, memories or symbols in the repertoire of the 
community, in this case the nation. The emerging set of myths, memories and 
symbols held and disseminated by Irish cultural nationalists, which were widely 
resonant, accepted and understood by members of the Irish nation, need not 
have been expressed in a mirror image to the political nationalism of the Home 
Rule movement -  and therefore need not have fulfilled contemporary and 
immediate instrumental political needs. Cultural nationalism was only broadly 
congruent with political nationalism, rather than identical or derivative. Cultural 
nationalists in Ireland ultimately succeeded in their project -  creating and 
reinforcing a strong sense of national distinctiveness.
The Three Stages of Irish Cultural Nationalism
Hutchinson identifies three stages in the crystallisation of cultural 
nationalism for the Irish nation. The first stage was a project carried out by Irish 
antiquarians in the mid-eighteenth century, and it was closely followed by the 
emergence of a movement of historical scholars and poets during the 1830’s, 
culminating in a movement of poets and folklorists at the end of the 19th
26 Smith, 1998,178
27 Smith, 1998,178
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century. In the Irish case, the emergence of the antiquarians, historians, and 
poets of the 1830’s was a consequence of the Anglo-Protestant population of 
Ireland trying to ‘make sense* of or rationalising their position in Ireland and in 
the newly formed Union.29 In the wake of the failure of Tone and the United 
Irish Rebellion of 1798, the movement which emerged was led by George 
Petrie. This movement attempted to unite the disparate and divided religious 
communities in Ireland by projecting a Gaelic past on to the island’s 
contemporary inhabitants in order to bring about the amalgamation and moral 
regeneration of a secular and artistic Irish nation.31
This phase of cultural nationalism was a reaction to contemporary 
events, such as the Act of Union in 1801. It was a movement seeking to 
distinguish an Irish nation from the newly forged British state. This phase of 
cultural nationalism in Ireland was simultaneously involved in a dynamic 
relationship with contemporary politics. The politics of O’Connell, the Repeal 
Movement and Mass Meetings, meant that cultural nationalism, to remain 
relevant, had to take into account and engage with the emergence of a Catholic 
landowning class in Ireland, and to a certain extent justify attempts to bridge the 
religious divide. This second revival failed in the quagmire of the Great 
Hunger, and in the wake of the Young Ireland Rising of 1848. In light of these 
events, the popular projection of a new found Gaelic unity, encompassing 
Protestant and Catholic, rich and poor, in all of Ireland, rapidly dissipated.33
28 Hutchinson, 1987, 50
29 Hutchinson, 1987, Chapter 2
30 Hutchinson, 1987, Chapter 3; Connolly 1998 439-40
31 Hutchinson, 1987,79
32 In this case, Catholic is used to describe a constituent element of the Irish nation, rather than a 
form of religious practice or theological outlook.
33 For a much more detailed discussion and analysis of these events, see especially Hutchinson, 
1987
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Cultural Nationalism and O’Connell’s Legacy
The strength of the third phase of the Gaelic revival of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries lay in its popular resonance as a movement of regeneration. 
Ireland had been devastated by the events of the mid-19th century, and there had 
been a national introspection in the wake of the Famine. The Gaelic Revival, 
after the fall of Parnell, was introspective, and it emerged as an alternative 
during a period when political nationalism seemed ‘sterile* and ‘bitter.*34 This 
national introspection can also be thought of, as an accommodation to the 
inability or lack of desire to politically, culturally or economically deal with 
‘modernisation.’ Irish cultural nationalism also emerged out of the frustration 
with constitutional nationalism in Ireland.36 This process was mirrored in 
religious doctrine at the time. It is almost impossible to determine which factor, 
culture or religion, was more causal for initiating this process of introspection.
O’Connell’s mass meetings for Repeal and continued Catholic 
Emancipation, and the removal of the last vestiges of the Penal Era, had already 
forced the British Government to restore some rights to Catholics in Ireland. 
Hutchinson argues that this was part of an ‘assimilationist drive.’ In the wake of 
these political gains, a cultural nationalist movement emerged. This cultural 
nationalism movement projected Ireland as a ‘superior rural Gaelic communalist 
civilisation exemplifying to a corrupt power-hungry world a higher synthesis o f
^7the spiritual and material. Almost twenty years later, when the momentum for 
this assimilationist drive had faded, there was a new expression of frustration 
with the political conditions in Ireland. The unsuccessful Feinian rebellion of
34 Boyce, 1995,259; Hutchinson, 1987
35 See Drumm, 1996
36 See Hutchinson, 1987
37 Hutchinson, 1987,115
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1867 ‘nudged* the British regime into carrying out some more ‘assimilationist’ 
reforms which addressed the grievances that lay behind its outbreak. Overall, 
these reforms did not adequately address the demands and rhetoric of Irish 
nationalists or match the hopes promised by the legacy of O’Connell.
Indeed, O’Connell’s repeal movements, land reform (culminating in the 
Irish Land Acts of 1903 and 1909) and the Local Government Act (1898) had 
only accomplished so much for the Irish nation since the Famine and fifty years 
after the Young Ireland rebellion. The emergence of the Feinian Brotherhood, 
and the failed Rising of 1867 -  organised by Young Ireland exiles and Irish 
immigrants who had fled to America for economic and political reasons -  
sprang from a ‘reservoir of hatred against the British state as a malign agency 
seeking the extirpation of the Irish people.’ 39 This reservoir was found in the 
vast body of the Irish diaspora who had left in the wake of the Great Hunger. 
Even a political nationalist such as Redmond, who was not deeply involved in 
cultural nationalism, made political capital by appealing to these fears and the 
sense of frustration with contemporary politics, by stating that Catholics at the 
turn of the 19th/20th centuries were only just emerging ‘from a state of absolute 
slaves and bondage ... those who profess the religion of the great majority of 
the Irish people are still in an inferior position.’40 The result was that cultural 
nationalists in Ireland had created a complementary movement to political 
nationalism. The pursuit of Home Rule became, with this complementary 
movement, more than a return to a form of self rule in Ireland, but rather a 
return to a national golden age.
38 Hutchinson, 1987,115
39 Hutchinson, 1987,114-115
40 Redmond’s speech at Mansion House, 4th September 1907, in Redmond, 1908
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The Role of the Famine in Cultural Nationalism
Doubts and concerns continued to dog Irish cultural nationalists as to 
Ireland’s role, politically and culturally, in the Union. Myths and memories o f 
the Anglo-Protestant other, of the era of plantations, Penal Laws, stories about 
hedge schools and exile, had been kept alive in the glowing emotional embers 
of the Famine; kept alive in newspapers, ballads and book covers.41 In the wake 
of the Famine, there was a drive for tangible political gains, but now 
nationalism had an added role -  to prevent the recurrence of the past. The 
‘glowing emotional embers’ of the Famine help to explain the continuing 
popularity of the myths, memories and symbols of the Reformation and Penal 
Era. The Famine formed a key component of the repertoire of Irish national 
myths, memories and symbols, and they seemed particularly salient after its 
occurrence. Attempts to ‘modernise’ agricultural practices or to proselytise 
amongst victims of the Famine, providing food and shelter in return for 
religious conversion, helped to keep pre-Famine and pre-modem myths, 
memories and symbols of the Penal Era and beyond alive. They provided a 
repertoire of meaning by which survivors could apportion blame for devastation 
of the Famine, and explain the vast repertoire of myths, memories and symbols 
of Irish historical suffering.
Blame for the Famine was often laid at the door of the Anglo-Protestant 
‘other.’ The Famine had led to ‘all joy [leaving] the people ... a hatred of 
England and Lords [sinking] deeper than ever into their souls.’42 Commentators 
such as Mitchel laid the foundations for these interpretations, perceiving the
41 Mitchell, 1983; Reilly, 1999
42 Paul-Dubois, 1911,73
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Anglo-Irish relationship to be inherently exploitative.43 These ideas were 
crystallised and disseminated in nationalist histories, stories, plays, and poems 
written in the latter half of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century.44
The fear of Anglo-Protestant malign intention was exacerbated and 
underpinned by the extant set of myths, memories and symbols of the 16th and 
17th century dis-establishment of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and of the 
Reformation. In fact it was contemporarily thought that the reason for the 
decline of ‘piety, like morality [in the wake of the Famine] ... may be found in 
the brutally abrupt introduction of the elements ... foreign to the spirit of the 
race’ -  these brutal elements having been introduced in the 16th and 17th 
centuries.45 The events of the Famine seemed to make these earlier myths, 
memories, and symbols come alive in a contemporary era.
Institutional Dissemination
Cultural nationalism was organised through institutions such as the 
Gaelic League (Conradh na Gaelige). The Gaelic League was founded in 1893 
by a group of twelve, including Eoin MacNeill and Douglas Hyde. The 
League’s purpose was not to espouse any political viewpoint, and it shied away 
from questions of political nationalism. Rather it attempted to ‘provide fellow 
Irish-Language enthusiasts with a forum to help preserve the dieing Irish 
language.’46 Hyde, the driving force behind the Gaelic League set out many of 
his ideas in a speech which he had delivered the previous year to the National 
Literary Society entitled ‘On the Necessity for de-Anglicising the Irish
43 Mitchel, 1983
44 Morash, 1996,115
45 Paul-Dubois, 1911,492
46 Grote, 2003, 86
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People.*47 As its title suggests, its hypothesis was that a return to the Irish 
language meant a return to the national and organic status quo that had been lost 
in the Anglo-Irish relationship, i.e. a return to a Golden Age of Celtic Ireland. In 
this speech, Hyde, ‘pointed out that the country which had once occupied a 
leading position among European nations because of its cultural achievements 
had now sunk to the very bottom ... due to a process of Anglicisation.’48 Like 
its slogan, ‘A country without a language is a country without a soul’, there was 
a belief amongst those who supported the Gaelic League that all that which 
made Ireland distinct as a nation was in its language, and without this 
distinctiveness they were merely another set of participants in the Union.49 
Without its language, Ireland would become a nation of imitators.50
Despite Hyde’s secular intentions, there was a clear interplay between 
religious identity and linguistic nationalism in the Irish case. Paul-Dubois 
compares the contrast of ‘the profoundly religious spirit’ of the Gaelic 
Language to the ‘materialistic and utilitarian character of the Anglo-Saxon 
tongue;’ and the spiritual idealism of Celtic Catholics to the rationalist 
Protestants.51 He goes on to state that:
To-day that living and fervent faith which is so different from the cold 
observance by the Anglo-Saxon of his utilitarian and secular religion would 
seem, in truth, to have become a portion of the race and of the nationality so that 
the one cannot be distinguished from the other. Her religion is in the blood of 
Ireland. It is a second nature, a hereditary and traditional instinct which has no 
need to be reasoned in order to be profound ... it has not ... reduced itself to 
reason ...52
47 Grote, 2003, 89
48 Grote, 2003, 89
49 Grote, 1994,47
50 Grote, 2003,90
51 Paul-Dubois, 1911,492
52 Paul-Dubois, 1911,492
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This sectarianism, the link between culture and religious identity that 
manifested itself in various nationalist movements, meant in practice a latent 
and complete separation existed in the minds of the members of the Irish nation, 
between themselves and the Anglo-Protestant other.
The Gaelic League, an ostensibly non-sectarian institution, became an 
umbrella institution fighting against the Anglo-Protestant establishment in 
Ireland. Discussions about the Gaelic League, in the pages of the Daily 
Freeman, refer to the “Irish Language Week” -  important for the revival of 
Irish, and an event which encouraged not only broad expressions of 
‘nationality’, but also ‘the practical development of national resources in 
production and manufacture.’53 In this way it deviated from some elements of 
Irish religious nationalism, as will be discussed later, in so far as it did not shy 
away from embracing ‘modernity.’ The week, according to the Freeman, 
provided an opportunity for every Irishmen, no matter his level of education, to 
‘do his share in the work of the revival.”54 Again, in the pages of this moderate, 
pro-Irish Party, pro-Redmond, and pro-Home Rule Freeman’s Journal, there 
are regular statements to the effect that “It is a truism that a national language is 
an essential element of nationality -  that without it our claim to nationhood 
would be vitally impaired ...”55 Ultimately, the Irish Language, and more 
specifically the movement behind the language served not only the general 
purposes of any national myth or symbol, but also cemented clergy to 
separatists, forming a broad platform for those broadly dissatisfied with the
53 Daily Freeman’s Journal, 17 March 1914
54 Daily Freeman’s Journal, 17 March 1914
55 Daily Freeman's Journal, 17 March 1914
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current state of affairs in Ireland, and particularly those worried about a march 
towards modernisation.56
Famine, Land and the Myth of the Golden Age
The experience of the Famine led to agitation for the redistribution of 
land in Ireland. The land issue was an example of where cultural and political 
nationalisms acted in complementary fashions -  where pre-Famine myths, 
memories and symbols came alive in contemporary politics. Myths, memories 
and symbols of eviction, emigration and suffering over the course of the 19th 
century and before, were highly salient in light of the land question as they had 
been in the Famine itself. The power of these issues amongst individual 
members of the Irish nation was due to their being along similar thematic lines 
to the Famine. This means that the repertoire of myths, memories and symbols 
which were attached to the land issue and the Famine both emphasised on 
suffering and deprivation.57 Popular phrases such as ‘To Hell or Connaught* 
reinforced the set of myths, memories and symbols about the eviction of 
Catholics and their suffering under Cromwell and later the Penal Codes, yet the 
repertoire underpinned contemporary political debates and wrangling over land 
reform in Ireland.
Cultural and political nationalists were both concerned about the 
possession of land in Ireland. For political nationalists, land reform led to 
economic and political power for the Irish nation. For cultural nationalists, 
possession of the land would redeem and restore the nation. For both cultural 
and political nationalists, possession of the land meant preventing the
56 Garvin, 1986, 74
57 Moran, 1999, 44; Connaught Telegraph 3 January 1880; Annual Report of the Local 
Government Board for Ireland, 1880, 136.
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deprivations of the past through a gain of symbolic and economic power in the 
present. It is interesting to note that for the Daily Freeman, ‘nationality’ and 
indeed cultural expression of the nation, such as linguistic nationalism was 
bound with the commercial endeavours of manufacture and production. Like the 
land question, economic power was seen as a cultural symbol of nationalism, 
above and beyond its clear political implications.
Both cultural religious and nationalist movements were frustrated by the 
slow and incomplete nature of land reform in Ireland, though each expressed 
this frustration in different ways. Cultural nationalists, in reaction, espoused the 
ideal o f an ‘Irish-Ireland’ which was thoroughly de-anglicised, notions 
crystallised in institutions such as the Gaelic League, the GAA and the Irish 
Literary Theatre. For religious nationalists, this frustration led them to 
intensify their search for salvation in the practice of Catholicism, and to bolster, 
solidify and expand the institutions of the Church. In this way, the example of 
the land question demonstrates a practical example of the distinction between 
cultural and political nationalists. On the one hand, it was an issue that propelled 
Parnell and the Irish Party to political prominence in Ireland because it mustered 
votes. On the other hand it was a highly symbolic issue, the resolution of which 
was a key step in the very resurrection of the nation and the restoration of a 
national golden age and which underpinned a rejection of an anglicised Ireland.
58 Hutchinson, 1987, 115
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Part II: Religious Nationalism
The relationship between nationalism and religion is traditionally 
viewed as one of status quo and usurper. In this view, nationalism, as secular 
ideology replaces the religious system.59 In modernist theories, religion is 
viewed as a kind of fertile soil from which nations and nationalisms emerge. 
Nationalists compare their efforts against and construct their projects in light of 
religious antecedents; religion acts as a backcloth.60 However, these approaches 
do not indicate the depth and dynamism of the relationship between religion and 
the Irish nation at this time. The political nationalism of O'Connell, Parnell, 
Redmond and others cannot, as Smith points out, be viewed in the context of 
‘secular political ideologies like liberalism and socialism* because their aims 
and the content of their message transcended the political quest for ‘human 
autoemancipation. ’ 61 The movement of religious nationalists perceives the 
nation as a sacred communion, devoted to the cult of authenticity and the ideals 
of national autonomy, unity and identity in an historic homeland. The 
following section, therefore very much follows in the footsteps Smith's project 
in Chosen Peoples, i.e. ‘to explore some aspects of the relations between certain 
elements within older belief systems ... and the sacred foundations of national 
identities.' In this way, I intend to explore the foundations of sectarianism m 
Ireland, not by establishing continuity between ancient religious practice and 
contemporary identity in Ireland, but rather by establishing the role of Irish 
religious myths, memories and symbols in underpinning the process of 
radicalisation at the beginning of the twentieth century.
59 Smith, 2003,9
60 Smith, 2003,10
61 Smith, 2003,18
62 Smith, 2003,254
63 Smith, 2003,257
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Religious myths, memories and symbols of the Irish nation were 
sectarian. The division between Catholic and Protestant in Ireland, and the way 
this division affected claims to membership in the Irish nation, were bound up 
with notions of religious truth and superiority, elements of divine election and 
communion, which were cemented by national ‘suffering* at the hands of the 
Anglo-Protestant other. This suffering was ‘remembered’ through myths, 
memories and symbols of events such as the Penal Laws and the Famine. The 
dominance of an ‘Irish-Ireland’ or a Sinn Fein Amhain outlook in Irish 
nationalism was tantamount to a sectarian declaration that the regeneration of 
the nation, or the achievement of a meaningful level of personal and/or national 
security could only occur within an Irish and Catholic context. This outlook 
boils down to a romantic belief that the character of the Irish nation could only 
be found in the ordinary and not yet anglicised Irish people, rather than in a 
project of the cultural or political elites.64
Images of martyrdom and political struggle were consistently 
demonstrated and reinforced in Irish religious life prior to the Rising. The 
importance of martyrdom went beyond simple individual bravery or heroism, 
tapping into a broader cultural Irish national narrative of Christian martyrdom 
and sainthood, and of specific cases in the Irish past, recent and ancient, of those 
who had died defending their faith. The Manchester Martyrs demonstrations in 
Dublin over the latter third of the 19th century, with their peculiar mix of 
Feinian myth and Catholic ritual made for an event where the Irish national 
narratives of sainthood and martyrdom were publicly and popularly apparent.65 
The demonstrations also became an opportunity for radical nationalists,
64 McCartney, 1967,44
65 Owens, 1999; McGee, 2001
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especially the Irish Republican Brotherhood as opposed to Redmondites, to 
command attention and gamer respect. Even in the aftermath of the Rising -  the 
first comparisons and some of the first demonstrations of public opinion and 
sympathy were held at the ‘hastily erected* memorial next to the Manchester 
Martyrs memorial in Glasnevin Cemetery.66
Within the descriptions of the religious Irish nation, terms such as pre­
destined or spiritual idealism were often used. St. Patrick’s day was a crucial 
day for the nation -  a national festival -  though it was considered to be more of 
a celebration for the political and cultural establishment, i.e. the Church and 
Irish Party, but again, the mix of religion, culture and politics was readily 
apparent.67 The celebration of religious days, conflated with the nation, such as 
St. Patrick’s Day or the feast of St. Columbcille, and symbols such as the 
Shamrock, combined religious significance with the symbolism of the nation. 
Following a pre-modem golden age of Christianity in Ireland, there was a ‘fall 
from grace’ -  a period of degeneration and ‘suffering’ which began with the dis­
establishment of the Catholic Church and the establishment of the Plantations in 
Ulster (despite the fact that they were established by a Catholic monarch) and 
clear attempts to deny the Irish Catholics their ‘organic’ self in the Penal Era. In 
this way the Church fulfilled a necessary element of being the locus for cultural 
nationalism in Ireland, as Catholicism in Ireland had been ‘implanted’ by nature 
and history, and its organic character was reinforced by institutionalised rites of 
passage, such as Baptism, First Communion, etc. These were reinforced by the 
Church’s monolithic role in the education of the young Irish and Catholic 
population of Ireland, especially as regards the role of Christian Brother
66 McGee, 2001
67 Alter, 1987, 9
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education. Cultural rites and reinforcement, as mechanisms for crystallising and 
disseminating the cultural nationalist project of the Catholic Church in Ireland 
ensured that the Church had a major role to play in the expression of Irish 
national myths, memories and symbols.
Catholicism and Distinctiveness
The impact of the Famine on the practice of Catholicism, on Irish 
national myths, memories and symbols, and on an individual’s thoughts and 
beliefs was significant. Ireland’s devastation as a result of the Famine was not 
unique, as other countries, like Belgium, were also hit hard and suffered the 
agricultural and demographic effects of this calamity.68 The evolution or 
establishment of other nations had also been affected by the chaos and 
disruption that accompanied the Reformation. The Penal Codes, while marking 
the Irish case as particularly horrific, were, by the time of the Rising two 
hundred years old. The ‘Popery Laws’ had forbidden Catholics from possessing 
weapons, leaving Ireland, purchasing land and from inheriting property and 
money from Protestants, or from leasing land for more than 31 years as well 
banishing the upper echelon of the Catholic clergy.69 They were a set of rules 
that did more than attempt to force the assimilation of the Catholic population of 
Ireland -  they reinforced cultural and economic boundaries between the 
communities in Ireland.
The events of the 19th century melded with earlier myths, memories and 
symbols of the 16th and 17th centuries, and in this way the myths and memories 
of a previous era came alive in contemporary minds. The degeneration of the 
Irish Catholic community in the 19th century was contextualised through the
68 Connolly, 1998,228
69 Connolly, 1998,438
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prism of the myths and memories of this earlier era, and the myths and 
memories of the Penal codes, hedge schools, and proselytising efforts on the 
part of Protestant missionaries became contemporarily manifest. The myths, 
memories and symbols of Irish and Catholic difference and distinctiveness from 
‘non-Irish’ (or more accurately non-Catholic) Protestants, who resided in 
Ireland for 200 years or more, were coming alive in this event that reduced the 
population of Ireland by as many as four million through pestilence, death, and
70emigration. The demographic effects of the Famine were extreme -  in so far 
as it had emptied tracks of land in the West of Ireland, affected birth rates, 
average age of marriage, and permanently altered the structures of Irish Catholic 
society throughout the entire island for over a century afterwards.71 While 
memories of the Famine were as varied as the individuals that remembered 
them, universal images such as vivid descriptions of “dead bodies strewn” along 
the road-side, and the opening of a front door to find a corpse of someone who 
had sheltered there were widely disseminated and recognised.72
In the wake of the Famine, survivors apportioned blame for its 
devastation. These myths, memories, and symbols of the Famine created a 
tangible sense of ‘survivor’s guilt,’ leaving those who survived to seek reasons 
for the Famine in past immoral or irreligious behaviour, and with a sense of 
anger at the injustice of the experience.73A great deal of the blame was placed 
on the self as if there was a variety of self-hatred for the culture that had led to
70 Miller, 1973,18
71 See Mokyr, 1983 amongst others. See also the discussion of Cardinal Cullen’s reforms of the 
Catholic Church in the wake of the Famine (i.e. the Cullenisation of the Church) and the debate 
over the devotional ‘evolution’ or ‘revolution’ in the practice of Catholicism after the Great 
Hunger in Larkin, 1972, Drumm, 1996, and McGrath, 1992.
72 Paul-Dubois, 1911,71-4
73 Drumm, 1996
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this disaster.74 This personal ‘shame’ accounted for the emergence of a new set 
of religious practices amongst famine survivors culminating in the 
‘Cullenisation* of the Catholic Church.75 It provided an institutional framework 
through which expression of guilt over past cultural practices -  i.e. sexual 
promiscuity accounting for high birth rates and a society so dependent on a 
single crop -  could be ‘psychologically’ worked through. The role of the 
Church in religiously proscribed actions became more important for individuals 
seeking to overcome their experiences. The Cullenisation of the Church was a 
‘devotional revolution’, whereby a shift in theology including a ‘weaning of the 
people from an over-reliance on folk religion,’ was accompanied by
7#\construction of new Church buildings. Cullen’s key ‘pastoral goal’ in the 
wake of the Famine was to make the Irish Catholic congregation a church-going 
one.77 This was accompanied by the end of practices such as the waking of the 
dead or the transformation of ancient festivals such as Bealtaine (1 May), from 
raucous, debaucherous, drunken celebrations to sombre occasions celebrating 
sobriety, morality and piety.78 The Church, as a set of institutions, took on the 
role of ‘moral arbiter’ so that both state and nation needed its support to
70reinforce their claims of political legitimacy. The emergence of new religious 
orders, temperance societies, etc. was a variety of introspection that assigned the 
cause of the calamity to the complete degeneration of society and the nation.80
The ‘congealed* distinctions that emerged in Ireland between the 
Catholic and ‘British/Protestant’ populations led to resentments that, when
74 Garvin, 1986
75 Drumm, 1996; Kerr, 1996
76 Baily, 1989
77 Drumm,1996, 88-89
78 Drumm, 1996; Kerr, 1996
79 Miller, 1973,3
80 Kissane, 2002, 81-2; Drumm, 1996
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coupled with religious fundamentalism, became an important source of
521separatist feeling. Regular references appear in newspapers to ‘Fighting the 
Soupers’ and the proselytising efforts of Protestant missionaries in the Dublin 
tenements. In May 1914, the Irish Catholic began a campaign to deal 
specifically with this issue, describing Protestant missionaries as ‘souper harpies 
... plying their foul and monstrous traffic* in the slums of Dublin, meeting 
limited success, as the paper reports that ‘at present less than 100 are to be 
found debased enough to deny their faith or to accept at the hands of soupers 
help which they can obtain from Catholics.’82 These stories form part of an 
appeal for money to support Catholic charities, on the grounds that it is only 
through an equal or greater provision of charity on the part of Catholics that 
‘souperism* could be stopped. Such appeals supposed the ‘organic’ relationship 
between the Irish nation and Catholicism. There was a link between the prospect 
of souperism, and the loss of identity, whether it be religious or national, as the 
two were at the time inseparable.83 These constant references to the tensions, 
contemporary and historical, between Catholics and Protestants served to 
demonstrate and reinforce sectarianism in Irish society at the time. The ethnic 
divisions that separated Catholic and Protestant in Dublin were clearly 
apparent.84
Blame for the Famine, on the national ‘self and on the Anglo-Protestant 
other, reinforced the role of Catholicism, as theology, as institution and as 
ethno-national identity marker in the Irish nation. As a devastating event and 
through an institutionally and elite engineered response, myths, memories and
81 Garvin, 2002, 5; This, of course, held true for Protestants as well as Catholics, though remains 
unexplored in this thesis.
82 Irish Catholic, 9 May 1914
83 Drumm, 1996
84 Garvin, 1989
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symbols of the Famine solidified the role of the Catholic Church in the Irish 
nation. These institutions allowed for the repentance of past sins, while marking 
the Irish nation as permanently and unalterably distinct from the ruling British 
regime. Like cultural nationalism, religious nationalism provided a mechanism 
by which the Irish nation was rendered distinct, organic, and morally superior. 
Religious nationalism, through the Catholic Church, created solidarity and unity 
in the nation through a sacred covenant and communion. The existence of blame 
and guilt only served to reinforce the central role of Catholicism in the Irish 
nation and reinforced this covenant and communion.
Religious Nationalism in Action
After the initial disgrace, and consequent death of Parnell, Irish political 
nationalism was in a shambles. Parnell had never been a particular favourite of 
the Catholic leadership, in part because of his initial support for ‘obstructionist* 
tactics, potential support of physical force nationalism in the agrarian struggle, 
political agenda, and because of his religious persuasion (Protestant). With 
Parnell’s fall, after he was named in a divorce proceeding, the Catholic Church, 
under the leadership of Archbishop Walsh of Dublin, amassed all of its political 
might to defeat Parnell’s supporters in the Irish Party.85 Walsh attempted to 
create a political movement whose aims could be controlled and determined by 
the Church.86 This action created schisms in the Irish Party and in Irish political 
nationalism which came back to haunt the Church in its efforts to suppress 
radical nationalists after the Rising.87 This incident serves to show two 
important points, the first being that religious nationalists saw their religion as a
85 Miller, 1987
86 For an extensive discussion of this situation see Miller, 1973.
87 Miller, 1987
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‘launching* point from which to effect and determine political nationalism in 
Ireland. The second is that even where not ‘explicitly’ involved in Irish politics, 
religious nationalists in Ireland saw it as part of their moral duty to direct and 
influence its agenda and those who were participating in it.
Despite the perceived moral duty of religious nationalists, the Church as 
the set of institutions which religious nationalists used to accomplish their 
agenda, was limited in its scope for action by its precarious position between 
State and Nation. Furthermore it was constantly subject to the disparate and 
competing views of its elites, resulting in only occasional stands on political
OQ
questions at the time. The pressure on the Church, external and internal, meant 
that when it did take these stands they were moderate.
The expression of the will of the elite religious nationalists came not 
only from pronouncements from above, but from control of their message and 
institutions from below. At the grassroots level, priests played a prominent role
O Q
in promoting the role of religion in Irish politics. This was only natural, in so 
far as the day to day interaction between individual and Church was mediated 
by the priest. Exposure to the Church and its specific messages occurred at 
Mass, led by the priest. If an individual disobeyed the will, rules or intents of 
the Church or its hierarchy, they were publicly shamed by the priest, in so far as 
they were denied the sacrament. Furthermore, there was the sense that the priest 
was part of the community itself and that ‘the priest suffered with the people.*90 
The local priest was understood not only to be ‘spiritual shepherd’ but also 
‘guide and counsellor in temporal affairs’ as ‘usually the only person in the
88 See Miller, 1973
89 Paul-DuBois, 1911,481
90 Paul-Dubois, 1911,493
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village who has any education ... the only leader who is obeyed.*91 In various 
situations, ‘the response of ecclesiastics to any public issue was governed by a 
combination of their ideals and the interests of their institution.*
The message of regeneration espoused by religious nationalists was 
located in the pastoral care of the Church, and emotionally in a process of 
‘recalling the sorrows ... traversed [renewing] confidence and strength and 
vitality of a race which no ruin has until now destroyed.*93 Even though there 
was financial difficulty in Ireland at the time, priests encouraged their 
parishioners to stay in Ireland because ‘even if the wages were small in Ireland 
there were compensating advantages ... at home in ‘holy Ireland’ there was an 
atmosphere of faith and piety ...*94 Though there was a recognition that Ireland 
suffered from its lack of modernisation and industrialisation, and that this 
increased levels of emigration, one Bishop believed that these industrial 
conditions led to ‘physical decadence ... those hives of industry ... [were] 
destroyers of the morals of the people ... *95 One Bishop gave a sermon in which 
he insisted that ‘the average Irishman or woman is never so happy as in his 
Catholic Irish home, where the air is pure, and where there is a feeling of 
religion and sympathy around him.’96 The link between religion, culture and 
national identity was a strong one, and it was the correct balance of all three that 
would bring about the fulfilment of the aims of cultural nationalists.
Priests were under pressure to tow the Church line on various issues. If a 
priest became too active in radical nationalism, for example by encouraging
91 Paul-Dubois, 1911,495
92 Miller, 1973,27
93 Green, 1908,493
94 Father Guinan in Miller, 1973,70
95 Freeman’s Journal, 6 January 1902 as cited in Miller, 1973,72
96 Irish Catholic, 4 Nov 1905 as cited in Miller, 1973, 72
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radical or violent agitation, these actions were often dealt with severely.97 The 
Church did take a position on land agitation, and especially on land reform 
believing that the redistribution of the land away from the Protestant landlords 
‘is the essential condition for the prosperity and happiness of Ireland.’98 If a 
priest was under the leadership of a Bishop who was unsympathetic to his 
particular political outlook, however, he was often disciplined and/or 
transferred.99 There was a real attempt on the part of the Church elites to 
concentrate political power under the auspices of its institutions, quashing those 
individuals and institutions that it deemed did not adequately recognise or 
adhere to its ultimate authority.100
Religion and Education
Interactions with the Church were not limited to religious practice. The 
Catholic Church also dominated the Irish educational system The Christian 
Brothers schools have been considered by many scholars to have been the 
factories in which a generation of young Irish nationalists were cast and refined, 
and the correlation between Christian Brothers education and participation in 
post-Rising ‘radical’ nationalism is apparent.101 Several key political struggles 
elucidate the position of the Church and its attempts to control politics in 
Ireland, such as the University question and its involvement in the Home Rule 
Bill.102
The University question shows the extent to which the Church sought to 
control social and political power outside of the confines of a strictly religious
97 Miller, 1973,20-4
98 Record o f the Maynooth Union, 1898-99, 31-2 as cited in Miller, 1973,75
99 Miller, 1973,20-4
100 Miller, 1973,53
101 See Fitzpatrick, 1998; Garvin, 1987; Augusteijn, 1996 amongst others
102 De Weil, 2003
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pastoral sphere. The foundation of a National University in 1908 meant the 
Church gained ‘effective control on all levels of what was now really a system 
of denominational education financed by the state.*103 In practice, this meant 
that from primary schooling through to university, the Catholic Church 
controlled the education system, its curricula and staffing. The University 
Question had been a key plank of Irish nationalist political debate since the 
establishment of the Queen’s Colleges in 1845. It was an issue that was 
particularly salient amongst a rising Catholic middle class and nationalist elites 
-  and it would come to be an issue that was highly symbolic to the entire Irish 
nation.104 The University Question was of particular import first to the Church, 
and later to Irish language supporters (the Gaelic League, etc.), both of which 
deplored what they perceived as the Anglicising influence of the Queen’s 
Colleges and Trinity.
At the time, it was thought that the University Question made the nation 
‘the football of Church and State,* as the Church and Westminster each sought 
to control the outcome on this issue.105 The Church, as a religious nationalist 
institution, determined that ‘whomever controls the education of the rising 
generation is the conqueror of the future.’106 The Catholic Church, under 
Cullen’s leadership, had condemned religiously mixed education. As part of the 
assimilationist drive of the British Government, the Church formed a Royal 
University in response to Catholic demands -  as an examination body -  a feet 
that did nothing to satisfy religious nationalist demands.107 Archbishop Walsh
103 Larkin, 1976,1267
104 Paseta, 1999, 5-6
105 Hackett, 1918,243 in Paseta, 1999, 6
106 Bishop O’Dwyer in Freeman's Journal, 26 February 1906 cited in Paseta, 1999, 7
107 Paseta, 1999,12-13,15
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dropped the demand for a solely Catholic institution, and sought to establish a
10fiuniversity which was ‘Catholic in atmosphere and administration.*
With the passage of the Irish Universities Bill in 1908, the Queen’s 
Colleges in Galway and Cork, and University College Dublin were established 
as two new universities. Questions as to their official theological outlook and 
about the official role of the Irish language dominated the discussions over their 
foundation. Augustine Birrell, in drafts of the University Bill, had included a 
clause that denied ecclesiastics guaranteed representation in the administration 
of these new universities. This caused anxiety amongst the Catholic hierarchy, 
but was unfounded.109 The role of the Catholic Church, in terms of official 
ecclesiastical participation and in terms of the Catholic character of these 
universities, would be in little doubt.110 It was ultimately the Church that had the 
political power and national credibility to fight the British state for nationalist 
gains and it created a moderate and powerful institutional umbrella under which 
most nationalists could happily fit.
Religion and Language
The Gaelic League, a cultural nationalist institution, recognised that the 
only institution capable of initiating and leading the regeneration of the nation 
after the devastation of the Famine, was the Catholic Church and clergy.111 This 
is a perfect example of the interplay apparent in nationalist visions -  secular 
cultural pursuits of language, literature and archaeology, etc. were inseparable 
in their moral purpose from the ‘upright’, ‘untainted’ and ‘incorruptible’ 
institutions of the Catholic Church. In this way, the self was Catholic, the nation
108 Paseta, 1999, 18
109 Miller, 1973,142
110 Kissane, 2002,105
111 McCartney, 1967,45; Hutchinson, 1987,127
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was self, and the nation was Catholic. Contemporary advertisements and notices 
for religious festivals, such as that of the Feast of St. Columbcille, described 
them as being appropriate for ‘those who are in sympathy with piety’s own 
tongue should attend.’112 Indeed the service was described as being for ‘every 
Catholic who pays more than a mere lip-homage to the language of his 
country.’113 This particular celebration was also described as ‘showing how the 
feast of a typical Irish saint should be celebrated in a Catholic City which looks 
forward to the Crown of nationhood.’114 Even in less explicitly religious papers, 
such as An Gaedal or The Evening Herald there were regular references to 
religious festivals and Church politics. In this way, the inherent religious 
element in Irish nationalism is apparent in the apparently secular pursuit of the 
Irish language.
The debate over the role of the Irish Language in the University 
Question, a row which had started over the perceived neglect of the language at 
Trinity College, Dublin also demonstrated some of the interplay between 
nationalisms in Ireland.115 By the time of the Rising, the Irish language, due to 
agitation on the part of the Gaelic League, had been made compulsory at the 
National Universities.116 One commentator went so far as to frame the debates 
over religion and language as ‘the decisive battle between Irish and West 
Briton.’117 Congruence between religious and cultural nationalisms could occur 
despite their often contradictory goals or orientation.
112 Irish Catholic, 16 May 1914
113 Irish Catholic, 16 May 1914
114 Irish Catholic, 16 May 1914
115 Garvin, 1986,73
116 Kissane, 2002,105
117 Hiberian Journal vol. iii, 1909 p. 3, in Pesata, 1999,21
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Even for moderate nationalists and ‘Home Rulers* the inseparability of 
religion, identity and nationalist politics was apparent, in so far as the first two 
to three pages of every issue of the Daily Freeman’s Journal, the organ of the 
moderate and constitutional nationalist Irish Party, contained regular references 
to meetings of the “Father Mathew Union” (an abstinence congress), “Christian 
Brothers Past Pupils Union” or indeed committees being formed or meeting 
regarding ‘The Religion of Children.”118 These meetings, as examples from the 
Daily Freeman’s Journal over the course of 1914 show, go towards 
demonstrating the meshing of religion, culture, politics and civil society at all 
levels of Dublin society, and amongst all degrees of nationalist persuasions in 
the run up to the outbreak of the First World War.
At times religion and culture came into conflict. In one diary, a 
description of Douglas Hyde, administering Casement’s fund for feeding school 
children in the fever districts of the West, in Lettermullen, was greeted with 
anxiety by priests, fearful that this was souperism in a new guise.119 This is 
because the relief was attached to education in the Irish language, rather than 
more broadly to the institutions of the Church. Also Hyde, as an individual, was
19Hviewed as a secular nationalist rather than as a staunch ‘religious* nationalist. 
Ultimately, however, the competition for dominance amongst Irish nationalists, 
even for non-religious groups of elites, had to be couched in terms of the 
history, myths and themes of the nation, and viewed within the symbolic 
context which was resonant amongst the nation.
118 Sec Freeman’s Journals, 1912-14
119 Diary of Mrs. Augustine Henry MS 7981 NLI
120 Diary of Mrs. Augustine Henry MS 7981 NLI
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Conclusion
Irish National myths, memories and symbols were a mix of politics, 
religion, language, literature, and art etc. They were ultimately inseparable 
though at times may well have been opposed or in competition. These cultural 
themes formed the canvas for later interpretations of the Rising. The 
intertwining of religion and culture with national myths, memories and symbols 
created the context in which the events of the Rising would be understood. 
Despite occasionally competing claims to the ‘true identity* of the nation, each 
served to reinforce the Irish nation’s distinctiveness from the ‘Anglo-Protestant’ 
other.
Each of these nationalisms also reinforced a latent sectarianism in Irish 
nationalism. The myths of organic distinctiveness, of moral rectitude and 
superiority existed in the religious sacred communion of the Irish nation, and its 
cultural pursuit of de-Anglicisation. Martyrdom and the suffering of the Famine 
defined the Irish nation in so far as it distinguished its members from the Anglo- 
Protestant other. Despite the varying philosophies on the Irish past, the Famine 
served to reify the sets of shared and competing myths, memories and symbols 
of cultural and religious nationalisms -  solidifying a belief in the victimisation 
of the Irish nation. Both cultural and religious nationalisms were laden with 
assumptions of national ‘pre-destination.’ Both varieties of nationalism focused 
on restoring an ‘untainted’ golden age of the Irish nation, but this vision serves 
to betray their assumptions of what the ‘organic* status of the Irish nation was -  
either Catholic or not Anglo-Protestant. There may have been competing 
nationalisms -  but they were constantly coming together, and the institutions of
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the Catholic Church and cultural nationalism served to perpetuate these popular 
sets of myths, memories and beliefs.
The debates over Home Rule and the University Question are evidence 
of the way that political issues, or power struggles between institutions (i.e. the 
Catholic Church and the British Government) rapidly became nationalist issues. 
In this way religious and cultural nationalisms can be seen as complementary 
phenomena, at times in competition but quite obviously in broad sympathy. The 
power of both movements, and the myths, memories and symbols that each 
brought to bear is harnessed under the rubric of the Irish nation. In the same 
ways that Hutchinson has suggested that political and cultural nationalisms 
reinforce and reinvigorate each other, so too can we begin to see evidence for a 
similar relationship with cultural and religious nationalisms, such that each 
serves to energise and invigorate the other, so that the feast of St. Columbcille 
or celebrations of St. Patrick’s Day are more symbolically potent than their 
religious or cultural significance alone would suggest. Despite the general lack 
of support for in radical political nationalism, it may be said that there was a 
clearly sectarian orientation to the Irish nation at this time. The existence of this 
latent sectarianism will help to explain why a process of radicalisation occurred 
in the wake of the Rising.
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Chapter 5:
The Rising as Cultural Trigger Point
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Introduction
The following chapter aims to establish the Easter Rising, 1916 as a 
cultural trigger point for the Irish nation. The chapter will provide a very brief 
outline of the immediate events of the Rising, then some initial examples of 
popular reactions to the Rising before the executions of its leaders. However, 
though full of historical references, this chapter does not constitute a history of 
the Rising. Rather, it serves as a survey of some contemporary perspectives on 
this event. This will allow for a comparison of the changes in reactions to the 
Rising resulting from the British responses. The moment of the cultural trigger 
point was in the shift in the outlook of popular Irish nationalism between the 
executions of the leaders of the Rising, the failure of Home Rule and the series 
of Sinn Fein by-election victories in the run up to the General Election of 1918. 
The Rising set the immediate context in which a sea-change occurred -  a 
context of rumour and anxiety. The cultural trigger point is an event or series of 
events that triggers a radicalisation in identity, a sense of injustice and 
perceptions of agency which accounts for a shift from a popular sympathy for 
and participation in constitutional nationalism to radical nationalism in Ireland. 
The three chapters which follow this one will then examine the evidence for the 
extent of this radicalisation throughout Irish society, focusing on how it was that 
this radicalisation was expressed in popular politics in the wake of the failure of 
Home Rule and the rise of Sinn Fein.
This chapter will be split into three sections. In the first I present a brief 
precis of the events of the Rising itself. In the second the events of the 
executions that followed the Rising will be described. The third section will 
examine initial reactions to the Rising. These reactions demonstrated confusion, 
anxiety and outrage. It is not surprising that the Rising did not stimulate a
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simple shift in the popularity of radical nationalism. Radical nationalism was 
not only unpopular, but, as we have seen in previous chapters, actively 
discouraged on the part of nationalist elites and institutions in Ireland. I will 
therefore seek to demonstrate the existence of three key factors that will later 
facilitate the process of transformation and radicalisation amongst the Irish 
nation. A state of confusion, anxiety, and outrage dominates the contemporary 
initial reactions to the Rising.
The situation was intensified by the circulation of rumours which 
heightened tensions and anxieties, and is not only evident after the fact in the 
interpretation of the Rising, but also remarked upon at the time.1 Rumours 
dominated the reporting of events during Easter Week; and they were rife in its 
aftermath. Rumours as to the intentions of the British Government were used to 
mobilise radical nationalists, and fears over the secret or surreptitious 
introduction of conscription in Ireland served as a tableau on which the events 
of the Rising unfolded.2 Rumours circulated about the intentions of the 
Volunteers, and as to the scale of the Rising. Rumours circulated concerning the 
response of the British, culminating in rumours of mass executions after the 
Rising.3 Confusion, anxiety and outrage, exacerbated by rumours, when later 
combined with the loss of legitimacy for Redmond and the Irish Party, and in 
the climate of distrust of the British forces in the aftermath of the Rising, would 
foster a climate in which myths, memories and symbols of latent sectarianism 
came to form the foundation for interpretation of contemporary events and a 
basis for national action. The following brief precis of the aftermath of the 
Rising will not provide any evidence for the cultural trigger point, but signpost
1 Stephens, 2000, 62
2 Papers Relating to Alphonsus Sweeney, MS. 35454 NLI; ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas 
King Moylan’, 1916, MS. 9620 NLI
3 Norway, 1999,54
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the direction in which these events were headed after the initial shock of the 
outbreak of the Rising.
Precis of the Rising 
Context
As previous chapters have shown, the myths and memories that lay at 
the heart of the ideology of the Rising had roots going back decades if not 
centuries. For practical purposes, the roots of the Rising can be traced back at 
least to the split in the Volunteer movement at the outbreak of the First World 
War. This split was mirrored in the split in radical and moderate political 
nationalism as detailed in chapters two and three.4 By the spring of 1916, 
specific concerns had emerged over Ireland’s role in the Imperial war effort. 
Elements of the Irish nation felt themselves estranged from the British political 
establishment, which they perceived as dominated by the Tories and the military 
especially after incidents such as the Curragh Mutiny. When Kitchener accepted 
the Ulster Volunteer Force en masse into the British Army as the 36th Ulster 
Division, the long delay in the creation of an equivalent Irish Division for the 
National Volunteers seemed to illustrate this estrangement even after the 
outbreak of the War, and the passage of Home Rule.
Despite this estrangement, the Irish had managed to avoid most of the 
worst hardships of War. Though there was a threat of conscription, it had not 
been enacted in Ireland. The rural population had benefited from the War as 
suppliers of various agricultural goods to the War effort. The urban population, 
especially the Dublin poor, had also benefited from the War. The War industry 
created new job opportunities and many men enlisted. It seemed as though 
Catholic Ireland could grow fat off the conflict without indiscriminately
4 See Contemporary accounts in Weekly Irish Times, ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King 
Moylan’, 1916, Ms. 9260 NLI and in Archbishop Walsh’s Papers in Dublin Archdiocese
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contributing her sons to the trenches. It wasn’t only poor Irishmen, seeking an 
escape from urban destitution, who were fighting in the British Army. All 
classes of Irishmen heeded Redmond’s call to enlist, in part through the 
National Volunteers. This was, however, participation in a British War on Irish 
terms, a practice which suited the moderate Home Rule nationalists and their 
Home Rule mentality, but which infuriated the Tory-Army establishment, and 
which threw Unionists into ‘fits of rage.*5 The opaque and ambiguous role of 
Ireland in the War served to illustrate a deeper problem. The events of Easter 
Week must be seen within the context of the lack of clarity about Ireland’s 
position in the United Kingdom as colony or home nation. The unsettled issues 
of the ‘exclusion’ of Ulster in the Home Rule settlement and the uncertainty 
surrounding its implementation heightened the ambiguity that defined the 
Anglo-Hibemian relationship. The outbreak of the War intensified this 
ambiguity.
Planning the Rising
Plans had been put in place by radical nationalists to foment a rebellion 
since the outbreak of the War. The infiltration of IRB men on to the executive 
committee of the ‘pre-split* Volunteers had been carried out in order that 
physical force nationalist would be able to control the movement’s potential 
early on. This infiltration had forced Redmond into affiliating the Irish Party 
with the Irish National Volunteers in 1914. Redmond did so to control the 
radical nationalists that would have otherwise have used the Volunteers for their 
own purposes. Various rumours had been circulating throughout the autumn of 
1915, such as the possible implementation of conscription in Ireland and the 
disbandment and disarmament of the Volunteer movements. While Ireland had
5 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, 1916, MS. 9620 NLI
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done quite well out of the War, and while its effects on the island and amongst 
Catholics and Nationalists were limited, conscription would, by its very nature, 
change this. Radical nationalists began to capitalise on the concerns over 
conscription, and thought them real and urgent enough to begin preparations for 
their Rising. With their normal drive to radicalism and with a belief that this 
was an opportune moment to strike, announcements were made concerning an 
Easter exercise for the Irish Volunteers in April, 1916.
The strategic aims of the Rising remain unclear and a matter of great 
dispute amongst historians. The choice of Easter was highly symbolic, with its 
resonant imagery of sacrifice, regeneration, and resurrection. The leaders of the 
Rising sought to link the Rising with this potent symbolism and imagery. They 
may have also sought to link the Rising to a continuum of Irish rebellion against 
foreign rule. It was their ultimate intention to ‘impel moderate nationalist 
opinion’ towards a more radical stand.6 Some suggest that the leaders of the 
Rising had never envisioned a military victory but that they rather sought a form 
of blood sacrifice: an action to awaken the sleeping radical passions of the Irish 
nation. The lack of potential tactical victory would become especially apparent 
after the failure of Roger Casement to land German weapons, and the confusion 
over the orders for mobilisation of the Volunteers. Even the particularly rational 
James Connolly expressed a similar sentiment, despite his espousal of pragmatic 
and socialist nationalism, stating in February 1916 that ‘without the shedding of 
blood there is no redemption.’8 The Rising would constitute the means by the 
masses would be impelled to support radical nationalism, though how or why 
remains unclear.
6 Jackson, 1998,203; Augusteijn, 2003,4
7 See Kee, 1982 and 1983; O’Dubhgaill, 1966; Moran, 1997 and 1999; Dudley-Edwards, 1977.
8 Connolly’s Editorial in Worker’s Republic of February 1916, in Kee, 1983, 272
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For the Volunteers, an important aspect of their strategy was that their 
conduct be deemed above reproach and ‘civilised.* Their strategy, to impel the 
Irish nation*s support for radical nationalism, hinged on gaining the support of 
the people, and therefore they were imminently concerned with creating the 
conditions which would gamer this support. The actions of the Volunteers were 
noted by prisoners who were held by groups of Volunteers, who generally 
commented on the ‘civilised’ nature of their treatment, a sentiment echoed in 
the Undersecretary of Ireland’s comments on the Volunteer’s actions in the 
Rising.9 For the British forces, this was not as high a priority, something which 
makes sense given the context in which they were acting -  they needed to 
restore order and snuff out a military threat on the home front, i.e. their 
priorities lay elsewhere. Though this distinction in attitude does not fully play 
out in the reactions to the Rising, as a basis for political behaviour it would 
come to impact greatly on this situation and the way in which the Rising and the 
executions were interpreted.
The Castle Document and the Rising Commences
On the 19th of April, 1916 a document, which had been circulating 
behind the scenes for several days, and was known as the ‘Castle Document* 
was published by a Dublin Alderman.10 The Castle Document described a 
British plan to disarm and disband the Irish and National Volunteer movements, 
and to arrest their leaders.11 Contemporary debates, at the time, raged as to the 
authenticity of this document, however, at the time many felt that it was
authentic. It has been suggested that it was forged by radical nationalists to
10  • • provoke support for the Rising amongst sceptics. It did have this effect m
9 Foy and Barton, 1999,177-81
10 Weekly Irish Times in 1916 Rebellion Handbook 1998,2
11 Kautt, 1999,37
12 Kautt, 1999,37; Jackson, 1998,203
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some contemporary accounts, some of which supplemented its publication with
rumours of simultaneous and secret attempts to enact conscription in Ireland.13
Eoin MacNeill, leader of the Irish Volunteers, was one of the nationalists
who needed to be convinced that the Rising was a necessary action. He had not
been advised or consulted on the Easter Rising plans, nor did he support it once
he got wind of the plot, although the Castle Document did force him to seriously
consider this position. While MacNeill supported radical nationalism he was
described as not being a ‘hot headed extremist.’14 The document had also been
given to the Archbishop of Dublin, via S.T. O’Kelly to his personal secretary,
some nine days before its publication.15 Whether this was done with the
intention of trying to get the Archbishop to intervene on behalf of the
Volunteers, or whether this was done in order to ‘soften’ the Archbishop up for
the impending Rising is unclear.16 Curran and O’Kelly had been boyhood
friends, and it is therefore unclear to what extent O’Kelly was trying to keep a
friend informed or to what extent he was attempting to exploit this relationship
to provide Church support for the impending Rising. The document was
accompanied by rumours such as of an officer who told a dance partner that ‘he
had not taken his clothes off for 48 hours’ because he and two hundred men
were on standby to attack the volunteers.17 O’Kelly later indicated to Curran
that it had been possible that the document was drawn up ‘in case of invasion’
1 8rather than for its immediate implementation. Regardless of the veracity of the 
Castle Document, and regardless of its intended audience, it served as a curtain 
raiser for the Easter Rising, and demonstrates the context in which the events of
13 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, 1916, MS. 9260 NLI 68-9
14 Letter from Walsh to Maxwell, June 1916 Walsh Papers, Ref No. 385/7
15 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
16 For further elaboration on this point see Walsh Papers, and Statement of Monsignor Michael 
J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
17 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
18 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
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the Rising must be understood, and the high degree of tension over war issues 
that dominated Ireland, even before the Rising.
Casement and German Guns
Over the three days following the publication of the Castle Document, 
the 20th through 22nd of April, German arms shipments were intercepted on the 
South Coast of Ireland. These shipments had been arranged by a former British 
civil servant, Sir Roger Casement. Casement had already tried to establish a 
German-Irish link, attempting to raise an Irish Brigade amongst Irish soldiers in 
German POW camps to fight on behalf of the Germans. These efforts mirrored 
those of previous Irish nationalists such as the Irish Brigade that had fought on 
behalf of the Afrikaners against the British in the Boer War. Casement’s efforts 
were not successful, as the captives were mainly those who had been inspired 
by Redmond to enlist in the British Army in the first place, generally marking 
them as supporters of moderate constitutional nationalism. When Casement 
landed off the west coast of Ireland from a German U-Boat, the consignment of 
German weapons had been spotted, and the ship bearing the weapons, the Aud, 
had been scuttled. The men who were sent from Dublin to meet Casement and 
the arms shipment mysteriously drove off a pier on their way to meet him.
There has been a great deal of debate as to how this happened. Whether 
it was atrocious weather, misfortune, or the superiority of British intelligence, 
the attempt at landing arms was an unmitigated failure. Had the landing of the 
arms been successful, the fate of the arms remains somewhat unclear -  though 
they would have more than likely been distributed in Dublin amongst the 
participants in the Rising. As a preliminary act of the Rising, the landing of the 
weapons was a spectacular failure, serving only to reinforce British fears that 
the Rising was a German plot to destabilise the British home front.
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Even though the British authorities were aware of Casement’s activities 
the outbreak of the Rising caught the authorities completely off guard. The 
Volunteers hid their initial actions as Easter Monday Volunteer exercises and 
manoeuvres. These exercises were a ‘cover* to conceal the real intentions of 
Pearse and his companions. MacNeill wasn’t the only Irish Volunteer unaware 
of the actual intent behind these exercises, as many of the rank and file members 
were also unaware of the full meaning of their orders, only learning the real 
purpose of their mission at the last minute, and often given no choice to back 
out.19 MacNeill attempted to countermand the order for mobilisation once he 
had caught wind of the actual intention of the leaders of the Rising despite his 
misgivings about the Castle Document. This led to a ‘fraught’ meeting at 
Liberty Hall on the Easter Sunday at which it was decided that the Rising would 
go ahead despite the high degree of confusion over what was to happen.20 
However, MacNeill’s countermanding orders, issued on Easter Sunday served 
only to delay the start of the Rising rather than prevent it, throwing the entire 
operation into confusion.
The effect of this confusion was that the number of Volunteers who set 
out on Easter Monday was smaller than expected.21 On Easter Monday, 24th 
April 1914 around 1,600 members of the Irish Volunteers took several key 
objectives in Dublin, including the approaches from the Kingstown harbour to 
prevent British reinforcements from landing and marching unimpeded on the 
city, as well as some locations of political significance, such as the General Post 
Office. The Volunteers also took possession of the railway depot at Amiens 
Street, the Jacobs Biscuit Factory and Stephens Green.22 Trenches were dug in
19 Foy and Barton, 1999,165
20 Jackson, 1998,202
21 O’Dubhgaill, 1966,181
22 Kautt, 1999, 38
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Stephen’s Green to defend these positions. Unfortunately the trenches were 
overlooked by all the buildings surrounding the Green rendering the trenches 
too vulnerable to British sniping from surrounding roofs. The Volunteer strategy 
was a static one, seizing a location and holding it until relieved or defeated. This 
made some immediate strategic and symbolic sense in so far as ‘territory’ could 
be claimed, but it made little long term tactical sense as it meant the Volunteers 
were committed to various positions from the outset rather than using mobile 
guerrilla tactics. This left them unable to maximise the small amount of 
manpower which they possessed. There were limited simultaneous supporting 
actions throughout Ireland, due in large part to the publication of MacNeill’s 
countermanding orders in the Sunday Independent. While simultaneous Risings 
at Ashbourne, Athenry, and Enniscorthy enjoyed some success, there was no 
contact or coordination between them.
The rationale behind the choice of the General Post Office as 
headquarters is debated. It was a centrepiece and symbol of British rule in 
Ireland. Its geographic location, near the Dublin tenements, was also important 
as it was, perhaps, chosen to cause ‘maximum bloodshed ... in the hope of 
resuscitating Irish Anglophobia’.23 After seizing the General Post Office, Pearse 
read a proclamation that declared the establishment of an Irish Republic. Pearse 
was credited with the drafting of the Proclamation, which linked this event to 
the continuum of Irish insurgency against British rule, and emphasised its 
chivalrous character, thereby representing Pearse’s ‘greatest aspirations.’24 
Though he was leader, Pearse never fired a bullet. He was later credited with 
keeping morale up by talking amongst the participants about the future of the
23 Fitzpatrick, 1998, 60
24 Jackson, 1998,205
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Irish nation, mapping out in great detail a national destiny and its links with a 
mythic past.
Although they captured most of their objectives with limited forces, the 
Volunteers were unable to take possession of Trinity College. A small cadre of 
members of the Trinity Officer Training Corps (OTC) were able to repel the 
Volunteers, and the failure of the Volunteers to overcome the small force of 
eight who were guarding Trinity College was to have tactically deleterious 
effects for the Volunteers. Trinity was a location of major strategic significance, 
providing a base of operations for the British forces in the centre of the city, and 
providing a vantage point from which to snipe at and worry the men who were 
in the General Post Office.25 It was also an important symbol of the Anglo- 
Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. By Tuesday afternoon the small guard of the 
OTC had been reinforced by more than 140 British soldiers, including artillery, 
which it was decided would be used commencing on the Wednesday morning.
In the meantime, despite the relative ease with which the Volunteers took 
various positions, the first blood was shed. The Volunteers fired on a group of 
British Lancers, killing a soldier and a horse.27
Though they were initially caught off guard, the British authorities had 
organised their response by the second day of the Rising. Reinforcements were 
being brought in from the countryside and from England by ship. On the first 
day of the Rising, the Lord Lieutenant made a proclamation enjoining all ‘loyal 
and law-abiding subjects to abstain from ... conduct which might interfere with 
the action of the Executive Government.’28 On this second day, Dublin Castle 
made a proclamation officially declaring the city and county of Dublin under
25 O’Dubhgaill, 1966,233
26 O’Dubhgaill, 1966,234
27 Kautt, 199,38
28 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,157
168
Martial Law. The proclamation of martial law was also accompanied by the 
decree of a curfew. In a move that would foreshadow later events, Section I of 
the Defence of the Realm Act, which provided the right to trial by jury, was 
suspended.29
There was not only artillery amongst the reinforcements in Trinity, but 
the gunboat HMS Helga was also sailed down the Liffey to prepare to shell the 
Volunteer positions. The decision to use artillery in central Dublin may have 
made military sense, but its use resulted in the razing of central Dublin. The 
dilemma is apparent from today’s perspective, but the decision must be placed 
in its historical context. There were real fears that the Rising was the first act in 
a German invasion of Ireland and therefore had to be put down at any cost. 
There were broader concerns as well, over the French fate at Verdun which was 
not yet certain, during a period of Russian defeats, Austrian victories over the 
Italians, and the defeat of British and commonwealth forces at Gallipoli, all of 
which had led to Vast losses and grave deterioration in prestige.’
Belligerents underpressure
On the second day of the Rising another event occurred which would 
come to have particular significance in the shaping of public opinion on the 
Rising. Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, Thomas Dixon, and Patrick McIntyre were 
arrested in central Dublin by Captain Bowen-Colthurst of the Royal Irish Rifles. 
He had only recently returned from action in the trenches on the Continent and 
was described as being ‘by nature excitable and eccentric.’31 On Wednesday 
morning these men were shot by a firing squad organised and commanded by 
Bowen-Colthurst. This was done without trial, ostensibly because they had 
violated the conditions of martial law on the previous day. Sheehy-Skeffington,
29 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,157
30 Falls in Martin, 1967,212; Stephens, 1992, 63
31 Kee, 1983,271
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a vegetarian pacifist had been engaged in posting signs to organise a committee 
to prevent the looting of Dublin shops.32 He was described in one contemporary 
account as being ‘outspoken’ but ‘harmless,’ ‘being too sincere to have any 
following’ and ‘antagonistic to the forcible methods for which the Volunteers 
stood.’ Dixon had been the editor of a weekly publication called the Eye- 
Opener, and McIntyre the editor of an ‘anti-Larkinite’ paper called Searchlight, 
neither of whom supported the Irish Volunteers or physical force nationalists.34 
From today’s perspective, a reasonable conjecture may be that Bowen-Colthurst 
was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. After the Rising, Bowen- 
Colthurst was court-martialled for his actions, found insane and incarcerated in 
Broadmoor prison until 1922. This dramatic and emotive event conveys the 
context of confusion that dominated the Rising.
While there were other incidents where innocent individuals became 
caught up in the conflagration, the deaths of Sheehy-Skeffington, Dixon and 
McIntyre were not easily explained away at the time as being the simple result 
of ‘confused and desperate fighting.*35 A group of corpses, unarmed civilians, 
were found on North King Street, apparently concealed on purpose amongst 
building rubble. This discovery raised some questions as to the conduct of the 
British forces, with some claiming these men had been held as prisoners of the 
British troops. This was in direct contrast to the explanation given by the British 
authorities, that these men had been armed and active combatants. The 
coroner’s report stated that these men had been ‘unarmed and unoffending’ and 
that the ‘explanation given by the military authorities is very unsatisfactory.’ It
32 Stephens, 1992, 51-3
33 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, 29 April 1916, MS. 9260 NLI; Stephens, 
1992, 50
34 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,207
35 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,207
36 Weekly Irish Times in 1916 Rebellion Handbook 1998,25
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was ultimately the execution of Sheehy-Skeffington that would have the 
greatest significance.
By Wednesday, the 26th of April, the shelling had commenced from 
Trinity on to the rebel positions in the General Post Office. The effect was to 
shatter all glass in the buildings of O’Connell/Sackville St., and to ‘wreathe [the 
surrounding buildings] in dust and smoke ... throwing open Northumberland 
House, and making the others mere empty shells.’37 Wednesday also saw the 
largest and bloodiest single engagement of the Rising, when the Sherwood 
Foresters, who had just sailed in from England, marched from the port at 
Kingstown and were shredded by the defensive posts held by Eamonn de Valera 
to prevent just such an advance. In this single engagement four officers were 
killed and fourteen wounded, and 216 men of other ranks were killed or 
wounded.
By the Thursday, the strategic failure of the Rising had become 
apparent. The shelling of central Dublin had rendered the General Post Office a 
smouldering shell and an untenable position. The green ‘Irish Republic’ flag 
which had been raised outside of the General Post Office at the same time as the 
proclamation was read on the Easter Monday was now ‘scorched a deep brown 
by flames.’38 By Thursday, this shelling came not only from the grounds of 
Trinity College, but also from the gun boat Helga. The Volunteers were forced 
to retreat, attempting to hold a new position not far from the General Post 
Office. This change of location did not bring about a change in fortune -  by this 
point the conflagration was almost concluded. Redmond, who had been 
previously warned by his deputy Dillon, that a Rising was afoot, also publicly
37 Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook, in O’Dubhgaill, 1966,234-5
38 Kee, 1983,273
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condemned the Rising on the Thursday.39 In part, this was because he thought 
the Rising was as much an attack on the Irish Party as it was on British rule.40
Executions, Internment and Aftermath
By Friday, the number of British troops had increased to 18-20,000 from 
roughly four to five hundred on Easter Monday. By Saturday afternoon Pearse 
was forced to accept terms and he unconditionally surrendered. The captured 
Volunteers were arrested and marched to temporary holding areas, such as 
Richmond Barracks. The leaders were segregated, interrogated and tried. Over 
the course of the week, Dublin had suffered ‘an almost complete paralysis’ with 
banks closed, no trams, no gas supplies, no postal services, and almost no 
newspapers (save the Irish Times which had its own gas supply) 41 Central 
Dublin had been razed by fire and British shelling. The importance of artillery 
had increased after the Sherwood Foresters had suffered so many casualties 
using traditional infantry tactics. By the end 64 participants in the Rising died. 
The British forces lost 134, with some 381 wounded, and out of these 35 were 
members of Irish regiments, 5 members of the Irish Voluntary Defence Force 
(the Gorgeous Wrecks -  so named for the GR, an abbreviation for George Rex, 
found on their uniforms) and 17 men who were part of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC) or Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP). Civilians suffered 
the most in this conflict, with some 220 killed and in excess o f600 wounded 42
Even before the Rising had ended, John Dillon MP, the deputy leader of 
the Irish Party, had been in contact with Redmond urging him to lobby Prime 
Minister Asquith that the punishment of the Volunteers be kept to a minimum
39 For a full description of Redmond’s actions see Coogan, 1993; Gwynn, 1971; Finnan, 2004; 
and/or Wheatley,2005.
40 O’Day, 1998,269
41 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,158
42 Kee, 1983,274
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lest the passions of the masses were aroused.43 He did not urge this policy of 
mercy out of sympathy with the Volunteer cause, rather he did not want the 
actions of the British forces to undermine the Irish Party’s political legitimacy 
and dependence on Home Rule. Dillon and Redmond realised that one or two of 
the leaders were bound to be executed, but they were concerned that there 
would be wholesale executions as part of a policy of retribution for the Rising. 
As will become apparent later, it is difficult to assess the success of their 
entreaties. While fifteen men were executed for their actions in the Rising, 
countless others had their sentences commuted to penal servitude.
Once arrested the leaders of the Rising were tried by field general 
courts-martial at which defendants did not have counsel, and with prosecution 
by a practicing barrister.44 The suspension of the Defence of the Realm Act and 
the imposition of Martial Law meant that the right to trial by jury had been 
suspended. There was no possibility of appeal against any decision made by the 
courts-martial; sentences once pronounced were ‘simply carried out.’45 The man 
in charge of this process was General Maxwell. Maxwell had been charged with 
taking ‘all such measures as in his opinion may be necessary for the prompt 
suppression of an insurrection in Ireland’ and was ‘granted a free hand ... in 
regard to such measures as may seem to him advisable .. . ,46 Maxwell described 
his task in sorting out the aftermath of the Rising as being particularly 
distasteful, but he applied military precision to what he saw as a dangerous 
distraction and a potential new front in Ireland.47
By the 3rd of May the executions had begun with Pearse, MacDonagh 
and Clarke all being shot at dawn. Despite earlier promises from the authorities,
43 Kee, 1982,1
44 Kautt, 1999,48
45 Kautt, 1999,48
46 Instruction to John Maxwell in Weekly Irish Times in 1916 Rebellion Handbook, 1998,43
47 Falls in Martin, 1967,206
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these men were executed without a priest being present.48 Maxwell refused to 
release Pearse’s body for burial in consecrated ground for fear that ‘Irish 
sentimentality will turn these graves into martyrs* shrines.’49 When Clarke was 
being detained prior to his courts-martial and before his execution, he was 
singled out for derision, with one officer declaring ‘This old bastard has been at 
it before ...he’s an old Feinian* after which he was made to strip and parade 
naked before nurses in the adjoining hospital50 The retelling of these events 
would do little to delay the process by which Pearse and the others were 
nationally and symbolically canonised in the Irish nation, or dampen the process 
by which radical nationalism would become more popular amongst the Irish 
nation.
On the 4th of May, four more participants were executed, Joseph 
Plunkett, Edward Daly, Michael O’Hanrahan and William Pearse. ‘Willy* 
Pearse, who was Patrick Pearse’s younger brother, was not a leader in the Irish 
Volunteers, and had little to do with the planning of the Rising. Daly, too, had 
little to do with the planning or organisation of the Rising, but he was the son of 
a prominent Feinian, so questions emerged as to whether his execution was 
some kind of ‘revenge’ for the ‘sins’ of his father.51 O’Hanrahan was a clerk in 
the Volunteers, whose execution was interpreted as meaning that if he could be 
executed then ‘the indications were of a massive number of executions to be 
made.’52 Plunkett had been heavily involved the planning and leadership of the 
Rising. The night before his execution, Plunkett had been allowed to marry his 
fiancee, in a ceremony held by candlelight in the prison chapel. This story was 
prominently reported on the front pages of the Dublin newspapers, even those
48 Kee, 1982,2
49 O’Broin, 1966,130
50 Sweeney’s Account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998, 79
51 Kee, 1982,2
52 Kee, 1982,3
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not sympathetic or supportive to the Volunteers.53 While these four men were 
executed, sixteen had their sentences commuted to penal servitude. But as 
Robert Kee points out, it was not these acts of clemency which were 
remembered or commented on at the time.54
After these initial executions Prime Minister Asquith telegraphed 
General Maxwell informing him that there should be no more. This was after 
Redmond had approached him to ensure that no more executions would be 
carried out. However, on the 5th of May John MacBride was executed. 
MacBride had been a rank and file member of the Volunteers, who had no part 
in the planning of the Rising. He had, however, led an Irish Brigade against the 
British in the Boer War -  an endeavour that had marked him as a prominent 
radical nationalist, even if not a prominent leader in the Rising.55 On the 6th of 
May, eighteen death sentences were commuted to penal servitude, including a 
life sentence for the Countess de Markievicz. The tide had seemingly changed. 
Then, on the 7th of May, despite the pleas of Redmond and Dillon, and the 
orders of Prime Minster Asquith, four more men were executed, Con Colbert, 
Eamonn Ceannt, Michael Mallin and Sean Heuston. By the 11th of May, 
Redmond and Dillon were now becoming increasingly desperate to stop the 
executions, and receiving reports of the changing mood in Dublin, they moved 
for the adjournment of the House of Commons. On the 12th of May, James 
Connolly and Sean MacDermott were both executed. Connolly, who had been 
shot in the ankle during the Rising was tied to a chair to facilitate his execution, 
and MacDermott wrote, in his last letter ‘the cause for which I die has been 
rebaptised ... by the blood of as good men as ever trod God’s Earth.’56 While
53 Edwards and Pyle, 1968,242
54 Kee, 1982
55 Kee, 1982 3
56 Phillips, 1920,108; Kee 1982,6
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these executions were occurring, it was unclear whether Connolly’s was indeed 
the last. Rumours were circulating of 100 foot long mass graves being dug 
outside of Richmond Barracks, and the fate of the participants was far from 
secure.57
By the end, there were over three thousand individuals arrested, and over 
half of these would be imprisoned or interned in British Jails. Fifteen leaders, 
and later Roger Casement, were executed for their parts in the Rising. 
Seemingly the Rising had been crushed, the German plot foiled, and radical 
nationalism dealt a fatal blow. However, two major problems emerged -  in light 
of these events, what power did Redmond and the Irish Party actually possess? 
And what was to become of Home Rule in Ireland?
Contemporary Interpretations
It is not surprising that initial reactions to the Rising were typified by 
contusion about what was going on. The pro-Redmond Freeman’s Journal 
proclaimed ‘When we search for the motive of it all we are baffled ... *59 When 
Pearse read the proclamation there was ‘no enthusiasm ... the people were 
unwilling to see ... a person of great significance to the country’ and no one saw 
this as a particularly significant event.60 Even the storming of the General Post 
Office was initially greeted with disbelief.61 There were some expressions of 
satisfaction that the Volunteers had not succumbed immediately to the British 
forces, but this was as far as the support went.62 Despite the grudging 
admiration for their achievements, reactions were, for the most part, initially 
confined to shock and disbelief, with some openly wondering ‘what sort of city
57 Accounts of Easter Week and After, by Sean T. O’Kelly MS. 27697 NLI
58 Jackson, 1998,206
59 Freeman’s Journal, 26 April -  5 May
60 Pamphlet from Eyewitness, quoted in Ellis, 2000,25
61 Norway, 1999,56; Stephens, 1992, 7
62 Stephens, 1992,39-40
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will we have in the morning?*63 Part of the shock of these events was due to a 
sense of distance between the War on the continent and life in Dublin.64 Some 
reactions to the Rising also indicated not only personal shock at the events, but a 
disbelief at the ‘utter unpreparedness of the Government... [who] in the face of 
a huge body of ... openly revolutionary men ... had taken no precautions for 
defence ...*65 Some were initially perplexed, in so far as they could not 
understand how the rebels were carrying out these actions unchecked by the 
military.66 There was a pervasive sense that events were spinning out of 
control.67
This sense of confusion rapidly turned to outrage. As the Volunteers 
took the Jacob’s Biscuit Factory, there were accounts of ‘howling mobs’ 
screaming at the Volunteers to ‘Come out to France you lot of so-and-so 
slackers.*68 The shock and curiosity of the crowds became increasingly 
disapproving and angry as the events of Easter Week unfolded.69 There were 
regular accounts of the Volunteers being attacked by civilians.70 By the end of 
the Rising, not much had changed when the Volunteers had surrendered and 
were marched to captivity by a guard of British soldiers. On this march, they 
were greeted by ‘jeers and rotten fruit and vegetables from hostile crowds’ and 
were given little sympathy and a hostile reception.71
Beyond shock and outrage, there was also a palpable sense of fear. This 
fear was expressed not only in general concerns about what the future might
63 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’ 24 April 1916, MS. 9260 NLI
64 Stephens, 1992,1
65 Norway,1999,41
66 Redmond-Howard, Norman, and O’Malley as cited in Kautt, 1999, 39
67 Redmond-Howard and Norman as in Kautt, 199,40
68 Walton’s account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998, 58
69 See accounts of Comerford, Harling, Kavanagh and Walton in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998 
55-9
70 Walton’s and Thornton’s Accounts in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998, 58; see also Norway, 
1999; Stephens, 1992
71 O’Day, 1998, 269; Sweeney’s Account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998, 79
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hold for Ireland, but in some letters people made allusions to personal 
arrangements, such as what should happen to their children should anything 
happen to them.72 Events that affected family members or loved ones took on a 
new significance, and perhaps as a manifestation of personal fear, or perhaps as 
a reaction to witnessing the events around them, rumour and fear led to an 
expectation of death and disaster at every comer.73 There were fears about 
whether or not there would be enough supplies to last through a long siege. 
Shops were not stocked over the course of Easter Week, and in light of myths 
and memories of the serious deprivation of the Famine, many contemporary 
commentaries and histories written in the immediate aftermath of the Rising 
make specific mention of these concerns.74 This only heightened a sense of 
being ‘absolutely cut off from the rest of the United Kingdom, and the rest of 
Ireland, especially as there was a clamp down by the censors on any news being 
printed, and in light of the mail boats being prohibited from travelling back and 
forth from England to Ireland.75
The trajectory of opinion over the course of Easter Week, from shock to 
outrage, was fuelled by fiction as much as fact. For some contemporary 
observers, part of the power of the rumours was that they coincided with actual 
tragedies occurring during the Rising, making dramatic but real events even 
more potent and terrifying.76 One individual stated that ‘the rumour of war and 
death was in the air’ having started on the first day, and that there would be 
‘many a year before the rumours cease.’77 Msgr. Curran, who was at the centre
72 Norway, 1999,46, Stephens, 1992, 35, Lyons Account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998,60
73 See ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, MS. 9260 NLI; Norway, 1999; Stephens, 
1992.
74 Redmond-Howard in Kautt, (1999), O’Duibhgall (1966), Kee (1982), Wells and Marlowe 
(1916); Letter in Edwards and Pyle, 1968,202; Norway, 1999,55; Stephens, 1992, 55
75 Norway, 1999, 42, Stephens, 1992, 21-3, 34, Lyons account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998, 
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76 Norway, 1999,53
77 Stephens, 1992 14, 21
178
of Dublin life as secretary to the Archbishop of Dublin even comments that he 
was noting rumours in his accounts, not just to show the ‘sensational and 
varied’ nature of the stories that were being reported to him, but also to show 
the stories which ‘the people were fed and which they swallowed ...,78
With little knowledge of events on the ground ‘nobody knew how 
serious the situation might be’ and as a result ‘there were rumours of Rising 
here, there and everywhere...’79 One rumour had it that conscription was going 
to be debated the same night as the Rising began.80 The Freeman’s Journal 
asserted that the entire endeavour was an ‘insane German plot’ and that ‘the
o 1
hand of Germany’ could be seen in the whole lamentable business.’ Towards 
this end there are many highly detailed descriptions of British Army Soldiers 
and Officers interrogating participants in the Rising as to the location of 
German agents, snipers, as to when and where the German Army was landing 
etc.82 Other rumours said that Verdun had fallen to the Germans, that Zeppelins 
were on their way to Dublin, that the German fleet was preparing a landing to 
invade England.83 These rumours were powerful enough to make one witness 
believe that members of the Dublin Metropolitan Police in their tunics and 
‘pointy hats’ were German soldiers who landed in Dublin.84 Other rumours 
included one that said that the Germans were planning to land in Dublin, from a 
fleet of U-Boats submerged off the coast, and there were various other rumours 
that all of Ireland was subject to revolution, general invasion, or under arson
78 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
79 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,158
80 Irish Times 24 April 1916
81 Freeman’s Journal, 26 April -  5 May, p. 1
82 Kautt, 1998; Brennan - Wh itmor e, 1996
83 ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by Thomas King Moylan’, 29 April 1916, MS. 9260 NLI; Foy and 
Barton, 1999,176; Stephens, 1992,23, 63,69
84 Thornton’s Account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998, 71
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attacks.85 There were also ‘wild rumours’ of insurrection in Cork and other 
places.86 Rumours had it that as the Sherwood Foresters arrived in Kingstown 
they were unaware of where they were being sent. These troops had almost no 
combat experience, virtually none had training in urban combat techniques, and 
they arrived in Dublin without the bulk of their supplies.87 Before arriving in 
Dublin Bay there was a real concern that the Volunteers had captured the Port, 
which would necessitate a proper combat landing, and even at this late stage 
many soldiers still were unaware of their final destination thinking they had 
been shipped off to France.88 In feet some, upon disembarking from their ship, 
started shouting ‘mereV at the crowds there to greet them.89 Rumours even 
circulated as to what was going to happen to central Dublin, that gas shells were 
going to be used to drive the rebels out of the General Post Office.90 All of these 
rumours had the effect of ‘maddening the Irish people’ spreading insurrection, 
disaffection and bitterness.91
The contemporary accounts are marked not only by rumour, but also by 
the expression of mixed and often contradictory emotions. This must have been 
in part due to the effect of the shock of witnessing the violence and destruction 
accompanying the Rising. For some men, there was a sense of ambivalence 
towards the Rising and towards the participants, with a ‘reluctance to express 
much more than curiosity or astonishment ...*92 The killing of five and 
wounding of nine members of the Irish Volunteer Defence Corps, the ‘gorgeous 
wrecks’ inspired by Redmond and consisting of ‘middle class Irishmen over
85 Foy and Barton, 1999, 176; See also Butler’s ‘Extracts from Lord Oranmore’s Journal' 1995; 
Stephens, 1992,22-23
86 Norway, 1999,44
87 Foy and Barton, 1999,165
88 Foy and Barton, 1999,165
89 Foy and Barton, 1999,165
90 Norway, 1999,49
91 Redmond-Howard, 1916, 61
92 Stephens in Kee, 1983,272
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military age,’ on the first day of the Rising had been viewed in a particularly 
negative light, especially given that these men had been on a route march 
through the Irish countryside, and though carrying weapons had no 
ammunition.93 Those that had witnessed the death of the British Lancer at the 
start of the Rising had considered it to be no less than an act of murder.94 These 
emotions were further exacerbated by the shooting of a civilian trying to 
extricate a cart from a Volunteer barricade, something which transformed the 
crowd’s mood from ‘bewildered curiosity [to] one of hate for the Volunteers.’95 
There were various stories of motorists having their cars confiscated to be 
placed in barricades in a menacing and violent manner, and these stories did 
little to endear them to their audience.96 Facts in stories like these were 
consistently exaggerated in the telling, such that a report of a single individual 
being shot and killed was rapidly exaggerated into several, or several dozen.97
The sense of outrage, however, has to be balanced with the feeling that 
the reactions of the British forces were not entirely commensurate with the 
actions of the Volunteers. There was a sense that the shelling of the entirety of 
central Dublin was an extreme reaction. The blame for the shelling of central 
Dublin, and the vast amount of death and destruction by Irish and British forces 
was placed on the Volunteers and their ‘irresponsible’ actions. The shelling was 
greeted with open shock and horror, giving one woman ‘cold shivers’ and when 
the Helga shelled Liberty Hall, that ‘nest of sedition’, it made her feel ‘quite 
sick.’98 Even the Irish Times described the shelling as ‘reverberating with nerve-
93 Kee, 1983,271
94 Redmond-Howard, 1916,3-4
95 Kee, 1983,27; Stephens, 1992,17
96 Stephens, 1992 13
97 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
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wracking explosives’."  This shelling was also contextualised within the 
reported imagery of the War on the continent, and therefore it seemed to the 
contemporary observers that the War had now arrived in Ireland.100
Comments on the actions of the Volunteers and British Troops indicate 
this mixed reaction and ambiguity. One letter describes the Sherwood Foresters 
as blazing ‘wildly away at everyone indiscriminately ... [having become] 
hysterical with panic and [taking] everyone for a rebel.’101 In this same letter, 
however, the actions of the soldiers are described as being typified by kindness 
and gentleness, leading to a good reception by the people. As word spread of 
Bowen-Colthurst’s execution of Sheehy-Skeffmgton, there was a demonstrable 
negative feeling about the actions of the British forces, a negative feeling that 
would later be compounded and became exponentially greater as news of the 
executions trickled out. These stories, however, must be counterbalanced by 
accounts that emphasised the decency of the British troops and officers -  one 
Volunteer who was particularly young being given a clip round the ear, and told 
to ‘get the hell home’ when they surrendered.102 Another Volunteer, who had 
given his age as nineteen, was told by a British officer that he should have lied
i mand said that he was younger so that he would be released. In fact most 
accounts mention that, despite several notable exceptions, ‘the British officers 
and troops treated [the volunteers] with all the kindness and consideration their 
own position permitted.’104 This was in contrast to reports of British soldiers
99 Weekly Irish Times, in 1916 Rebellion Handbook 1998, 7
100 Norway, 1999,66
101 Letter in Edwards and Pyle, 1968, 203
102 Harling’s Account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998, 76
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firing at drunks and those who were clearly non-combatants in the streets, such 
that they ‘showed them no mercy at all’105
The actions of the British forces were contrasted with depictions of 
Volunteer ‘savagery.’ One man described a prisoner of the Volunteers who was 
shot while trying to escape, being ‘a terrible case.*106 Civilian casualties were 
also often blamed on the actions of the Volunteers, for example old ladies were 
being shot and having to have legs amputated, and a servant who mistakenly 
flashed an electric light was ‘instantly shot through the head’ by a Volunteer
107smper. Even where the wounds were incidental or caused by ricochet, etc. the
1052accounts of the day place the blame squarely on the Volunteers. Other stories 
were of Volunteers luring British troops with the raising of a white flag only to
10Qfire on them upon approach. Of course such stories directly contrasted with 
the impression that the Volunteers wanted to give. Whether these stories were 
factually true is immaterial
The savagery of the actions of the Volunteers however contrasted with 
the way that the leaders of the Rising were described, even by those who were 
not sympathetic to the radical nationalist cause, as being good men who ‘died 
like saints ... mystics who kept the light burning.’110 Descriptions of the 
Volunteers are marked by a ‘common feature’ of acting like regular soldiers, 
with great self-control, discipline and honour.111 Their objectives were
117described as creating a momentum for everyone to fall in behind them. They 
were seen as having ‘brought great and terrible trouble’ but having meant to do
105 Sweeney’s Account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998
106 Norway, 1999,45
107 Norway, 1999,51
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I l lthe exact opposite. There were stories of British officers being captured, after 
mistakenly entering the General Post Office wishing to buy stamps and then 
being forced to peel potatoes for a meal which they would later share with the 
Volunteers.114 Various accounts also emphasised the discipline with which 
Volunteers acted in the General Post Office, not looting cash registers despite 
them being full of money.115 They cast this story as an example of the high 
degree of morality amongst the participants in the Rising, despite their 
misguided actions over Easter Week.
Moral rectitude and civility were important aspects of the Volunteer 
strategy. From the viewpoint of today, while the executions of some participants 
might have been expected and not entirely unjustified given the context, stories 
such as that of Plunkett’s wedding were public relations ‘coups’ for the 
Volunteers. The Volunteers were desperate to maintain order after reading the 
proclamation outside of the General Post Office, but looting soon followed as 
word spread of their actions. They attempted to prevent the sacking of Sackville 
Street without harming the destitute, who had spilled out from the tenements to 
loot the candy stores, hat shops, and department stores. Towards this end, 
Connolly had instilled a policy that the Volunteers were not allowed to shoot 
looters, even if they themselves felt that this was the best way to prevent the 
looting.116 However there were various accounts of the Volunteers shooting 
looters in order to prevent their actions.117
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Ultimately, the Rising was marked by as many claims of kindness as of
1152atrocities. One commentator mentions the peculiarity of the scene of the 
arrival of the soldiers from England into Kingstown, where ‘the whole 
population turned out to cheer them’ but when this group of Sherwood Foresters 
marched into Dublin, they quickly found themselves in the bloodiest and 
deadliest episode in the conflagration.119 For every report of friendly women 
supplying the arriving troops with tea and biscuits there were counter-stories of 
the civilians of Dublin being complicit in ambush tactics against British 
soldiers, or that the tea and biscuits the women were providing were laced with
i onpoison to kill them. For British troops it must have been contusing, 
perplexing and exhausting to regularly encounter both extremes of the Irish 
sentiment towards them, and this must have made these troops weary and 
untrusting.
Opinion hardened against the Volunteers over the entire course of the 
Rising, but especially after the British began shelling central Dublin.121 This 
animosity though has to be tempered with the disbelief that this could be 
occurring in Dublin and in Ireland, rather than on the continent.122 Such 
confused outlooks were, in part, due to the shock of witnessing scenes such as a 
man with ‘all his lower jaw blown away’ through machine gun fire.123 When the 
Volunteers had withdrawn from the trenches in Stephens Green, young boys 
had tried to jump the fence and explore them. However, the Green had become 
a kind of no man’s land between the Volunteer and British positions, and the
118 Foy and Barton, 1999,177-80
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boys found that ‘bullets were quickening their fee t... small boys do not believe 
that people will really kill them, but small boys were killed.’124
Amongst women the hardening in attitudes towards the Volunteers was 
particularly apparent; with regular assertions that these actions constituted a 
‘civil war’ and that the participants should be shot.125 This was especially true 
for the poorer women who lived in the tenements neighbouring the General Post 
Office, many of whom had husbands and relations fighting for the British on the 
continent, and who depended on pensions for survival. The urban poor had 
economically benefited from the War. 126 The reaction amongst ‘the lower 
classes’ were thought generally to be ‘necessarily more complex and uncertain 
... there was a divided allegiance in that some of their relations and friends were
177fighting in the rebel ranks, while others fought in ... Irish regiments.’ While 
they may have facilitated a ‘negative support,* i.e. aiding an escape, they 
‘extended no active support... the mass of popular opinion manifested itself as 
unmistakeably not with the rebels.’128 This group in particular felt that the 
Rising, in its entirety, was a German plot.129 Indeed for Dublin’s poor, the War 
had produced financial gain in that it ‘provided relief for a congested labour 
market through enlistment... and by the prosperity of industries concerned with 
war work . . . ,13° These benefits though were precarious, not least because this 
war time prosperity was dependent on the weekly payments of salaries and 
allowances to wives of soldiers. This group had already felt their position and 
their access to these resources were under threat prior to the Rising, when it was 
reported in January 1916 that these payments were leading to increasing levels
124 Stephens, 1992, 33
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of drunkenness and moral debauchery.131 When this money was not available, 
on account of the events of the Rising, and with the concern that such payments 
could or would be cut off in retaliation for perceived Irish disloyalty, anxieties 
ran high amongst the working class of Dublin, and in particular working class 
women.
The reactions amongst the upper and middle classes were typified by a 
belief in the British soldiers as ‘deliverers from the regime of anarchy.’132 Of 
course, it wasn’t just poor Irishmen that had joined the British Army, Redmond 
had pledged the National Volunteers to the War effort, and encouraged young 
men to enlist in the British Army so as to, in a sense, earn Home Rule. By the 
time of the Rising, rich and poor, urban and rural had heeded this call so that for 
every one Irishman who participated in the Rising there 80 serving in the British 
Army.133
Conclusion
From start to finish the actions of the Volunteers were confused and 
lacked the necessary organisation, manpower and tactics to succeed. Beginning 
with the debacle of landing Casement’s arms, with the digging of trenches on 
Stephens Green, and ending in the destruction of central Dublin, none of their 
military objectives were achieved. Even in its symbolic aims and objectives, 
the Rising initially failed. As an exercise in public relations, the Volunteers, 
were accused of as many atrocities as acts of kindness. There certainly is no 
evidence of a spontaneous impulsion of the masses to the radical nationalism of 
the Irish Volunteers -  no mass rush to take up arms in sympathy with the 
Volunteers. The moments of greatest symbolic significance, such as Pearse’s 
reading of the proclamation, perplexed those who witnessed them. Reactions to
131 Codd, 1986, 25
132 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,159
133 Falls, 1967,213
187
the Rising are universally characterised by a sense of bewilderment. Observers 
could not quite believe their eyes. Violence and war occurred on the Continent, 
not the cosy confines of Dublin. Ireland in general and Dublin in particular had 
grown fat off of the War, and though there were real fears of conscription, it had 
been, thus far, a British war fought on Irish terms.
Soon after the outbreak of the Rising, the confusion tended to turn to 
outrage. There were accounts of Volunteer and British atrocities. In the 
reactions to the Rising, no blame for the Rising was initially apportioned to the 
British. Even if rumours had it that conscription was to be secretly debated, 
perhaps enacted, even if the Castle Document was perceived as being a real and 
imminent threat, it was a more or less universal perception that the Volunteers 
had picked this quarrel with the British. Therefore, despite some evidence of 
grudging respect for their bravery and civility, their defeat was never doubted, 
and the feet that they should be punished not in question. What would later 
come to haunt the British authorities was how it was that this ultimately 
sympathetic attitude could be squandered in the aftermath of the Rising -  how 
fifteen executions demonstrated too much brutality, and was not perceived as 
showing enough sympathy or respect for the Volunteers. This miscalculation 
would lead directly to the cultural trigger point and the transformation o f 
popular Irish nationalism. It is, however, of the utmost importance to recognise 
that this entire process exponentially heightened tensions amongst all 
individuals in Ireland. Anxiety and confusion now reigned supreme, and when it 
came time to interpret and make sense of the executions, and rumours of the 
executions in the aftermath of the Rising these anxieties and confusions led to a 
great deal of pressure and concern for individuals in the Irish nation. The 
ground had been fertilised for the eventual moment of the cultural trigger point,
188
and this would lead to the absolute and definite transformation of the Irish 
nation, from moderate to radical. Though the Volunteers had initially failed to 
impel support for radical nationalism, the actions of the British authorities 
would complete this action for them.
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Chapter 6:
The Transformation of Perspectives
on the Rising
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0  but we talked at large before 
The sixteen men were shot,
But who can talk o f give and take,
What should be and what not
While those dead men are loitering there
To stir the boiling pot.
From Sixteen Dead Men by W.B. Yeats
Introduction
Religious, cultural and political nationalism, as expressed in the myths, 
memories and symbols of the Irish nation provided the repertoire by which the 
sixteen executions in the wake of the Rising were contextualised. This context 
reinforced the notion of Irish organic distinctiveness and victimhood. The 
previous chapter demonstrated the states of confusion, anxiety and outrage 
which pervaded initial reactions to the Rising, prior to the fifteen executions 
after the Rising, and the later execution of Roger Casement.1 These executions 
and the policy of retribution on the part of the British authorities triggered a 
radicalisation in popular perceptions of the Rising, evident in the new popular 
attitudes towards radical nationalism, through the change of the Irish view of the 
Anglo-Irish relationship, and the transformation of the reputation and depiction 
of those who participated in the Rising and were executed after Easter Week.
This chapter is comprised of two sections. The first will establish the 
role that Irish national myths, memories and symbols played in contextualising 
the accounts of these events in the immediate transformation of the perceptions 
of the executions. The second, will examine how accounts of these events 
triggered action on the part of individuals in the Irish nation -  literally how
1 From herein these 16 executions will be simply referred to as ‘the executions.’ The set of 
events which I will describe as ‘the aftermath’ of the Rising will include the executions and the 
imposition of martial law by the British authorities in reaction to the events of the Rising.
191
perceptions of these events spurred individuals to participate in or demonstrate 
support for radical Irish nationalism.
Part I: Sectarianism and ‘Organic Distinctiveness9
The Rising was an attempt by radical nationalists to revive Gaelic 
culture and to return Ireland to the former glory of its mythical Golden Age 
through physical force -  it was ultimately a movement of restoration.2 Even 
though this vision was unpopular, not particularly resonant, and considered 
radical in the extreme, as a position it was familiar to members of the Irish 
nation. Nationalism in general, and radical nationalism in particular was 
predicated on the assumption that Ireland was distinct from its Anglo- 
counterpart. In the aftermath of the Rising, when the executions were perceived 
to be an overreaction, comparatively unjust, and carried out in an unfair manner, 
and at a time when martial law was being applied in such a way as to exacerbate 
these issues, the radical nationalist restorative project returned to the fore.
The antipathy towards the executions was contextualised within ‘cultural 
truisms’ and British behaviour. On the one hand, it was observed that the Rising 
generally had had the effect of ‘stirring up the old bad feeling which all patriotic 
men hoped the Great War would kill out.* In this context it was reported that 
‘the feelings of the people became hostile to the Government.’4 On the other 
hand, some contemporary commentators more explicitly blamed the process of 
radicalisation on British policy -  and especially contradictions in its application. 
It was felt that the Government had ‘made no attempt to explain the real gravity 
of the Rebellion’ encouraging a belief that it had been ‘merely a sort of street
2 Kautt, 1999,57
3 Report in the situation in Co. Cork, East Riding, May 1916, C0904/100 PRO Kew
4 Report on the situation in Kilkenny, 1916 CO903/19 PRO Kew
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riot on an extensive scale.’5 This then ‘threw into disproportionately high relief 
the punishment inflicted on the leaders of the rising.’6 Denying legitimacy to the 
Rising and radical nationalists, a reasonable and strategic reaction on the part of 
the British authorities, begged the question -  why then did the signatories and 
others deserve to die?
One aspect of British reactions to the Rising that became particularly 
inflammatory was that they were veiled in secrecy. Rumours of British savagery 
and overreaction flourished because courts-marital and executions were carried 
out in secrecy. Secrecy led to a context in which all British actions were subject 
to exaggeration and made more horrific than they actually were.7 It was 
believed that British policies after the Rising, in so far as they were secret, 
accounted for the ‘the wildest rumours in circulation ... exciting popular 
apprehensions.’8 This secrecy, in combination with what was perceived as the 
summary nature of these trials, did little to inspire confidence in British 
institutional reactions to the Rising, and this course of action was said to be 
‘inflaming public opinion.’9
Secrecy also contributed to the levels of uncertainty and fanned rumours 
and exaggerations of British belligerence and cruelty, in so far as no one 
definitively knew the boundaries of acceptable behaviour under this regime. The 
result was to make punishment seem random and arbitrary rather than just and 
transparent. There were reports of prisoners having been often arrested because
5 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,203
6 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,203
7 Kautt, 1999,47
8 The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 9 May 1916
9 See Kautt for discussion of Wylie and Campbell, Kautt, 1999, 46-49, see also newspapers, 
including Freeman’s Journal, 9 May 1916
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they were known to speak Irish at home.10 Others noted in their personal diaries 
that it was ‘not quite safe to be too free with the pen as the most innocent 
expressions are liable to cause trouble.’11 Others told stories of individuals 
being arrested and sentenced to long prison terms despite holding no rank or 
office in the Irish Volunteers.12 Even Eoin MacNeill, who had not known of the 
planning of the Rising, and had done everything in his power to stop it, despite 
his misgivings about the Castle Document, was found guilty by the British 
authorities and sentenced to life imprisonment in Dartmoor.13 One story went as 
far as to say that MacNeill faced execution unless he implicated Dillon, who 
abhorred radical nationalism and was a moderate constitutional nationalist and 
staunch supporter of Redmond, in the organising of the Rising.14
In this context, no one knew what the British policies or reactions were, 
or why they might be carried out. This led to a situation where it was 
‘persistently stated that a large number of prisoners were secretly massacred.’15 
Dillon himself alluded to the manner in which the secrecy of the trials and 
executions was ‘poisoning the mind of Ireland.’16 Further exacerbation of this 
insecurity occurred because of the perceived injustice regarding the trials of the 
participants in the Rising. For those accused, there was no defence counsel, on 
the grounds it would give them a platform for ‘grandstanding,’ and there was no 
appeal from their sentence.17 Accounts of these trials did leak out. Plunkett’s
10 Letter from Mabel Fitzgerald to Archbishop Walsh, 24 May 1916, Archbishop’s Papers 
Reference Number 385/1, 5-7
11 Papers Relating to Alphonsus Sweeney, MS. 35454, 1-14 NLI, ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by 
Thomas King Moylan’ MS. 9620 NLI
12 Letter from Mabel Fitzgerald to Archbishop Walsh, 24 May 1916, Archbishop’s Papers 
Reference Number 385/1, 5-7
13 Kee, 1982,7
14 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS 27728, NLI
15 Dillon Papers in Hennessey, 1998,139
16 Dillon’s Speech to Commons, in Kautt, 1999,47
17 Kautt, 1999,48
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‘Pathetic Wedding* was especially heralded in the Freeman’s Journal being 
summarised as ‘a touching element of pathos and romance,’ and with the events 
being described as ‘buying a ring, married that night, executed that morning.’18 
These stories served to further inflame rumour and insecurity, heightening the 
fame of and sympathy for the participants in the Rising, who were now being 
popularly rehabilitated as ‘lads’ whose actions were misguided but brave and 
selfless.
As events in the aftermath of the Rising were carried out in secret, 
without recourse to appeal and in a retributive manner, it was also perceived 
that ‘normal* democratic politics had broken down and were now absent. This, 
in turn, served to heighten concerns in Ireland that the British Army, no friend 
of moderate constitutional Irish nationalism, let alone the radical variety of 
nationalism, was being given a free hand to govern and bring retribution for the 
Rising as it saw fit.19
Indications that cultural nationalism and the latent expression of Irish 
organic distinctiveness were part of the process of radicalisation are evident in 
references to ‘hundreds of years of difference’ and the ‘inherent’ differences 
between Irishman and the English/British. These references, in the aftermath, 
were as likely to come from moderate constitutional nationalists as they were 
from radical nationalists. For example, Dillon was ‘thoroughly sympathetic’ to 
the change in opinion while ‘filled with indignation’ about the executions and 
the rule which was being put on Ireland by the military administration in Dublin 
Castle.20 In a speech to the Commons, he stated that the actions of the British 
authorities were ‘letting loose a river of blood ... between two races who, after
18 Freeman’s Journal April 26- May 5, 1916
19 Kautt, 1999,49
20 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
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three hundred years of hatred and strife, we nearly succeeded in bringing
* I
together.’ This same speech also drew a clear distinction between Irish 
‘insurgents’ and ‘your soldiers’ in so far as ‘it would be a damned good thing 
for you if your soldiers were able to put up as good a fight as these men did in 
Dublin.’22 Indeed, Dillon, in his extreme frustration with the treatment of 
Ireland and the participants in the Rising stated that ‘it’s our country, though 
you seem to look upon it as a kind of backgarden of this country that you can 
trample into the dust without any consideration at all.’23 For such a prominent 
member of the Irish Party to express these culturally loaded sentiments indicates 
exactly how dramatic the contemporary transformation was.
Even for Augustine Birrell, Undersecretary in Ireland, there was a belief 
that the newly popular radical nationalism was ‘composed of the old hatred and 
distrust of the British connection ... always there was a background of Irish 
politics and character ... this dislike is hard to define but easy to discern.’24 
Other contemporary accounts make reference to the ‘old suspicion and dislike 
of the British Army which the War seems to have destroyed gain[ing] a new 
lease of bitter life.’25 Local Councils passed resolutions to ‘press’ the authorities
to release men who ‘have been respectable, peaceable, and law abiding citizens
0(\and ... were in no way connected with disturbances ... ’ This sentiment was 
also observed at an institutional level with RIC reports noting that ‘it must be
21 Dillon’s speech in Kautt, 1999,48
22 Dillon in Kautt, 1999,50
23 Dillon in Kautt, 1999,51
24 Birrell in Hennessey, 1998,140
25 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,208
26 Resolution passed by Urban District of Fermoy, 25 May 1916 in O’Day and Stevenson, 1992, 
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remembered that hostility to England has always been more or less ingrained in 
the Irish character.’27
Contemporary observers referred to ‘English’ soldiers as ‘reared to 
regard every Irishman as a rebel.’28 One woman commented in a letter that 
when trying to shoot a sniper, the British had used as much ammunition as 
‘would wipe out a German regiment ... But then the British don’t hate the 
Germans the way they hate us.’29 The treatment of the Irish belligerents was 
compared to that of German prisoners, such that ‘they don’t shoot German 
Prisoners although they call them ‘Huns’ and ‘baby-killers’ they only shoot 
brave Irish boys.’30 Martial Law became identified with ‘odious memories of 
regimes of “Coercion” which had been fading into the forgotten backgrounds of 
Irish history.’31
There are many examples of how the actions of the authorities helped to 
fuel rumour and stirred up antipathy and distrust of ‘Castle’ rule. For example, 
the murder of Sheehy-Skeffington (detailed in last chapter) had occurred during 
‘what was euphemistically called “The Rounding Up of the Rebels” and “House 
to House Visitation,”’ a situation that it was noted was occurring ‘while the 
citizens of Dublin were confined to their own houses under penalty of death if 
they stirred.’32 The further persecution of Hannah Sheehy-Skeffington, after the 
murder of her husband, did little to inspire confidence in the justness and 
impartiality of the British forces. Even the official British accounts of these
27 Report on Co. Meath, 1917 CO903/19 PRO Kew
28 Papers Relating to Alphonsus Sweeney, MS. 35454, 1-14 NLI, ‘A Dubliner’s Diary by 
Thomas King Moylan’ MS. 9620 NLI
29 Letter quoted in Kautt, 1999,52
30 Letter from Patricia Lynch, quoted in Kautt, 1999, 50
31 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,208
32 Redmond-Howard, 1916,59
33 See Report of the Royal Commission on the Arrest and Subsequent Treatment of Francis 
Sheehy-Skeffington, etc. in The Irish Uprising 1914-21,2000
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events stated that ‘Mrs. Skeffington and her boy had bayonets pointed at them 
and were ordered to hold their hands above their heads* while rooms in their 
house were ‘thoroughly ransacked.’34 This treatment was being meted out to a 
woman who was commonly known throughout Dublin to be a feminist- 
vegetarian-pacifist -  odd perhaps, but no radical. This harassment was carried 
out soon after her husband’s murder, during a search for evidence. The 
authorities searched her house twice, the second time arresting and holding the 
maid for a week. When the house of Thomas Dickson, who had been murdered 
with Sheehy-Skeffington, was similarly searched, a bag full of documents was 
removed from his house and placed in the house of Alderman Kelly -  the same 
Alderman Kelly who had published details of the afore mentioned ‘Castle 
Document’ -  and it was suggested by some that it was done ‘with the object of 
attaching suspicion to Alderman Kelly.’35 The effects of such incidents must be 
understood beyond their immediate context -  because the veil of secrecy meant 
that stories such as these rapidly became wildly exaggerated rumours and this 
had the effect of making these stories greatly distressing to the public at large.
Another example of negative reaffirmation of Irish conceptions of 
distinction was the perceived different and negative treatment that Ireland 
suffered after the Rising compared to other parts of the Empire. The fate of the 
participants in the Rising was also compared to the fate of participants in the 
Boer War some 20 years before the Rising.36 The executions were considered to 
be particularly unfair when they were compared to the British reactions to the
34 Royal Commission on the Arrest and Subsequent Treatment of Francis Sheehy-Skeffington in 
The Irish Uprising 1914-21, 2000,144-5
35 Report of the Royal Commission, 146
36 Hennessey, 1998,142
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‘more wicked and dangerous rebellion in South Africa.’37 The Freeman alluded 
to the way that ‘men are pointing to the contrast with South Africa where the 
victorious general who put down the rebellion ... proved to be a wise and 
prudent statesman ... People are asking, what is the difference?*38 This level of 
comparison was common, so that even when the Archbishop of Dublin tried to 
explain to the Royal Commission what he saw as the causes that lay behind the 
Rising, he made specific reference to Ireland’s political position vis a vis South 
Africa, Canada and Australia. This comparison would later become important, 
when, during the negotiations over the treaty to establish the Irish Free State, the 
British would draft in General Smuts to encourage the Irish to accept the terms.
Popular Beatification
While this latent sectarianism and sense of organic Irish distinctiveness 
was emerging in direct response to British policies, it became apparent that 
these were having a radicalising effect on Irish nationalism. Those who were at 
first reviled for their participation in the Rising were now starting to be 
reinvented and rehabilitated as ‘misguided* but brave and selfless. Their 
reinvention and rehabilitation was complete when this was combined with 
religious images of martyrdom and with their popular beatification.
This was already evident in the comments of politicians such as 
Matthew Keating, an Irish Party MP, that the Rising, and in particular the 
alliance of the volunteers with Germany was ‘between an angel and a demon in 
the cause of virtue.’40 For The Nation this moral rectitude meant that, though 
they considered ‘these men to be deeply guilty ... they were not hard, cynical or
37 Hennessey, 1998, 141-2; Lee, 1989 35-37
38 The Daily Freeman's Journal, 9 May 1916
39 Statement of Monsignar Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
40 Kilkenny People, quoted in Hennessey, 1998,140
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self seeking .. . ,41 Dillon refers to those being executed not as murderers but as 
‘insurgents who have fought a good clean fight, however misguided.’42 When 
Keating’s comments appeared in the Kilkenny People the paper responded that 
if public men had ‘nothing to say in favour of brave if misguided men who 
fought and fell, let them be sparing of their censure ... *43 Some papers opined 
that though they found the pursuit of the Rising insane or abhorrent, the fete of 
the leaders was a ‘sad one’ worthy of sympathy, especially for those who had 
participated after having been ‘gulled and poisoned by pro-Germanism’ and was 
ultimately worthy of mercy.44
The first stage of apologism: that the participants were poorly led, 
misguided or gulled, soon gave way to depictions of their morally upstanding 
characters, their love of the Catholic faith, and their ‘Gaelic’ bravery. For one 
commentator, the men who were executed were ‘good men ... who willed no 
evil, and whose movements of body or brain were unselfish and healthy’ and 
that it was ‘mournful to think of men like these having to take charge of bloody 
and cursed work.’45 The sense of moral rectitude therefore extended out from a 
personal trait to the way in which the participants in the Rising fought, so that 
‘from every quarter we have the same account; that the poor foolish young 
fellows made a good clean gallant fight... hence a great wave of sympathy has 
gone out to their memory from every true Irish heart.’46 This sense of 
upstanding moral character and rectitude facilitated the translation of sympathy 
for the executed into an expression of cultural and religious nationalism. Even
41 The Nation as quoted in The Daily Freeman’s Journal, 9 May 1916
42 Dillon in Kautt, 1999,50
43 Kilkenny People, quoted in Hennessey, 1998,140
44 Dungannon Democrat in Hennessey, 1998,141
45 Stephens, 1992, 89,92
46 Murphy in Hennessey, 1998,142
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amongst moderate nationalists there was a recognition that ‘they died like saints 
though they had brought great and terrible trouble on Ireland.’47 Other 
contemporary observers report that the executed men were ‘passing into legend* 
and that a key part of this legend was their ‘scrupulously upright characters’ and 
that the ‘posthumous fame of Pearse and his comrades tended to encourage 
pietism throughout Ireland.’48
The process of rehabilitation for Pearse and his companions is evidence 
of the power of the combination of cultural and religious nationalisms in 
Ireland. In this synergy, the restorative project of radical nationalism becomes 
evident, for example, in contemporary popular religious expression. The role of 
the Catholic Church in this radicalisation in the aftermath of the Rising was not 
its traditional one of providing political direction, an outlet for emotional 
expression of guilt, or mechanisms for prescribed forms of social and political 
organisation. Instead, the Church was used by the members of the Irish nation in 
a ‘bottom-up’ fashion, to express their distress at the aftermath of the Rising -  a 
function of mass emotional expression which had been, as discussed in previous 
chapters, engineered as part of Cullen’s devotional revolution 49 This process 
can be observed where religious and cultural practice was curtailed by the 
British authorities. In order to bury the civilian dead during Easter Week, 
families were forced to apply for a permit and a pass, and then at Glasnevin 
cemetery, ‘every coffin passing was opened and the remains examined ... the 
gruesome duty was ... carried out by plain clothes officers of the police force.’50 
This meant that even beyond the myths and symbolism of the executions, it
47 Letter cited in Edwards and Pyle, 1968,204-5
48 Kee, 1982,15; Contemporary Review as cited in Whyte, 1967,224
49 See especially the work of Drumm, 1996
50 Freeman’s Journal April 26 -  May 5,1916 p. 4
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appeared that the British authorities, in their imposition of martial law, were 
interfering with the sacred moral and religious duty of dignifying and burying 
the dead.
However, the link between Irish organic distinctiveness extended 
beyond the mortal treatment of the participants in the Rising, to their immortal 
souls as well. There was an explicit juxtaposition between the ‘slaughtered Irish 
recruit’ sent to certain death and murder so that ‘England might live,* and the 
‘slain Irish Volunteer’ proudly dying for their Irish nation.51 The recruit was 
depicted as a restless ghost, the Volunteer as ‘at peace and blessed by Jesus 
Christ.’52 In popular depictions, skeletons and graves “characterised” the fate of 
the Irish recruit, whereas the separatist martyr was instead immortal, being 
‘destined to rise again in the heart of the Irish nation itself.’ This was not the 
traditional institutional role of the Irish Catholic Church, but the expression of a 
popular and resonant ‘folk’ Catholicism. The juxtaposition was not just of the 
fate of the soul, but of the anglicised nature of the recruit, and the Gaelic 
Irishness of the Volunteer -  a distinction which made the portrayal of the Rising 
as a spiritual triumph more potent and more resonant than a mere political 
victory.54 This meant in contemporary imagery that Jesus accompanied the 
Volunteers into martyrdom -  and this imagery was then tied the deaths of 
Pearse and his companions, to notions not only of martyrdom, but of 
resurrection which was inherent in the core restorative project of radical 
nationalism. The mix of religious and cultural imagery, of martyrdom and self- 
sacrifice, discipline and moral rectitude meant that the Volunteers were
51 Ellis, 2001,28
52 Ellis, 2001,28
53 Ellis, 2001, 29
54 Ellis, 2001, 28
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perceived by contemporary observers as part of a national tradition based on an 
‘inherent righteousness and sanctity of a cause hallowed by the blood of the 
martyrs.’55
These sacred depictions of the Volunteers indicated a process that 
unofficially but popularly beatified those that had been executed, a process that 
not only recounted their miracle, Easter Week, but also their strong moral 
characters before their sacred act. References were regularly made to the 
executed as being ‘good men ... they died like Saints ... mystics who kept the 
light burning.*56 This was part of a greater ‘patriotic cult’ which rose up around 
the Rising, which lent itself to the ‘flood of rebel memorabilia, o f postcards, 
mass cards, song sheets, pamphlets, flags, badges’ etc.
This was not a novel use of these particular myths, memories or symbols 
in Ireland. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Manchester 
Martyrs had been depicted as the ‘noble-hearted three,* with prayers and the 
recitation of the Rosary playing a central role in public commemorations of 
their executions.58 Indeed these commemorations explicitly linked death in the 
Feinian cause with early Christian martyrdom.59 In the wake of the executions 
of the participants in the Rising, a temporary structure to commemorate the 
‘martyrdom’ of Pearse and his companions was erected by the side of the 
Manchester Martyrs memorial in Glasnevin cemetery, despite General Maxwell, 
commander of the British forces in Ireland during the period of martial law, 
holding back the physical remains of these men. The extent to which the 
propagation of this imagery was intentional on the part of those participants in
55 Ellis, 2001,30
56 Letter in Kautt, 1999, 52
57 Hart, 1998,207; Novick, 2002,38-40
58 McGee, 2001
59 McGee, 2001
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the Rising who were not executed, or whether it emerged as a function of 
radical nationalist ‘propaganda’ in its wake is unclear. However it is apparent 
that these comparisons were ‘conjured* in the wake of the executions in the full 
knowledge of their potential resonance.60
With the process of rehabilitation for participants in the Rising almost 
complete, all that remained was to link the institutional reorganisation of radical 
nationalism with the institutional power, legitimacy and authority of the Church. 
This was accomplished by asserting the ‘traditional’ Catholic credentials of the 
‘Sinn Feiners’ through their regular and faithful participation in the rites and 
rituals of the Church. Accounts of participants who were arrested and interned 
in the wake of the Rising emphasise their religious character, such that they 
were always praying the rosary, attending mass, etc.61 One of the first letters 
which the Archbishop received from internees at Knutsford, drew his attention 
to the feet that ‘95% of the men detained here are Catholics’ and that there were 
no arrangements to hear mass, with internees generally being ‘treated more like 
dogs than like Christians and [being] unable to see a priest.’62 From the 
internees themselves, there are regular references to the importance of religious 
practice, such as the saying of the rosary while being shipped in British 
merchant vessels from Ireland to Britain, and regularly on arrival at the 
internment camp ‘for the repose of the souls of those poor fellows who lost their 
lives in the rebellion.’63 Upon their arrival in the camps one internee remarked 
that ‘it was impressive to look over row after row of kneeling men many of
60 See Ellis (2001) for a description of this process
61 Brennan-Whitmore, 1996,117
62 Letter dated 29 May 1916,385/7 Archbishop Walsh Papers
63 Two Letters from P. O’Connor, Irish Prisoner, Knutsofrd, 20 June 1916 MS. 4615
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them saying a fervent prayer for our latest Irish martyrs who gave their lives in a 
glorious cause.’64
The process of transformation which led to radicalisation was therefore 
highly dependent on the rehabilitation of Pearse and his companions. The 
myths, memories and symbols of Irish cultural and religious nationalism 
provided a well trodden, accessible and ready made repertoire to aid in this 
process. The executed and still living participants in the Rising went from being 
booed, to being misguided, then misguided but selfless and brave, to morally 
strong, to finally undergoing a process of popular beatification which lent these 
figures a sacred quality. The flipside to this process was the demonisation of 
British actions. This helped to develop the perception, at an individual level 
through the myths, memories and symbols of the nation, that British reactions to 
the Rising were inherently unjust and retributive.
Part II: Trigger Action
Prior to the executions, before the full effect of the Rising became 
evident, the Chief Secretary in Ireland, Augustine Birrell, had written ‘It is not 
an Irish rebellion ... it would be a pity if ex post facto it became one .. . ,65 
Birrell was picking up on the apparent and general lack of initial resonance of 
and support for the Rising by the Irish nation, as described in chapter 5. 
However, this ex post facto process was exactly what was commencing as he 
wrote these words. The news of the executions began a process of 
transformation amongst the Irish nation, causing ‘bitter feelings,’ with the
64 From account of internee, MS. 31326 NLI
65 Birrel in Kee, 1982,1
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imposition of martial law serving to ‘intensify’ this feeling.66 Contemporary 
accounts of actions which were particularly ‘strong’ and unwarranted regularly 
featured in popular depiction of the imposition of martial law in Ireland. 
Various RIC reports allude to the feet that while martial law provided a 
‘prompt, ready and effective instrument for the repression and punishment of 
crime and disorder,’ it did not take away from the fact that under the surface and 
despite martial law ‘there [was] a strong current of hostility towards England 
and sympathy with Sinn Feinism.’67
Whereas radical nationalism had been a weak force in Ireland before the 
Rising, after the execution of the leaders of the Rising, their message was 
disseminated fer and wide, and heard by those who previously would have 
rejected them out of hand. The initial condemnation of the Rising was observed 
as being a function not of ‘patriotic motives or the injury done the Empire’ but 
rather that the actions of the ‘Sinn Feiners’ had damaged the prospects of Home 
Rule. Though their actions had failed, British reactions created a social context 
in which their message began to resonate. Though broadly unknown before the 
Rising, these men would become famous in death.69 This was noted by 
contemporary observers, such that on execution those who had been ‘without 
any wide public influence in their lives, became popular heroes and martyrs’ 
after their execution.70 In RIC intelligence reports from 1916, there is a 
recognition that ‘the shooting of the rebels and the speeches of Dillon have 
created sympathisers with the Rising arousing people outside the Sinn Fein 
Party ... even though they desired to see the Rebellion put down, they did not
66 O’Malley in Kautt, 1999,50
67 Report on Co. Tyrone, 1916 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
68 Report on the situation in Co. Tyrone, 1916 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
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approve of the shooting of the rebels . . . ,71 In RIC memos there was regular 
reference to the momentum now enjoyed by these ‘rebels.*72
Contemporary accounts emphasise the cumulative effects that the 
courts-martial had in raising Irish pulses and transforming opinion. Information 
emerged day by day in a ‘piecemeal’ fashion, only serving to heighten concerns 
and anxieties over these actions.73 Even the staunchly moderate and 
constitutional nationalist newspaper, The Daily Freeman had identified the 
‘wholly disastrous* effect that this set of policies was having on popular 
sentiment, arousing sympathy ‘with the victims where nothing but indignant 
condemnation of their criminal enterprise previously existed.*74 For Dillon, 
there was a belief that the British authorities were ‘doing everything 
conceivable to madden the Irish people ... and to spread disaffection and 
bitterness from one end of the country to the other.’75 One contemporary 
observer stated that mistakes in the implementation of martial law were serving 
to ‘add fuel to the fire against the regime.*76 In light of this, when there were 
hundreds being arrested every day, it was hardly surprising that there was fear 
and antipathy towards British reactions to the Rising.77
Sir Roger Casement’s execution is another case where the 
implementation of the policy of retribution exacerbated the situation. Whereas 
Pearse and his companions had been executed in the immediate, and confusing 
aftermath of the Rising, Casement was executed in a more sober period when
71 Report in the situation in Co. Clare May 1916, CO904/23 PRO Kew
72 Minutes for Release of Interned Sinn Feiner Denis Doran, 23 August 1916, CSB Files, 
3/716/24 NAI
73 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,205
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75 Dillon in Kautt, 1999 50-1
76 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,207
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the full effects of the Rising were beginning to become apparent, in July, 1916. 
While there was some expectation, even initially some excuse, or even amongst 
some a desire, for the executions of Pearse and the other signatories to the 
Proclamation, Casement’s execution came in a now transformed situation. 
Casement’s fate, however, was sealed. As a member of the British Imperial 
establishment, as a civil servant, his ‘betrayal’ and ‘disloyalty’ to the Crown 
was even more pronounced than that of the others. In this way, the situation had 
a certain inevitability about it -  the British authorities could not afford to be 
lenient, but a lack of clemency further exacerbated and triggered the process o f 
radicalisation in Ireland, fuelling a popular sense of martyrdom for Ireland.78 
Contemporary public petitions make specific mention of this dilemma, claiming 
that the transformation in public sentiment regarding the execution ‘was 
undoubtedly caused by the punishments inflicted* and the belief that ‘another
7 0execution so long after will rouse popular feeling.’
The transformation of the Irish nation engendered by the aftermath of 
the Rising was so complete that it was regularly remarked upon. However, the 
power of the transformation lay not just in the shift of public opinion, but also in 
the manner in which it created a sense of agency and urgency. Dillon 
commented that ‘It would really not be possible to exaggerate the desperate 
character of the situation here ... the executions, house searching throughout the 
country, wholesale arrests ... savage treatment of prisoners, including those that 
who had no more sympathy with Sinn Fein than you have, have exasperated 
feeling to a terrible extent.’80 Those that had welcomed the British troops when 
they had arrived to quell the ‘insurrection’ were now criticising their use of
78 See Especially Kee, 1982.
79 Draft Petition for Casement, 385/6 Archbishop Walsh’s Papers
80 Dillon in Kee, 1982,10
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overwhelming force, and their methods of maintaining the peace in the wake of 
the Rising.81 This fostered a belief, suggested by both rumour and outrage, that 
the rebels were ‘patriots, heroes, and martyrs murdered by the ‘cowardly’ 
British.’ The participants in the Rising were being transformed from ‘being 
objects of contempt and derision [to] heroes.’83 The trigger effect was so 
thorough that one observer hailed the ‘success’ of Pearse and his companions 
during Easter Week, because Ireland had already been ‘bled white with 
emigration and starvation ... if the Sinn Fein Rising cost a few hundred noble 
Irish lives, it saved hundreds of Thousands ...’84 These feelings were not 
‘limited to Sinn Fein,’ noted one RIC intelligence report, but the ‘punishment 
inflicted on the leaders of the rebellion aroused widespread sympathy ... 
embraced by all nationalists.’85
The events of the Rising, and especially the events in its aftermath, 
forced an elite and institutional reassessment of the role of religion in Irish 
nationalism. Initially the vast majority of Irish prelates had remained silent 
about the Rising, or expressed mild condemnation emphasising the extenuating 
circumstances behind the brave but misguided actions of the Irish Volunteers.86 
But now the Church was forced to accommodate popular ‘grass-roots’ religious 
expression. Correspondence between Bishops suggested that amongst those who 
supported moderate nationalism, and even amongst others who were openly 
hostile to all nationalisms in Ireland, the events of the Rising forced a 
reappraisal of their positions, with debates raging as to the appropriate manner
81 Kautt, 1999, 51
82 Kautt, 1999,51
83 Report on Co. Tyrone, 1916 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
84 ‘Miscellaneous Mimeograph’ possibly by Msgr. Curran or alternatively S.T. O’Kelly, Special 
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by which to interpret canon law and the Rising.87 There was, as ever, no single 
or unified position on the part of the Church, rather expressions on the part of 
various individuals who did or did not react to these events within the 
framework of the Church.88
This reappraisal took many different forms. In one case, Bishop 
O’Dwyer of Limerick had refused to discipline two priests who were 
sympathetic to the cause of radical nationalism on the grounds that pleas for 
mercy on behalf of the ‘poor young fellows who surrendered to you in Dublin’
O Q
had gone unheeded. He went on to express his own personal opinion that 
Maxwell’s ‘abuse of power’ had been ‘as fatuous as arbitrary’ and that it had 
served to ‘outrage the conscience of the country.*90 Bishop O’Dwyer was 
consistently outspoken in public condemnation against British reactions to the 
Rising, making a pronouncement in the Spring of 1917 condemning the 
treatment of Irish prisoners still imprisoned in British jails. While noting the 
‘fruitlessness’ of the Rising itself, he claimed that it served to ‘galvanise the 
dead bones in Ireland, and breathed into them the new spirit with which 
England now has to reckon ...’91 Even for other prelates, less sympathetic than 
O’Dwyer to the radical nationalist cause, it was clear that it was not worth 
‘troubling’ their congregations with a denunciation of the actions which had led 
to the ‘awful tragedy’ of Easter week, but that rather to denote the morality of 
the participants, such that the Volunteers had died ‘bravely and unselfishly*
87 Correspondence between Bishop Foley and Bishop O’Dwyer, in Kautt, 1999,46
88 McHugh, 1966,198
89 Letters of Correspondence between Maxwell and Bishop in O’Dwyer, MS. 32,695; Miller, 
1987, 198
90 Hennessey, 1998,142; Letters of Correspondence between Maxwell and Bishop in O’Dwyer, 
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91 ‘Important Pronouncement by Rev. Dr. O’Dwyer, Bishop of Limerick, printed material, in 
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210
even if ‘foolishly.’92 This heavily qualified version of condemnation was 
ultimately intended to provide comfort to the survivor’s of the Volunteers, and 
not to explicitly denounce Pearse and his companions.
At a popular level, religious nationalism now became a central form of 
expression of radicalism. Though martial law was being strongly implemented, 
popular sympathy with radical nationalism was evident the large number of 
masses said for the men who died during and after Easter Week.94 The Catholic 
Bulletin proclaimed that ‘the founts of our nationality have been stirred to their 
depths’ with a searching of one’s heart, and that the expression of this is piety, 
as evidenced through the recitation of Requiem Masses for the dead of the 
Easter Rising.95 There were even stories, by June of 1916 of a little girl praying 
to ‘St. Pearse* to intercede on her behalf for a new hat.96 Curran, and therefore 
the Archbishop, were very much aware of the ‘altered attitude of the public 
mind towards the Rising’ illustrated in the popular support for, and significance 
assigned to Requiem Masses in November 1916, for those who had died in the 
Rising.97 General Maxwell had identified this trend, writing to Walsh to 
intervene with the holding of requiem masses because ‘There is a section of the 
people who are taking advantage of the Requiem Masses said for the repose of 
the souls of those unfortunates who suffered death for the leading part they took 
in the late deplorable rebellion ... *98 Maxwell was especially concerned that the 
masses were being used as excuses ‘to make political demonstrations outside of
92 Whyte, 1967,221
93 Whyte, 1967,221
94 Kee, 1982,15
95 Catholic Bulletin as cited in Whyte, 1967,224
96 Kee, 1982,15
97 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
98 Letter from Maxwell to Walsh, June 1916 Walsh Papers, Ref No. 385/7
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the churches and chapels in which these masses are said.’99 These 
demonstrations included the waving of ‘Sinn Fein flags [and] booing at officers 
and soldiers.’100 Walsh responded to these requests by saying that while he had 
had an informal word with those involved to remedy this situation, the ‘real 
difficulty is that there is a very widespread feeling of discontent, already 
sufficiently strong, ... and growing stronger everyday.’101 To this end, Walsh 
informed Maxwell that actions ‘taken from purely humane motives for the 
avoidance of bloodshed may be misinterpreted’ within this context.102 
Maxwell’s attempts to quell religious, cultural and political expressions of 
radical nationalism had failed in almost every conceivable way.
Sympathy for radical nationalism went beyond expressions of public 
opinion. The Rising stopped recruiting almost entirely throughout Ireland.103 
There was a sense that in the aftermath of the Rising, Irish participation in the 
Imperial War effort was no longer ‘an issue of friendship’ but rather a matter of 
power and necessity dictated by the British authorities.104 There was another 
aspect to the transformation which was occurring. The debates over the 
introduction of conscription and its expansion to include Ireland, which 
occurred on the 9th of May, broadly indicated the potential for a new reckoning 
for Ireland’s post-Rising role in the Empire. Opposition to conscription was 
widespread throughout the Empire, in so far as conscription had barely passed 
in a Canadian referendum, failed twice in Australian referenda, and was not
99 Letter from Maxwell to Walsh, June 1916 Walsh Papers, Ref No. 385/7
100 Letter from Maxwell to Walsh, June 1916 Walsh Papers, Ref No. 385/7
101 Letter from Walsh to Maxwell, 26 June, 1916 Walsh Papers, Ref No. 385/7
102 Letter from Walsh to Maxwell, 26 June, 1916 Walsh Papers, RefNo. 385/7
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104 Finnan, 2000,187
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even proposed in South Africa.105 Asquith and Redmond agreed that the 
application of conscription to Ireland would serve to add ‘petroleum on a fire’ 
with Churchill commenting that it would not be worthwhile to court a ‘serious 
Irish row.’106 The Archbishop of Dublin was made aware of this evolving 
situation, expressed concern about its possible outcome.107 The issue of 
participation in the War effort triggered popular reactions, as farmers’ sons 
would come to flood the ranks of the IRA in 1917-18, desperate to prevent the 
application of conscription to Ireland and equally apathetic to British authority
10Rin Ireland which had, by now, lost a sense of political and moral legitimacy.
War, Famine and Popular Radical Nationalism
By the end of 1916/beginning of 1917, the already existing antagonism 
to enlistment and the Imperial War effort had become even more pronounced, 
with one priest stating to his parishioners that ‘he did not see the use of 
providing com, etc. if John Bull is going to seize it all which he will do and 
leave the people to starve, the same as happened in *47 when John Bull ... 
created Famine in Ireland.’109 This was echoed in letters received by 
Archbishop Walsh from prominent public figures in October 1917, concerned 
that there would be a ‘grave danger of food shortage in large cities ... during the 
coming winter and spring.’110 The danger which they identified, was that Ireland 
was exporting more than the country could spare to aid the British War effort; 
and these public figures were trying to organise ‘for the retention and
105 Finnan, 2000,185
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distribution of such a quantity as will prevent a recurrence of the appalling
disaster of *47 and ‘48’ i.e. the Famine.111 Other priests also said, on the topic of
recruitment, that they did not want Irish Catholic soldiers ‘in the realm when
they were evicting their forefathers’ whereas now the British establishment
1 1 0‘wanted [the sons of the forefathers] to fight for them.’ Here we see the 
operation of what I have termed the cultural trigger point -  here is the repertoire 
of past events evoking interpretations of current actions as injustice, informing a 
sense of collective identity, and creating a sense of agency and urgency found in 
popular and radical nationalism. The myths, memories and symbols of the 
Famine were being expressed to communicate the broader sense of British 
injustice towards Ireland -  reifying the collective identity of the Irish nation by 
assuming such imagery was familiar and accessible to its members.
The aftermath of the Rising transformed elements of cultural practice 
and political symbolism. Symbols of moderate and constitutional nationalism, 
the Green Flag and the song ‘God Save Ireland’ were replaced with the 
‘Soldier’s Song and the Tri-colour.113 The ‘Soldier’s Song’ went from a 
marching song of the Irish Volunteers to the *de facto’ national anthem of 
Ireland after the events of 1916, and ultimately became the official anthem of 
the Irish Free State in 1926.114 On the first anniversary of the Rising, a tricolour 
was raised over the GPO.115 One observer reported an incident in Cork in 1917 
when the Army had tried to pull down a Republican flag hanging over the City 
Hall, but with the building being shut having to hail a passing fire truck to use
1,1 Letter from De Markievicz, Ginnell, Lynn (from Sinn Fein Offices) to Walsh, 6 October 
1917, Walsh Papers 3891
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its ladders to pull it down.116 In his view this story was indicative of the way 
that Republican symbols could be found in more and more public locations over 
the course of 1916/1917 and that the presence of such symbols ‘did much to 
propagate the Sinn Fein policy.’117 By the Autumn of 1916, even before the 
release of internees from Frognoch, the authorities noted the ‘revival’ of ‘Sinn 
Fein’ activity, in the GAA, the formation of cycling clubs, holding of social 
events, advocating the wearing of a ‘distinction ring by Irish speaking persons 
and members of the Gaelic League’, the wearing of similar Sinn Fein badges, 
and the general ‘movement of suspects throughout the country.’118 These visible 
and tangible symbols, flags, badges etc. made palpable and demonstrable the 
transformation which had already occurred in the minds of individual members 
of the Irish nation. Even the terminology for the events of Easter Week was 
undergoing a process of transformation; one school child remembered being 
told by a Nun not to refer to these events as a rebellion, which was ‘against a 
lawful authority* but rather as an insurrection or rising, which denoted action 
‘against injustice. *119
The dissemination of these symbols of radical nationalism was no 
accident. From the outset, in the immediate wake of the Rising, Sinn Fein and 
radical nationalists also underwent a process of transformation. Frognoch 
became the site of a university ‘both educational and revolutionary and from 
that camp came the hard core of the subsequent guerrilla war in Ireland.’120 The 
reorganisation that began in the camps not only included the making of new
1,6 Cork in Easter Week, MS. 31330 NLI
117 Cork in Easter Week MS. 31330 NLI Account of Maire Comerford in Griffith and O’Grady, 
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links and contacts, but also elements of cultural and political training. Back in 
Ireland, the authorities had, by this point, also recognised that ‘for every one 
potential rebel ... six months ago, there are now probably five . . . ,121 On the 
return of the internees, their specific intentions were to reorganise and to ‘try 
and buck up the language, the Gaelic League and any other organisation that 
wasn’t banned and we could get into.’122
After the release of the detainees, and on the anniversary of the Rising, 
the perceptions, myths, and memories of symbols of this event had been 
transformed so thoroughly that the ‘Irish National Aid and Volunteers 
Dependents Fund’(INAVDF) could be found holding a two day fund raising 
event in the Mansion House, Dublin.123 The object of the INAVDF was ‘to 
make provision for the families and dependents of the men who were executed, 
of those who fell in the events, and of those sentenced to penal servitude in 
connection with the insurrection of Easter 1916, and to provide for the 
necessities of those others who suffered by reason of participation or suspicion 
of participation in the Insurrection.’124 Items for sale in the two day ‘gift sale’ 
included the highly symbolic and the mundane, from Pearse’s personal sword -  
an antique which had been used in the United Irishmen Rebellion in 1798 -  or 
the block upon which Emmet was beheaded, to the mundane, such as a basket 
with a sitting of Rhode Island Red Hen eggs.125 Other items included a first 
edition of Yeats’ poems, an edition of Connolly’s Labour in Irish History, a 
‘Frognoch Harmonium’ and a full report from the foundation meeting of Sinn
121 CSB Files, 1916 3/716/24 NAI
122 Walton’s Account in Griffith and O’Grady, 1998,98
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• 19/5Fein in 1905. There was an accompanying pamphlet produced by the 
INAVDF, stating that ‘a year ago one might have said “here is a garland for the 
graves of those who died,” now one must say “here are the flowers for the altars 
of those who live forever ...”’127 This transformation of opinion, and broad 
sympathy translated into greatly expanded membership in Sinn Fein clubs 
throughout Ireland, so that there were 1039 clubs with 66270 members in 1917, 
1354 clubs with 112080 members in 1918 and 1454 clubs with 118,649 
members by 1919.128
In this way, ‘after the Rebellion, the Sinn Fein movement attracted many 
new adherents* and the actions of the British authorities was understood to 
effect ‘a feeling of sympathy with those who had previously condemned the 
movement.’129 By the end of 1916, the British authorities reported that while 
there had been little to no Sinn Fein activities, there was evidence of the popular 
institutional revival of radical nationalism in the guise of the GAA, cycling 
clubs, social evenings, the wearing of the Fainne and Sinn Fein badges, and the 
formation of a “Repeal League.”130 The newly popular radical nationalism in 
Ireland was evident in a pamphlet published by the Gaelic League which stated 
that ‘the future of Ireland, spiritually and temporally is bound up with the Irish 
Ireland movement, a movement to free the Irish Nation from intellectual 
dependence on outsiders ...*131 Over this same period, crime rates in Ireland 
gradually began to change such that a previous downward trend in crime was
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beginning to reverse. This was despite the period of initial shock in the 
aftermath of the Rising concerning the action of the radical nationalists, and the 
complete disorganisation of radical nationalists after the Rising. By 1917, 
overall crime had risen 6% from 1915, and this trend became even greater in 
1918 and 1919.132 Compared to the figure of 1907, crime in 1917 was still some 
almost 7% lower, demonstrating that it was a relatively quiet period while Sinn 
Fein and the IRA went through a process of reorganisation. By 1918, crime had 
risen more than 26% compared to 1907, and by 1919, this figure had risen by 
more than 77% what it had been some 12 years before.133 This was true not only 
of the general overall crime statistics, but specifically of ‘agrarian crime’ as 
well.
By 1918, the equation of Irish political, cultural and religious 
nationalisms was complete. A quintessential example of this was the production 
of the Sinn Fein Catechism. Modelled on religious catechisms, it emphasised 
the ideology of nationalism and national identity to the Irish population 
asserting, amongst other things, what it means to be Irish, and how this is 
antithetical to being loyal to England, as only ‘Frenchman can be loyal to 
France, a Chinaman to China and an Englishman to England.’134 If an individual 
insisted that they were Irish and loyal to England, this would be nonsense as 
‘No one can serve to two masters, no one can be loyal to somebody else’s
132 See Appendix II; the extent to which the represented the extent of a change on the Irish 
scene, versus the extent to which it demonstrates altered perceptions of what kinds of crimes 
should be or must be reported is debatable. This is an issue which, had time and space 
permitted, I should have liked to explore more fully. I have, however, used these statistics in this 
instance to demonstrate that there was some sort of general shift in Irish society at this point in 
time.
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nation.’135 For the Irish nation, specifically this meant ‘hating England’s cruelty 
in Ireland since the beginning ... we must hate England’s power that holds us in 
bondage against our w ill... ’136
Conclusion
Overall there is clear evidence to suggest that the effects of British 
policies on the Irish nation were understood though the prisms of religious and 
cultural nationalisms. The first part of this chapter demonstrated the manner in 
which perceptions of the Rising changed in the Irish nation. Initially 
individual’s perceptions were typified by hostility, outrage, fear, and disbelief. 
In the aftermath of the Rising, British actions were considered to be overly 
belligerent, retributive, and secretive. In this context, the reactions of 
individuals in the Irish nation became increasingly hostile to the British 
authorities. The executions and the imposition of martial law, both of which 
seemed as arbitrary as they did harsh, appeared to make the prophesies of the 
radical nationalists come true, and furthermore tapped into the deep vein of 
conceptions of Irish organic distinctiveness and latent sectarianism.
The second part of this chapter has shown the manner in which 
transformed perceptions of the events of the Rising led to participation in and 
sympathy for radical nationalism. At the institutional level, the Catholic Church, 
though broadly anti-radical, was forced into a process of re-conceptualising both 
Canon Law and their attitudes towards radical nationalism in Ireland. In part, 
this was a reaction to the grass-roots groundswell o f ‘folk* Catholicism, evident 
in the popular requiem masses for the Easter Week dead, which led to public
135 Sinn Fein Catechism, by Darrel Figgis, 1918, Archbishop Walsh Papers, Special 
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expressions of anger against the British regime, and support for radical 
nationalism. The popular beatification of Pearse and his companions, and the 
radicalisation in public opinion would go on to undermine support for the 
moderate constitutional nationalism of the Irish Party, and despite the efforts of 
Asquith and the British Government, serve to permanently destroy previously 
held aspirations for a Home Rule settlement. The next chapter will demonstrate 
how these religious, cultural and political shifts in outlook would have direct 
political implications in the rise of Sinn Fein from February 1917 onwards.
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Chapter 7 
The End of Moderate Nationalism
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Introduction
This chapter will trace the fall of the Irish Party, and the manner in 
which the Irish Party, and its leader, John Redmond, became increasingly 
alienated from, and unrepresentative of the Irish nation. I will therefore chart the 
fall o f the Irish Party as a result of its failures to secure Home Rule between 
May 1916 and April 1918, ultimately leaving no viable ‘Imperial solution* to 
the Irish question. This series of events, when combined with the unleashing of 
support for radical nationalism, and the resultant rise of Sinn Fein, served to 
permanently close the door on a moderate and constitutional solution to Irish 
nationalist demands as imagined prior to the Rising. This chapter and the next 
will contend that the willingness of the Irish Party to accept the exclusion of 
Ulster as part of a Home Rule settlement, when combined with the ‘outrage’ 
emanating from the Irish nation in the aftermath of the Rising, re-invigorated 
what was the previously moribund and stagnant radical nationalist institution of 
Sinn Fein. This had the effect of redefining a sense of Irish identity and agency. 
Though the release of the 1916 internees and the reorganisation of Sinn Fein 
had a major invigorating effect on radical nationalism in Ireland, the success of 
radical nationalism depended in large part on the apathy felt for the discredited 
moderate nationalists and their constitutional means. Their collapse reinforced 
the burgeoning sympathy with, and resonance of the radical nationalist agenda 
in Ireland.
The End of the Irish Party
As has been discussed in earlier ‘pre-Rising’ chapters, the Home Rule 
question had dominated Irish politics since at least the formation of the Home 
Government Association in 1870. Whether this desire for some form of Home 
Rule grew out of an inherent fear of the return of the Famine, concerns over the
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subjugation of Irish Catholics in the Union, or an expression of the political 
desires of a rising Catholic middle class, it was the issue in Irish politics around 
which all others orbited. The Home Rule question had dominated Irish politics 
to such an extent that prior to the outbreak of the First World War, that Ireland 
had witnessed the formation of armed paramilitary groups, and even saw a 
rebellion in the British Army in response to these orders to disarm Ulster 
Unionists opposed to a Home Rule settlement. It had seemed as though these 
tensions had disappeared in the frenzy of patriotic and pro-imperial sentiment 
that accompanied the outbreak of the First World War. This impression was 
reinforced by the apparent decline and absence of radicalism amongst 
nationalists and unionists after August, 1914. The reasons for this were the 
outbreak of the War, and the passage of the Home Rule Act, despite its 
suspension for the duration of the War.
The Irish Party had benefited from this passage of events. It had 
dominated nationalist politics since the end of the 19th century, because of its 
extensive political network throughout Ireland. It held a grip on the politics of 
the Irish nation not least because it had been able to apparently deliver the 
ultimate prize after forty years of nationalist agitation. The Home Rule Act was 
more than had been previously gained by Irish nationalists, and promised as 
much freedom as Ireland had enjoyed in the mythical golden age before the Act 
of Union. For the Irish Party*, its elites and supporters, this gain was thought to 
be the result of shrewd politicking on the part of Redmond.1 One incident held 
up as an example of this was Redmond’s taking control of the executive of the 
Volunteer movement, and its subsequent co-optation to the will of the Party. His 
ability to deliver the support of the Volunteers to the Imperial war effort at the
* Herein references to the Party will refer to the Irish (Parliamentary) Party, i.e. the IPP or IP
1 Martin, 1967,243
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outbreak of the War, from a moderate nationalist’s perspective, showed Irish 
loyalty, and evidence of how much Ireland deserved Home Rule. It was also an 
action that was intended to allay Unionist fears of Irish extremism, again by 
showing Irish loyalty to the Imperial project. In addition, the Irish Party’s 
alliance with the Liberal party, something on which the Liberal Party had 
depended to retain power throughout the end of the 19th century/beginning of 
the 20th centuries, while no longer politically necessary, provided evidence for 
the Irish Party supporters of how their political loyalty in Westminster 
ultimately paid dividends. In short, the achievement of Home Rule appeared to 
the Party and its supporters to be the result of the political manoeuvring of 
Redmond, both at Westminster and at home.
The Easter Rising and British reactions to the Rising damaged the 
Party’s vision of politics in Ireland. As was shown in the previous three 
chapters, the Rising re-stimulated the resonance of Irish national myths, 
memories, and symbols, reignited nationalist passions, and unleashed sectarian 
extremes that lay behind Irish nationalist demands for self-rule. For example, 
the manner in which these events had brought recruitment to the British Army 
to a standstill has already been established, and it is a good example of the 
Imperial legitimacy crisis in Ireland. Irish apathy if not outright antipathy 
towards the British Army, prior to the Rising, at mass and elite levels, had 
apparently been overcome by Redmond’s political will. He ensured that British 
recruiting efforts were at least respected, if not supported. The aftermath of the 
Rising -  its effects on British perceptions of Irish loyalty, and Irish perceptions 
of British rule -  struck at the very core of the Party’s strategy and Redmond’s 
reputation.
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The Irish Party’s demise began with their reaction to the transformation 
and radicalisation of the Irish nation after the Rising. The Party initially 
hesitated to react strongly to the executions after the Rising, and then hesitated 
again when the transformation of the Irish nation became popularly apparent. 
Though the previous chapter established Dillon’s and Redmond’s reactions in 
the Commons to the executions of Pearse and his companions and to the British 
authorities’ implementation of martial law, it rapidly became apparent that 
Redmond and the Party lacked any power to effectively lobby Asquith to 
prevent these events from occurring. Dillon had observed that military rule in 
Ireland was ‘doing everything in its power to turn people against you and us.’ 
Asquith, despite assuring Redmond that the executions had ended, either was 
‘out of the loop’ in Maxwell’s decision making process as regards the carrying 
out of sentences in Ireland, or was misrepresenting the truth to Redmond. 
Redmond’s political power and personal reputation was being made to look 
dependent on individuals and institutions who simply disregarded his requests.
In the immediate aftermath of the Rising, therefore, it seemed as though 
the actions of the Irish Party’s politicians, and their ability to influence British 
Government policy, were not in tune with the transformed Irish nation. Even the 
‘mouthpiece’ of the Party was forced to change its opinions on the Rising and 
its participants. The Freeman’s Journal went from condemning the Rising and 
its leaders to an attitude of grudging respect, and it generally followed the grass­
roots process of transition of the depiction for Pearse and his companions from 
‘devils* to saints.3 This change occurred after its ‘dogmatic’ reporting of the 
Party line almost ruined its reputation, with its circulation dropping
2 Dillon in Kautt, 1999, 58
3 See Chapter 6.
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precipitously as compared to that of The Irish Independent in October 1916.4 
Redmond, amongst others in the Irish Party, now recognised that it was 
necessary to act if the party was to have any chance of political survival. The 
question then arose as to whether or not action meant effecting a change in the 
Party’s strategy -  Dillon wanted to break the Party’s traditional alliance with the 
Liberals and become a true party of opposition, in order to put forward the case 
for Irish nationalism.5 Redmond hesitated -  wanting to see what response would 
be put forward by Asquith and his cabinet.6 Redmond had staked his political 
career and political ambitions for Ireland on supporting the British war effort -  
he could not simply withdraw from this course now.
Initially this appeared the right decision, as it seemed as though the Irish 
Party would be able to turn these events to their advantage by gaining the 
immediate implementation of their ultimate ambition, Home Rule. As the 
executions were taking place, Asquith announced that he would visit Ireland to 
gain a first hand knowledge of the Irish situation. Prior to his departure, Asquith 
had stated that the system of government in Ireland had ‘completely broken 
down* and that some form of Home Rule, as agreed to at the start of the War, 
would have to be implemented to solve Irish problems.7 This heartened 
nationalists who thought that they would finally have Home Rule as it was 
passed by Westminster in 1914, i.e. Home Rule for all of Ireland.
In the immediate aftermath of the Rising, Asquith met with Nationalists 
and Unionists, moderate and radical in Ireland. Asquith’s visit undermined 
support for the Irish Party and moderate constitutional nationalism in Ireland, 
instead serving to reinforce the apparent effectiveness of the actions of the
4 Fitzpatrick, 1998, 99
5 Rees, 1998,217
6 Rees, 1998,217
7 Kee, 1982,8
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radical nationalists.8 There had been no movement on Home Rule as an issue, or
on Ireland as a cause of concern for Asquith’s Government prior to the Rising
and quite fairly so, for there was the small matter of the War. The actions of
Pearse and his companions sparked the British to address this situation.
Asquith’s visit helped to effect the transformation and radicalisation of political
opinion in favour of radical nationalists, as the Rising, as foolish as it initially
had seemed, had apparently forced a change in policy on the part of the British
Government which had previously seemed impossible.9 On his visit, Asquith
visited men being held in Dublin jails who had participated in the Rising. For
these men who had not yet been shipped off to prisons in England and Wales,
Asquith’s visit had the effect of transforming them from being ‘despondent* to
‘insulting their guards, throwing up their caps and shouting victory.’10 The
County Inspectors made reference to the way that Asquith’s actions, through his
speeches and visit, when ‘coupled with the executions of the leaders completely
changed the feeling of large numbers of the people.’11 Another wrote that ‘it
was felt that the rebellion had done more than ten years of constitutional
12agitation to convince the Government of the urgent necessity of Home Rule.’
Even General Maxwell believed that ‘there is a growing feeling that out of the
1 ^  •Rebellion more has been got than by constitutional methods...’ Asquith’s 
visit bolstered the legitimacy of radical nationalism in Ireland -  even whilst his 
regime was in the middle of carrying out a policy of suppression.
On his return from Ireland, Asquith reported to the Commons that the 
Rising had created ‘a unique opportunity for a new departure for a settlement of
8 Kee, 1982,8
9 Kee, 1982,8
10 Kee, 1982,9
11 Co. Kilkenny Inspector Report, 1916 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
12 Co. Monaghan Inspector Report, 1916 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
13 Maxwell, memo, 16 June 1916 cited in Laffan, 1999,61
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outstanding problems’ and re-asserted that Castle Rule in Ireland had 
irreparably collapsed.14 Some British critics and observers believed that the 
reaction of the British authorities to the Rising was ‘verification of all that [Sinn 
Fein] had feared and prophesised, and for which they had until that point been 
looked upon as fools and scaremongers.’15 However, Asquith’s actions on 
Ireland must be contextualised, in so far as they went beyond immediate 
governmental concerns over the fete of Ireland itself. The situation in Ireland 
was alienating United States’ support for the allied war effort, and it was 
causing much concern amongst the Imperial Dominions, which was having a 
detrimental effect on recruiting efforts.16 The Government was receiving reports 
from the British Ambassador in Washington that there was now a ‘wave of fury 
sweeping through Irish American originating with the executions.’17 This 
concern was particularly keenly felt by the British Government, acutely aware 
of the upcoming American Presidential election in the autumn of 1916.18 The 
cabinet worried that Irish-American attitudes towards Westminster were being 
shaped by the reactions to the Rising, which had served to horrify and radicalise 
Irish-Americans. This had the potential effect up of forcing a change towards a 
pro-German stance in the US presidency.
Asquith now approached Lloyd George about brokering the negotiations 
over Home Rule in Ireland. Lloyd George was already serving as Minister for 
Munitions, and this position made him acutely aware of the potential damage 
that a change in the outlook of the US could have on the supplies of allied
14 Asquith in Kee, 1982,9; O’Day 1998; Wells and Marlowe, 1916
13 ‘English Critic’ quoted in Redmond-Howard, 1916, 57
16 O’Day, 1998,270
17 British Ambassador in Washington cited in Kee, 1982, 9
18 Rees, 1998,217
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munitions.19 By the 24th of May, Lloyd George agreed to take on this special 
role to negotiate the implementation of a set of proposals entitled ‘Headings of a 
Settlement as to the Government of Ireland.’20 These proposals were based on 
the Home Rule Act of 1914, though they were altered to include the exclusion 
of six counties in Ulster, although whether or not there was a time limit on the 
exclusion of this six county entity was left deliberately vague.21 This meant that 
these negotiations began at a point before the passage of the Home Rule Act in 
1914, which did not include a provision for the exclusion of Ulster, though 
whether exclusion would have always occurred is a matter for debate. These 
Lloyd George-led negotiations were therefore beginning where the failed 
Buckingham Palace Negotiations of the summer of 1914 had left off. These 
1914 negotiations had occurred when tensions were at their highest, and Ireland 
was on the brink of civil war. This new set of negotiations, in the aftermath of 
the Rising, took place between Northern Unionists, led by Carson, and 
Nationalists as represented by Redmond and the Irish Party. A third group 
would come to a play a significant role in these negotiations as they progressed, 
the Southern Unionists, led by Lords Lansdowne and Long.
The Cabinet had two pre-conditions for these negotiations. Firstly they 
determined that these negotiations would pick up where the Buckingham Palace 
Negotiations had left off. This meant a rehash of the same issues that had 
dominated the previous sets of negotiations -  would Ulster be excluded from a 
Home Rule settlement, and if so, for how long? Indeed the second and unstated 
though implicit pre-condition for these negotiations was that the period of 
exclusion of Ulster from Home Rule would be indefinite. This meant that the
19 For a discussion of Lloyd George’s motivations, see amongst others O’Day, 1998, Rees 1998, 
McBride 1991
20 Rees, 1998,215
21 O’Day, 1998, 271; Rees, 1998,215
22 See Chapter 3.
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Cabinet from the outset believed in exclusion lasting for as long as the Ulster 
Unionists saw fit. This is not surprising because, though Asquith’s Cabinet was 
a broadly Liberal wartime coalition, it had Conservative and Unionist members 
who were hostile to any Home Rule settlement in Ireland. Redmond and the 
Irish Party had been offered a position in Asquith’s Cabinet, but had declined on 
the grounds that ‘the principles and history’ of the Irish Party made it 
impossible to accept a position in the cabinet.23 Now Redmond and the Party 
found the institutional reins of power beyond their grasp, initially leaving them 
unable to prevent the British policy of retribution after the Rising, and now 
unable to effect the setting of the parameters for the negotiations over Home 
Rule. They were caught in a political no-man’s land -  lacking a strategic 
advantage in power and position.
The importance of the proposal to exclude a part of North-East Ireland -  
whether it was the full nine counties of the historical province of Ulster, only six 
of them, or simply the four with a majority Unionist population, cannot be 
overemphasised.24 Even though it had almost led to Civil War before the 
outbreak of the First World War, Redmond now believed that the Irish dilemma 
could ultimately be solved by compromise. He recognised that there was, most 
likely, no way to immediately convince Ulster Unionists, led by Carson, to 
accept an all-Ireland implementation of Home Rule. There was also a 
recognition that the Party lacked the political strength to force the Cabinet to 
make Unionists accept Home Rule without exclusion. Therefore he concluded 
that it was up to the Irish nation themselves to convince the British Government 
and their Unionist compatriots of their deserving of Home Rule. In this way, 
Redmond did not stray from his 1914 strategy of committing the National
23 McDowell, 1970,45
24 See Map 1.
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Volunteers to the War effort. From this perspective, Redmond calculated that 
the exclusion of a six county entity in Ulster might be a temporary price worth 
paying while convincing the Unionists of the benefits of Home Rule. However, 
any form of exclusion of the North-East of Ireland for any period of time was 
very difficult, if not impossible to ‘sell’ to nationalists outside of the Irish Party 
elite.25 By the time Redmond and the Irish Party realised this, they had been 
backed into a political comer -  to oppose exclusion meant the collapse of the 
Home Rule negotiations, but to push on meant accepting the principle of 
exclusion. Despite the passage of the Home Rule Bill in 1914, which, 
apparently, applied to all of Ireland, they were now forced to accept some form 
of exclusion as a precondition for Home Rule.
Lloyd George had shown the Home Rule proposals which he had put 
forward to the Cabinet to Carson and Redmond by the 29th May.26 Negotiations 
were carried out individually, so that Lloyd George met with Carson and 
Redmond at separate times. This enabled Lloyd George to give differing 
impressions of the issue of exclusion to Carson and Redmond. Redmond gained 
assurances that the exclusion of the proposed six county entity of Tyrone, 
Fermanagh, Armagh, Down, Londonderry and Antrim was temporary. Lloyd 
George had told Redmond that he ‘placed his life upon the table and would 
stand or fell by the agreement come to.’27 Simultaneously, Lloyd George had 
provided a written assurance to Carson that ‘we must make it clear that at the 
end of the provisional period Ulster does not, whether she wills it or not, merge 
in the rest of Ireland.’28
25 See especially Hennessey, 1998 far an in depth discussion of these issues.
26 See Kee, 1982
27 Lloyd George quoted in Kee, 1982,11
28 Quoted in O’Day, 1998,271
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In the meantime, there were heavy defeats for the British Navy at 
Jutland on the 31st May. Southern Unionists took this opportunity to declare that 
the time was not right for negotiations over Home Rule, because the War was a 
much more pressing issue than the Irish situation. They therefore declared that 
they could no longer negotiate over this issue. They wanted the entire project to 
be shelved, and they had the political clout, if they could ally themselves with 
sympathetic Conservatives, to wreck the Bill and bring down the Asquith’s 
Cabinet. Like Northern Nationalists who were concerned about being left 
behind in the area of exclusion in Ulster, Southern Unionists felt that exclusion 
would render them a vulnerable minority in a Home Rule entity dominated by 
Nationalists and Catholics. In the cabinet, they threatened, both explicitly and 
implicitly to wreck the Bill and bring down the government, and generally to do 
everything in their power to prevent the implementation of Home Rule.29
At the same time Northern Nationalists were aghast that Redmond and 
the Irish Party could conspire to leave them out of a settlement. Ulster Unionists 
were also broadly in opposition to this development. Carson, encountering 
Ulster Unionist Council hostility, proclaimed that the Unionists should support 
this measure because of ‘Imperial necessity.’30 While there were various 
questions and concerns over issues such as parliamentary representation for the 
area of Home Rule after its implementation, most of the basic factors for an 
agreement appeared to be in place. Despite the opposition within the Unionist 
and Nationalist camps, Carson and Redmond were both supporting the efforts of 
Lloyd George, and participating in the negotiations. Therefore, despite the 
apparent shakiness of popular support for their efforts, both of these politicians 
were carrying their parties, however reluctantly, with them.
29 See Kee, 1982,12; McDowell, 1970 57-61
30 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,213
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Redmond, in particular, found that the support for the plan was patchy.
Beyond the Irish Party elites, and outside of Westminster, this proposed
settlement was unpopular. There was a great deal of concern amongst rank and
file nationalists that the exclusion of the six county entity would be permanent,
despite the assurances of Redmond and the Irish Party. One commentator
observed that ‘everywhere [in the North] the proposed terms were rejected with 
1
contempt.’ There was a sense that ‘once we assent to the theory of partition ... 
we cease to believe in Ireland’s national entity ... if once we admit this theory 
of exclusion ... there is no knowing how far or into what absurdities it will carry 
us.’ For the Irish Party the disagreement over the interpretation of whether or 
not exclusion was permanent or temporary was ‘more apparent than real ... it 
actually represents two legitimate views of the same proposal, and may easily 
be cleared up afterwards.*33 This explanation wasn’t enough, however to allay 
Northern Nationalist fears.
Nationalist critics pointed out that the population of the proposed area of 
exclusion in Ulster was being created in such a way as to ensure a Protestant 
majority; this was despite its returning 17 Nationalist MPs to 16 Unionist ones 
in the Imperial Parliaments.34 In order to forge ahead, the Irish Party 
systematically attempted to convince Nationalists in the area of exclusion, 
particularly those in Tyrone and Fermanagh, that the arrangement was 
temporary, and that the final fate of their region would be sorted out at an 
Imperial conference at the end of the War.35 Out of the six counties to be 
excluded, Tyrone and Fermanagh were the only two to have a Catholic 
majority, while some other areas, such as Derry City, also had large
31 Devlin quoted in O’Day, 1998,271
32 Irish Independent, cited in Hennessey, 1998, 147
33 Devlin quoted in O’Day, 1998,272
34 Irish Independent cited in Hennessey, 1998,149
35 Hennessey, 1998,145
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concentrated Catholic populations.36 Yet other critics pointed out that there was 
no real choice being presented in the Lloyd George-led negotiations -the 
options were either this form of incomplete Home Rule or martial law. The 
effect of such a choice would be to ‘traffick the grave of St. Patrick and the See 
of our only Cardinal to the men whose oath of initiation is to “wade knee deep 
in Papish blood.”’37 This would mean ceding the fate of those Catholics and 
Nationalists in the exclusion area to a ‘people in whom ... religious jealousy 
and sectarian distrust are as rampant as in the days when we were struggling for 
emancipation’ and it would mean that those left behind would be ‘consigned to 
an Egyptian bondage that nobody alive is in a position to say will pass away in 
this generation or the next.’38
These sentiments were crystallised in the Catholic Church’s opposition 
to exclusion. As an institution it rejected these proposals, citing the fears that a 
Protestant dominated administration for the area of exclusion would have a very 
negative impact on Catholic education and religious practice.39 One Bishop 
claimed that the threat of partition was ‘the grossest insult to the spirit of Irish 
nationality’ and that it was ‘utterly subversive of the National ideals.’40 For 
Archbishop Walsh the ‘segregation’ of the six counties was a ‘bastard policy’ 
that would have a ‘deplorable effect on Religion and Education’ and was to be 
resisted by the Church.41 Redmond had recognised this potential threat to the 
negotiations from the outset, and had met with the Bishops to try to allay their 
fears on the 16th of June. Even traditionally moderate Bishops reacted strongly. 
The Bishop of Derry had described the proposals as rot, and the bishop of
36 Kee, 1982,10
37 Midland Reporter in Hennessey, 1998,149
38 Fermanagh News and Fermanagh Herald cited in Hennessey, 1998, 149
39 McBride, 1991,214; Miller, 1987,199
40 Bishop McKenna cited in Hennessey, 1998,148
41 Dictated by Walsh, 22 June 1916 Walsh Papers 385/7
234
Raphoe said that the ‘party could not support the scheme and survive.’42 
Redmond sought the support of the Bishops knowing that without the 
institutional support of the Catholic Church, he would be accused of using the 
Irish Party machine to undemocratically foist partition onto Catholics and 
Nationalists in the areas of exclusion.43 This meeting did not lead to an 
agreement, with the result that the Church in the North became alienated from 
Redmond and the Irish Party.44 One week later, an Ulster conference of 
nationalist supporters met, and a measure supporting the negotiations was 
passed. This occurred in large part because its representatives were heavily 
comprised of Ancient Order of Hibernian members, who supported Redmond’s 
Northern allies because they were subject to the patronage of Irish Party MPs. 
Indeed, of the 740 representatives who had been at the conference, 270 had been 
from Tyrone-Fermanagh-Derry, and 183 of them, some 68%, had voted against 
the proposals 45 An accusation had even been made in the Irish Independent that 
those who supported the proposals for partition had prolonged their speeches to 
ensure that those who wished to catch the last train home (i.e. those not from 
Party’s stronghold of Belfast) were unlikely to stay to the end to vote.46
The interpretation of these events were coloured by the sentencing of Sir 
Roger Casement to execution. As was shown in previous chapters, this 
execution, though legal and perceived as necessary by the British authorities, 
further antagonised nationalists and did little to inspire their confidence in 
moderate and compassionate British rule. Coming as it did on the heels of this 
vote amongst Northern nationalists, one could deduce that it was perceived as 
an action that seemed only further to call into question Redmond and the Irish
42 McDowell, 1970,53
43 Rees, 1998,219
44 Miller, 1987,199
45 McDowell, 1970, 54
46 McDowell, 1970,54
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Party’s supposition that demonstrations of Irish Imperial loyalty would be justly 
rewarded. Furthermore, Casement’s prosecution had been carried out by a 
Unionist member of Asquith’s cabinet, F.E. Smith as Attorney-General. There 
was an irony in Smith’s prosecution of Casement, in light of his participation in 
‘extra-parliamentary’ activities on behalf of Ulster Unionists to block Home 
Rule some two years before, and this irony did not go unnoticed by nationalists. 
This further strengthened perceptions of alienation and isolation in the Irish 
nation from Westminster and Asquith’s cabinet, and further brought into 
question what power, if any, Redmond and the Irish Party still possessed.47 An 
event of equal significance for Unionists was the beginning of the Battle of the 
Somme on the 1st of July, which saw the decimation of the Ulster Volunteers in 
the 36th Division with 2000 killed and 3000 wounded. This must have seriously 
brought into question what prize their loyalty unto death for the Empire would 
now bring.48
By the 11th of July, the negotiating process began to seriously falter. 
Lord Lansdowne made a speech at Westminster in which he produced the 
written assurance which Lloyd George had given to Carson, praised General 
Maxwell, and proposed that the Defense of the Realm Act (DORA) be further 
extended to maintain the rule of law in Ireland with or without a Home Rule 
settlement.49 He furthermore put it to the cabinet that Lloyd George had in fact 
exceeded his brief by promising Redmond the immediate implementation of 
Home Rule, and by promising that the exclusion of the six counties would be
47 Rees, 1998,215
48 Rees, 1998, 222; As has been previously noted, this event, in particular, seemed to underpin 
the repertoire of Unionist myths, memories and symbols of their sacrifice for Britain, and 
therefore seemed, from the Unionist perspective, supreme justification of their vehement 
opposition to Home Rule.
4* Rees, 1998,221
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temporary.50 These actions were broadly intended to antagonise the Irish Party 
and nationalist support for Home Rule, and specifically constituted an attempt 
to wreck the Bill. They did, and the negotiations over Home Rule fell apart by 
the end of July, 1916. The Cabinet endorsed the promise made by Lloyd George 
to Carson. Redmond, felt completely betrayed by this turn of events. He 
declared all negotiations at an end, stated that he found Lansdowne’s speech to 
be a ‘declaration of war on the Irish people* and made it known that he and the 
Irish Party now opposed the new Home Rule Bill in its entirety.51
Castle Rule Reinstated
In the wake of the failure of the negotiations over Home Rule, Asquith 
reinstated a form of Government in Ireland which was the same as had been in 
place prior to the Rising -  a system of government which he had previously 
claimed had broken down entirely. It had been proposed that a new Irish 
administration be appointed by an advisory council, comprised of 
representatives of the different Irish parties, but Asquith dismissed this on the 
grounds that it was ‘attractive but impracticable.*52 Instead, Asquith selected an 
administration that had a distinctly Unionist tone, to replace the military regime 
of Maxwell. The combination of a return to this form of rule, along with the 
selection of Unionist politicians to fill the positions in the Irish administration, 
was hugely unpopular with the Irish nation. For example a member of 
Maxwell’s staff, Brigadier General Sir Joseph Byrne had been chosen as the 
inspector General of the RIC, in part, because he had been singled out for praise 
by Maxwell for his ‘handling of captured insurgents.’53 For the Irish nation, 
now transformed and radicalised, this was damning praise. The Irish Attomey-
50 Rees, 1998,218
51 Hennessey, 1998,148
52 McDowell, 1970, 64
53 McBride, 1991,215
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General was also a controversial appointment, as he had been Carson’s 
‘lieutenant’ in the Ulster Unionist movement.54 Even Dillon refused to initiate 
any kind of contact with the new administration.
Not only had there been no tangible evidence for headway or 
advancement on Home Rule despite all the political machinations on the part of 
the Party and Asquith, but the re-imposition of Castle Rule was now seen as 
evidence of a Unionist victory. Unionist success in thwarting Home Rule, along 
with its domination of the Irish administration, especially given its draconian 
form, with extended DORA powers and martial law still in place, all served to 
increase nationalist anger and fears. In feet this fear was not completely 
unjustified, as imprisonment without trial became increasingly common and 
provision for its implementation was continually extended.55 Of course, the 
more these powers were implemented, the more the population shunned the 
police and turned against the British regime as a whole, and the more the nation 
became radicalised, which in turn led to the further justification, in the minds of 
the British officials, of the use of the courts-martial and extra-judiciary 
powers.56 With the reestablishment of Castle rule, and this cycle of 
radicalisation in place, all Redmond and the rest of the Irish Party could do was 
to futilely demand that these powers be rescinded, propose fruitless debates at 
Westminster, and demand that the British authorities ‘trust the Irish people once 
and for all by putting the home rule into operation.’57
The Price o f Failure
It is apparent, in retrospect, that as great an impact as the events of 
Easter Week had had on the Irish nation, its impact was almost negligible in
54 Phillips, 1923,112
55 Fitzpatrick, 1998, 14
56 Fitzpatrick, 1998, 15
57 Redmond’s speech to the Commons, 24 July 1916 cited in McDowell, 1970,66
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terms of a shift in the political thinking of the elite. The exclusion of Ulster, as it 
had been proposed by the British Government, and accepted by the Irish Party, 
and the supposition that negotiations over Home Rule should simply take up 
where they had left off before the outbreak of the War, or the events of the 
Rising, demonstrated their utter lack of understanding of the transformation in 
the Irish nation.58 Redmond had misjudged the change brought about by the 
CTP in the Irish nation -  swelling up from the masses were expressions of a 
Sinn Fein Amhain (Ourselves Alone) mindset, and a project that was based in 
< part on a broader sense of British patriotism would not now suffice.59
Redmond’s failure to adjust to the changed political circumstances o f the Irish 
nation, left the political potential of Home Rule in Ireland ‘discarded and 
discredited. ,60Redmond*s pledging of the National Volunteers to the War effort 
had been a calculated political gamble to get Home Rule, but now it seemed that 
this gesture had ultimately gone unrecognised by the British Government. The 
sense that this gesture had not been successful was already prevalent, as 
Kitchener had previously failed to create a companion nationalist regiment for 
the 36th ‘Ulster’ Division. Now it seemed overly hazardous to risk Irish lives for 
little political gain.61 In assessing the situation during the autumn of 1916, 
Redmond rued the feet that ‘from the very first hour our efforts were thwarted, 
ignored and snubbed. Everything we asked for was refused, and everything that 
we protested against was done.’62 In this mindset, Redmond’s commitment of 
the Volunteers and support for the Imperial War effort had gained no advantage 
whatsoever for the advancement of Irish nationalism.63
58 Mansergh, 1997, 13
59 Boyce, 1995,288
60 Mansergh, 1997, 11
61 Rees, 1998,222
62 Redmond, October 1916, cited in Mansergh, 1997,29
63 Kee, 1982,18
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Redmond’s problem was now that ‘constitutionalism in a country whose 
grievance is that it possesses no constitution is an historical humbug . . . ,64 It had 
now become apparent that the Party’s ‘leaders ... had ceased to be 
representative.’65 Observers within the Irish Party felt that Redmond’s personal 
influence had been ‘irreparably broken.’66 One local politician declared ‘It was 
John Redmond’s fault, everything was his fault.’67 The feet that he had tried to 
compel those Northern nationalists who were dissatisfied with the proposals 
only further brought his political judgement into question.68 For one county 
inspector, it was blatantly obvious that nationalists in Tyrone ‘did not view with 
favour the proposed settlement excluding Tyrone ... and viewed its failure with 
great satisfaction.’69 It was contemporarily observed that only the abandonment 
of Lloyd George’s proposals had ‘prevented a split in the Nationalist Party as 
serious as the Pamellite split and the repudiation of Redmond by a large body of 
his nominal followers.*
Redmond’s brother, and political ally, Willie, an Irish Party MP 
representing East Clare, argued that the Party had now become obsolete, 
suggesting that he and his brother should retire and ‘hand over the task of
H1representing Ireland at Westminster to younger men.’ In feet, there was some 
basis for his concern that the younger generation was alienated from the Party 
and its leadership, or perhaps more correctly stated, how the leadership had 
become alienated and isolated from the younger generation. O’Brien wrote that 
the British ‘have driven all that is best and more unselfish among the young 
men of Ireland to despair of the constitutional movement by ... bungling [and]
64 O’Brien in Longford Independent 28 April, 1917, as cited in Boyce, 1995, 289
65 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,214
66 Gwynn cited in Hennessey, 1998,152
67 Member of Ennis ‘Board of Guardians’, 1916 cited in Fitzpatrick, 1998,102
68 Hennessey, 1998,152
69 Co. Tyrone Inspector’s Report, 1916 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
70 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,214
71 Fitzpatrick, 1998, 97
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double-dealing in reference to Home Rule ... above all by the methods by 
which you governed Ireland during the last six months.’72 That this younger 
generation had despaired of moderate constitutional nationalism would later 
become apparent -  it was the young who would go on to agitate most strongly 
on behalf of the burgeoning Sinn Fein movement. Redmond now believed that it 
was the British Government that had set upon a political course that was 
‘bound to do serious mischief to these high Imperial interests which we were 
told necessitated the proposal of the [Home Rule] settlement... they have taken 
the surest means to accentuate every possible danger and difficulty in this Irish 
situation.’73
This crisis led to state in which contemporary observers found that 
‘Every fool and semi-illiterate ass is busy with his “I never trusted Asquith”, “I 
always said the Party was not strong enough” . . . ,74 Even the Party’s 
subscriptions suffered, dropping from £1,127 in March 1916 to £674 in June.75 
In various papers, it was proclaimed that the Irish Party’s leadership had now 
discovered what the average person knew all along that they were being 
‘tricked, deceived, and humbugged by the Liberal Government* and that it had 
been a mistake to call for the Irish people to ‘help to strengthen the Empire’ and 
to leave behind the nation.76 For Dillon ‘enthusiasm and trust in Redmond and
m ■the Party [was] now dead so far as the mass of the people is concerned.* The 
impression left by the failure of these negotiations was that the leadership of the 
Irish Party ultimately lacked competence, that in choosing the Empire over 
Ireland they had made a terrible blunder, and ultimately the transformation and
72 O’Brien in Commons, 24 July, 1916 as cited in Foster, 1989,486
73 Redmond in Commons, cited in Kee, 1982,12
74 Michael Conway, former Irish Party MP quoted in Hennessey, 1998,160
75 Lafian, 1999, 61
76 Kilkenny People and Sligo Nationalist cited in Hennessey, 1998,160
77 Dillon cited in Kee, 1982,15
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beatification of the Rising and its participants was further emphasised by these 
points of view.78 One historian put it succinctly, stating that ‘the reward of
«7Q
compromise [was] distrust, distaste, and political death.’ Laffan points out that 
by August, the Irish Party had been so thoroughly defeated in the House of 
Commons that Redmond and his colleagues found that even the time in Ireland, 
which had been twenty five minutes faster than GMT, had been changed to 
harmonise it with English time, despite the vociferous protestations of the
Q A
Party. There was therefore a sense that somehow Redmond and the Irish Party 
had been defeated at every level over the issue of Home Rule, and as a result
01
they lost power and legitimacy.
The Final Failure o f Home Rule
Throughout the summer of 1916, there were continued attempts on the 
part of the Irish Party and Asquith to ‘keep the negotiating spirit alive.82 In 
December, a Lloyd George-led coalition replaced Asquith’s after he resigned. 
Lloyd George’s Cabinet was promptly stocked with the same Unionists with 
whom he had negotiated that summer. Sinn Fein’s by-election victories over the 
course of the spring of 1917 demonstrated the potential dangers of an Ireland 
without some sort of Home Rule settlement, and there was now some impetus
O')
on the part of Lloyd George’s Government to move on the Irish situation. By 
March, in the wake of a by-election in Roscommon, there was some definite 
movement within Lloyd George’s Cabinet towards this end. In debates on 
Ireland in the Commons on the 7th and 22nd of March, Lloyd George made 
speeches which reiterated the British Government’s position that they were
78 See especially Hennessey 1998 and O’Day 1998
79 O’Hegarty cited in O’Duibhgall, 1966, 86
80 Laffim, 1999,62
81 Intelligence Report “Attitude of the People Towards the Empire” February, 1917, CSB Files, 
3/716/24 NAI; see also Laffan, 1999
82 Letter from Asquith to Redmond, 28 July, 1916 in O’Day, 1998,275
83 For more on these by-elections, see next chapter (8).
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willing to grant Home Rule to those areas which wanted it, but would not 
impose it where it wasn’t.84 The first proposals on how to resurrect a Home 
Rule settlement included a provision for negotiations led by a commission 
comprised of statesman from the Dominions where ‘the problem of local 
autonomy has presented itself in different forms and has been solved in different 
ways.’85 Even this had an ulterior motive, to try to reinvigorate recruiting in the 
Dominions by making them part of the solution to the Irish problem However, 
when the Colonial Secretary approached various individuals to serve on the 
commission, representatives of the dominions declined to take part ‘since their 
own countries were divided over the Irish issue.’86
By April these matters had become more pressing, a bill to prolong the 
life of the existing parliament was coming up for a second reading in the 
Commons, and the Irish Party was threatening to obstruct its passage. This left 
Lloyd George’s cabinet with one of two alternatives -  to force through the 
legislation despite the risk that Irish Party opposition would ‘become a focus for 
opposition from other quarters of the House’ or to call a general election. The 
Cabinet chose the former while simultaneously pursuing a policy that would 
attempt to appease Irish demands for Home Rule.88 As part of this effort, a 
modified proposal emerged which provided for the parties in Ireland to 
negotiate a solution to the Irish problem between themselves, rather than 
directed or moderated by British or Dominion representatives. While the Irish 
Party failed to block the Bill, the episode served to put Ireland back on the 
political agenda of Lloyd George’s cabinet and restarted the negotiations over 
Home Rule.
84 McDowell, 1970, 71
85 Speech by Asquith in the Commons cited in McDowell, 1970,71
86 McDowell, 1970,72
87 McDowell, 1970, 73
88 Cabinet Minutes, 16 April 1917 cited in McDowell, 1970,73
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By the 16th of May, Lloyd George had sent two Home Rule proposals to 
Redmond and Carson. The first was that Home Rule should be implemented 
immediately with the exclusion of the six counties. Exclusion would be 
reconsidered after five years, and a council of Ireland would be formed that 
would be comprised of representatives from both the Home Rule and excluded 
areas to deal with problems that would affect all of Ireland, in this way creating 
an all-Ireland dimension. The second proposal, a last minute addendum, was put 
forward by Lloyd George as a ‘last resort.’ It proposed ‘a convention of 
Irishmen of all parties for the purpose of producing a scheme of Irish self- 
government.’89 By the 21st of May, because of its appeal to the Irish Party and 
Southern and Ulster Unionists, and despite Lloyd George’s original intentions, 
this second proposal was adopted as the way to move forward, such that 
‘Ireland should try her hand at hammering out an instrument of government for 
her own people’ and Lloyd George agreed that whatever ‘substantial agreement’ 
was reached by the Convention would be implemented by the Government.90
The makeup of the members of the convention was a particularly 
contentious issue, especially when what constituted a substantial agreement had 
yet to be agreed. Eventually a compromise emerged that called for 95 
representatives to make up the body of the Convention. It would therefore be 
made up of 52 Nationalists, 26 Ulster Unionists, 9 Southern Unionists, 6 Labour 
Representatives, and 2 Liberals. Lloyd George’s Cabinet was, in particular, 
concerned that all aspects of Irish society were represented at the Convention, 
including religious representatives, representatives of those who held ‘advanced 
nationalist opinions* and representatives of organised labour. Of course it was 
the latter two groups that had come together to carry out the Easter Rising, so
89 Lloyd George quoted in The Times 17 May 1917, cited in McDowell, 1970, 76
90 McDowell, 1970,77
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their participation was seen as being crucial, though in a strictly controlled and 
limited manner.91 Sinn Fein refused to officially participate unless the 
Convention’s representatives were democratically elected and possessed the 
power to declare Ireland independent, and unless the British Government would 
pledge itself to the ratification of whatever the majority of the convention
Q<)
decided. They recognised that they were being asked to participate in a limited 
capacity, and flushed with their electoral successes, wouldn’t hold truck with a 
body that did not adequately recognise their new found political status, as Sinn 
Fein had only been assigned five seats in the convention. Sinn Fein also did not 
participate because its entire political rationale was dependent on its holding an 
anti-status-quo stance towards constitutional politics in Ireland, and this strategy
0*5
had already aided them to by-election victory. Eventually the places for 
‘advanced nationalist opinions’ were filled by members who met daily with 
Sinn Fein representatives, but who could not officially ‘be regarded in any sense 
a representative of the party.’94 Of the other representatives, four came from the 
hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and their main concern was to prevent any 
form of exclusion that would lead to Protestant control of Catholic education in 
the excluded area.95 This was, of course, problematic, because it was one of the 
aspects of a potential settlement sought by the Ulster Unionists. The leadership 
of the Nationalist delegation was left to Redmond -  once again he staked 
political reputation, and potentially the fate of the Party, on Lloyd George- 
inspired negotiations over Home Rule.
The Irish Convention convened in July 1917 and collapsed in March 
1918. Though it was long and arduous, it did produce some real compromise
91 McDowell, 1970, 82
92 McDowell, 1970, 82
93 See especially Coogan, 1993 amongst others.
94 Lysaght’s Diary cited in McDowell, 1970, 84; Jackson, 1999,209
95 Miller, 1987,2000
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between and fundamental changes among Unionists, Southern and Ulster, and 
Nationalists. The key issues of the Convention were Ulster and Customs -  and it 
was in fact these issues which the negotiations ultimately foundered on.96 Fiscal 
control of Home Rule Ireland constituted the thin legal membrane between a 
glorified devolved local authority under the control of the Imperial Parliament, 
and the achievement of full Dominion status, to rival that of Canada, South 
Africa and Australia. It therefore comes as no shock that this issue was the main 
bone of contention between Ulster Unionists, who wanted no form of fiscal 
devolution between Ireland and Britain, and Nationalists, who believed there 
could be no liberty for Ireland without substantial economic independence. 
Nationalists, in particular, were concerned that a dominant British parliament 
would always put the economic and industrial concerns of Britain first. 
Therefore to ensure the ultimate security of the Irish nation it would be 
necessary for the Irish Parliament to be able to enforce customs and excise 
duties as it saw fit rather than at the behest of Westminster. This approach was 
informed in no small part by the memories of the Famine and Irish economic 
underdevelopment and dependence. It would also be necessary, from this point 
of view, for an Irish parliament to be empowered to negotiate foreign trade 
treaties to ensure that they would have independent access to resources for 
which they might find themselves in competition with Britain herself. This was 
an anathema to Ulster Unionists, and the negotiations rapidly ground to a halt.
In late 1917, Southern Unionists proposed a compromise to overcome 
this stalemate. The position of the Southern Unionists had altered from the one 
which they had held in the first set of negotiations. Many in this group now 
recognised the apparent inevitability of some sort of Home Rule settlement, and
96 O’Day, 1998
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were therefore seeking to shape this settlement to their advantage. In accepting 
an inevitability of an all-Ireland Home Rule solution, the Southern Unionists 
had diverged from their Ulster Unionist counterparts, and this change of 
position was a cause of conflict within Unionism. The compromise which was 
put forward by the Southern Unionists suggested that the right of internal 
taxation should indeed be held by an Irish Parliament, but that the right of 
raising custom duties and tariffs should remain with Westminster. This left the 
bulk of Irish economic policy in the hands of Westminster, a situation that was 
historically and symbolically ‘problematic* for nationalists with memories of 
the 19th century.
In early January, 1918 Redmond forged ahead with this compromise 
despite the misgivings of nearly all nationalists in the Convention, including his 
own advisors and allies. This was a compromise too far. It collapsed, exposing 
Redmond to hostility even from his own Party. In the aftermath of the collapse 
of this compromise, and in a cloud of political defeat and embarrassment, 
Redmond withdrew from the convention, on the grounds that ‘he could no 
longer be of service.’97 His health was already in decline, and he would be dead 
within two months. The Convention had, in the meantime, become hopelessly 
deadlocked, and three months later delivered three different reports to Lloyd 
George, a sign of its inability to come to a substantial agreement as to the future 
of Ireland. The majority report, passed 44-29 represented a new compromise 
which suggested that the matter of customs be deferred for a period after the 
cessation after the War.98 For the nationalists, this was ultimately a ‘dangerous’ 
concession, in so far as it ultimately meant the implementation of a ‘federal
97 Hennessey, 1998, 233
98 Hennessey, 1998,228
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Home Rule* rather than ‘colonial’ Home Rule, i.e. limited self-government 
rather than full Dominion status."
This debacle was reminiscent of the disgrace attached to the end of the 
first set of negotiations, and it was unclear to what extent the Irish Party had 
now gained anything in participating in these negotiations. This perception was 
only further reinforced by debates over Irish representation in Westminster, with 
Nationalists believing that it would justify and sanction further British 
interference in Irish affairs, and Unionists believing it to be evidence of 
attachment to the Empire.100
Military Service Bill
Ultimately, however the proposals of the Convention failed not only 
because of the inability of the Irish Parties to come to terms over the Home Rule 
fate of Ireland, but also through the actions of the British Government in April 
1918. There were massive defeats for the Allied forces in late March, with a 
German advance capturing some 98 square miles, penetrating British lines as 
deeply as 4 ‘A miles, and on one day killing 7,000 British soldiers with another 
21,000 being taken prisoner.101 Between the 21st of March and the end of April, 
Britain had lost 300,000 men -  and throughout April the British Army was 
engaged in a series of actions to save Amiens, which, if it were overrun, could 
have meant the failure of the entire British defence system on the Continent.102 
The Cabinet now decided to extend the application of the Compulsory Military 
Service Bill in England, to include seventeen year olds, vicars, etc. and to apply 
conscription to Ireland. The introduction of conscription was not a surprising 
proposal, given the negative effect all of these events had had on recruiting, and
99 Hennessey, 1998, 211
100 See Hennessey, 1998,207-215
101 Hennessey, 1998, 220
102 McDowell, 1970,185
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it had been foreseen by one county inspector as early as 1916, who thought that
with recruiting having virtually ceased, ‘it is not expected many more will join
unless compelled to do so.’103 A Military Service Bill for Ireland was
►
introduced, along with a Home Rule Bill, ostensibly to sweeten the bitter pill for 
nationalists. This was part of an effort to raise some 550,000 more men in 
Britain, and some 150,000 in Ireland. The bill served to alienate Nationalists 
and Unionists in equal measure, and drove yet more ‘former’s sons’ into the 
ranks of Sinn Fein and the Volunteers.104
Sir Horace Plunkett, Chair of the Irish Convention, viewed this situation 
as critical.105 He felt that the decision to introduce the Bill in Ireland, coming 
just when the Convention reported, proved ‘unhappy’ and that it was pushed 
ahead by the Government as ‘unwise.’106 Opposition to conscription created a 
basis for an alliance of disparate elements of the Irish nation, the clergy, 
moderate nationalists and radical nationalists could come together to oppose 
conscription, and as a result it would finalise the process of radicalisation in 
Ireland.107 In fact it would provide Sinn Fein with the final mantles of 
legitimacy. Plunkett believed, as a result, that any resistance to the 
implementation of conscription in Ireland would be ‘very effective’ and ‘no
1 f i f t  •levy could be effected in response without bloodshed.’ It was Sir Horace
Plunkett’s ultimate belief that ‘to accompany the concession of Home Rule for
Ireland with conscription by England was a tyrannical act.*109
The Bill more or less finished the Irish Party’s nationalist political
legitimacy, in so for as it destroyed any semblance of the Irish Party strategy of
*
103 Co. Carlow Inspector’s Report, 1916 CO903/19 Pt. II PRO Kew
104 See last chapter.
105 Plunkett to Col. House, 20 April 1918 in O’Day and Stevenson, 1992,164-166
106 Plunkett to Col. House, 20 April 1918 in O’Day and Stevenson, 1992,164-166
107 See Chapter 8
108 Plunkett to Col. House, 20 April 1918 in O’Day and Stevenson, 1992,164-166
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loyalty and participation, and forced nationalists of all varieties to question what 
right Westminster had to enforce such a law. In fact, the Military Service Bill 
was being introduced without any consultation of the Irish Party whatsoever, an 
action that called into question what purpose was being served by its presence in 
the Commons. The Party attempted to renounce its moderate position and 
associate itself with the radical and anti-conscriptionist nationalism of Sinn Fein 
to form ‘one general movement,’ but this ultimately failed for a variety of 
reasons -  not least its loss of political legitimacy because of previous failures.110 
In feet Lloyd George delivered the final blow to the Irish Party in November 
1918, when he declared that Home Rule would be withheld ‘until the condition 
in Ireland made it possible to implement,’ completely undermining the Irish 
Party’s raison d ’etre in the run up to the General Election in December.111 After 
this collapse, Home Rule was dead, despite several half-hearted attempts to 
resuscitate it. The Irish Party was, as a result, now finished, and the reformed 
and reorganised institutional expression of radical nationalism in Ireland, in the 
guise of Sinn Fein, now solely possessed the sole political legitimacy of the 
nationalist cause and resonated strongly and popularly throughout the Irish 
nation.
Conclusion
The effect of this course of events was twofold. Firstly it demonstrated 
to the Irish nation the dangers of negotiation with the British authorities. This 
had the further effect of raising the question for the Irish nation of its role in the 
British Imperial project. Secondly, that Home Rule had failed twice after the 
Rising, and in so fer as each time it had hinged on Redmond’s personal 
reputation and that of the Party, these failures ultimately doomed them both.
110 Fitzpatrick, 1998, 98
111 Foster, 1986,490
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Political miscalculation and isolation from the nation led to the Party no longer 
being representative. Their position on exclusion had shown how out of touch 
the elites of the moderate constitutional nationalist movement had become. For 
Redmond this became especially apparent with his ‘compromise too fer.* Before 
the ultimate failure of Home Rule and the collapse of the Party, while there was 
still some potential for a constitutional settlement to Irish nationalist demands, 
there may have been a great deal of sympathy for, even resonance of radical 
nationalism, but its development as a popular political movement was greatly 
hindered by the constitutional alternative. With the door firmly shut on a 
constitutional remedy, there were no more barriers and distractions from the full 
of development of an unhindered radical nationalist movement in Ireland and its 
full force was unleashed. The failure of the Irish Party changed national political 
identity in Ireland in so far as it created a political vacuum. With this 
transformation, there was a fundamental question over what the new politics of 
nationalism should be -  and the sense of agency and urgency that resulted from 
the cultural trigger point therefore changed as a direct result of the collapse of 
the Party. This situation would prove particularly fertile soil for the growth of 
Sinn Fein.
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Chapter 8 
The Rise of Sinn Fein
Introduction
While the Irish Party had been busy negotiating with the British 
Government and Unionists over the possibility of the implementation of Home 
Rule in Ireland, radical nationalism, initially shattered by the aftermath of the 
Rising, was starting to reorganise. In part this reorganisation was driven by its 
adherents -  indeed they had been motivated enough to act when there was no 
support for their cause before the Rising and its aftermath, and now a period 
where it seemed that there might be some cause for optimism was all that it took 
to hearten them and make them redouble their efforts. More importantly, 
however, reorganisation was being driven by the effects of the cultural trigger 
point -  the collapse of the Irish Party released for the unfettered expression of 
radical nationalism, and there was a new sense of urgency and agency after the 
failure of the constitutional option. In the wake of the Rising, especially once 
Home Rule had failed (twice over) there was a demand from the nation for a 
new and more representative set of political institutions to come into being to 
replace the now discredited Redmond and the Irish Party. The institutional re- 
emergence and resurrection of Sinn Fein in the aftermath of the Rising can be 
charted from the initial foundation of alternative political organisations after the 
Rising, and through a series of by-elections from November 1916 onwards. The 
process was not necessarily a smooth one, but by the end of the War the radical 
nationalist party of Sinn Fein was able to claim to be the dominant political 
force in all of Ireland, and the effects of the cultural trigger point became 
apparent.
Burgeoning Radicalism: the Irish Nations League
For Redmond and the Irish Party, the failure of the Home Rule 
negotiations represented a major setback. Redmond and the Party had been
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willing to accept the temporary exclusion of the six counties of Ulster, when 
popular nationalism would not.1 There was a strong reaction to this willingness 
to compromise the geographic unity of Ireland, and for radical nationalists it 
was summed up by Michael Collins’ sentiment that he was delighted by ‘the 
smashing of the Home Rule proposals’ believing that there should be ‘anything 
but a divided Ireland.*2 At the same time, for one contemporary observer it was 
clear that radical nationalists, now larger and continuing to grow, accepted ‘the 
fact of the proposed [Lloyd George] settlement as a reward for rebellion and 
used the form of the settlement, which was repugnant to the national instincts ... 
to recruit and strengthen further.’3 A Sinn Fein-inspired ‘advanced nationalist* 
movement was appealing to the undercurrent of unrest and disaffection, 
especially ‘amongst the younger section of the people* to the detriment of the 
Irish Party.4 Redmond and the Party’s failed political gambles provided new 
political space for radical nationalism to operate.
After the failure of the Lloyd George led Home Rule negotiations, over 
the summer of 1916, the influence of the National Volunteers was on the wane, 
while the popularity of the Irish Volunteers was on the increase. The RIC 
believed that while the membership of the Irish Volunteers was small, it had 
‘much influence with the labouring classes and shop boys, and through the 
relations with the rebels.’5 There was a sense that there was an ‘undercurrent of 
unrest and disaffection, especially amongst the younger section of the people 
due to current political events’ and this disaffection was leading to the 
reorganisation and increased drilling amongst the Irish Volunteers.6 There was,
1 Kee, 1982
2 Coogan, 1991,52; see also accounts in CSB Files from August, 1916 3/716 NAI
3 Wells and Marlowe, 1916,215
4 Co. Kilkenny Inspector’s Report, 1917 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
5 Intelligence Reports, 1916 CO903/19 PRO Kew
6 Reports on Dublin and Kilkenny, 1917 CO903/19 PRO Kew
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however no single body to which those who were feeling disaffected could turn. 
Radical nationalism was limited in its capacity to agitate, with an observer 
stating that ‘owing to the absence of leaders the movement is in abeyance, but it 
would not require a clever organiser to create a dangerous organisation.’7 This 
untapped potential was recognised by radical nationalists who were lamenting 
that in the absence of these leaders, Redmond and the Party were making 
attempts to rehabilitate themselves, and those ‘that had been fighting 
parliamentarianism for nearly a quarter of a century now find ourselves without 
a leader when there is a chance to win the country to our view.’8
In the wake of the failure of Home Rule, there were calls for a political 
organisation to replace the disgraced and denuded Irish Party. While some 
organisations already were in existence, such as O’Brien’s All-For-Ireland 
League, various new political organisations now started up and vied to represent 
the transformed and radicalised Irish nation, including the ‘Irish Ireland League’ 
the ‘Repeal League’ and the ‘Anti-Partition League.’ At the start of August 
1916, the Anti-Partition League became the Irish Nations League (INL). The 
Church, under the direction of several Northern Bishops, came together with 
Northern nationalists to form the Anti-Partition League on the 20th of July, to 
oppose the Irish Party’s planned compromise of the exclusion for the six 
counties from Home Rule. Two weeks later this body had become the Irish 
Nations League. Though the content of these organisations was now more 
radical, their form, and even the style of their leadership retained aspects of their 
moderate forerunners. This was due in part to the fact that many of their 
organisers, sympathisers and agitators had previously done the same for Home 
Rule and moderate nationalism, and they brought with them experience and
7 Co. Meath Inspector’s Report, 1916 CO 903/19 PRO Kew
8 Letter to ‘Dixon’, 10 October 1916 MS. 35262 NLI Dublin
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assumptions as to what form a political organisation should take.9 Though the 
Irish Nations League was ultimately to have little political impact, it is 
indicative of the popular calls for the representative reorganisation of 
nationalism in Ireland.
The expressed aims of the Irish Nations League were to avert partition, 
participate in independent opposition in the Commons, perform ‘militant 
agitation* at home, and to demand a form of rule in Ireland along Dominion 
lines.10 It believed that ‘the Irish leaders, having betrayed their trust, the people 
of Ireland can have no further confidence in them, they have acted in direct 
opposition to the National sentiment.’11 Its aims however were expressed in 
‘dulcet tones’, in that it sought to ‘preserve and cherish the National ideals ... to 
cultivate patriotism and good citizenship ... to develop the natural resources of 
the country.*12 The Irish Nations League did not see itself as a separatist party 
but rather as a ‘revived, purified and reinvigorated Parliamentary Party.’13 The 
Irish Nations League was therefore compared to various Parliamentary- 
orientated forerunners, such as the United Irish League and for one 
contemporary the comparison was obvious, in so far as ‘both looked to London 
and Parliamentarianism to remedy Ireland’s grievances.’14 It was a transitional 
step from radicalised perceptions of the events of the Rising to full blown 
participation in radical nationalist politics. As one priest put it, the Irish Nations 
League was a type of purgatory, ‘a place or state of punishment where some 
Parliamentarians suffered for a time before they joined Sinn Fein.’15
9 See Chapter 4, Fitzpatrick, 1998
10 Hennessey, 1998,148
11 Handbill from Irish Nations League, 3 August 1916 in Walsh Papers 385/7
12 Pamphlet, 4 August 1916 cited in Laflan, 1999,63
13 Laffan, 1999,63
14 Letter to ‘Dixon’ 10 October, 1916 MS. 35262 NLI Dublin
15 Sermon, 15 October 1917, cited in Lafian, 1999, 64
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While this group had some elements of radical nationalism, its power 
never extended beyond the areas affected in Ulster and its main base of power 
lay in Tyrone-Fermanagh-Derry. Of its 42 branches that were established 
between August and October 1916, 20 were in Tyrone.16 In fact it did not hold 
its first meeting outside of Ulster until the 10th of September.17 It did, however 
represent the institutional growth of grass-roots radical nationalism. It also made 
contact with other groups who were disaffected from the Irish Party, but very 
much within the constitutional tradition, such as William O’Brien’s ‘All for
1 ftIreland League’ centred in Co. Cork. The emergence of the Irish Nations 
League was an explicit demonstration that there was a constituency in Ireland 
that felt that the Irish Party was no longer representative, and that it was 
necessary to set up an alternative political institutional structure to achieve Irish 
nationalist aims. The cultural trigger point was definitely having an impact, but 
the extent of its impact on the political behaviour of the Irish nation had yet to 
be determined. The Irish Nations League was not a full blown radical nationalist 
organisation, but it was representative of radicalisation.
These expressions of anti-Party sentiment suffered inherent drawbacks, 
in so far as they lacked clear leadership, policies and structures by which to 
accomplish their goals. In the Irish Nations League policies were being decided 
and felt out as they were being made. As part of this process of shedding off the 
institutional and parliamentary mentality of the Irish Party, it was noted that 
‘people are beginning to think and act for themselves’ beyond the stifling 
leadership and machine of the Party.19 This was marked by a demonstrable shift 
to what might be considered to be a more ‘traditional’ or ‘orthodox’ nationalist
16 Hennessey, 1998,148
17 Laffan, 1999,63
18 Laffan, 1999, 63
19 Galway Observer in Kee, 1982, 19
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ideology, ie. that the nation is best governed by itself, independent of non­
national influences. In the Irish case, after the failures of Home Rule, and with 
the process of radicalisation having firmly taken root, the popular belief in an 
Irish-Ireland became increasingly important. This meant an understanding of 
Ireland as not only culturally distinct but also politically independent from its 
Anglo-Protestant counterpart. This resurgence in the popularity of a Sinn Fein 
Amhain outlook marked a radical departure from the moderate and 
constitutional politics of the preceding 40-50 years.20 The organic 
distinctiveness of the Irish nation, as expressed in this Sinn Fein Amhain 
ideology, now even begged the ultimate question -  why participate in 
Westminster or a ‘Home Rule’ scheme at all? This question, expressed in the 
issue of abstention, would now increasingly come to dominate radical 
nationalist politics. In fact the Irish Nations League’s first stated aim was to 
secure self-government for the Irish nation, and its provisional constitution 
stated that Irish MPs should withdraw from Westminster ‘whenever called upon 
to do so.’21
The West Cork By-Election
By November 1916 there was a by-election in West Cork which would 
provide a gauge by which political change in the aftermath of the Rising would 
become apparent. The election was chiefly between a pro-Redmond Irish Party 
candidate, Daniel O’Leary, who was running despite Redmond’s instructions to 
the contrary, a ‘self-styled Sinn Feiner’ Frank Healy who was running at the 
behest of O’Brien for his All-for-Ireland ticket, and a local independent All-for- 
Ireland candidate, Michael Shipsey. Healy had been selected by O’Brien, 
Redmond’s bitter enemy in the Irish constitutional nationalist movement to try
20 Kee, 1982
21 Kee, 1982,20
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to court a protest vote. Healy was an O’Brienite, who had been deported by 
the British authorities after the Rising, a friend of Sinn Fein’s founder, Arthur 
Griffith, and was known as a sympathiser with the ‘Sinn Fein rebellion.’23 He 
was not, however, officially involved in or representative of Sinn Fein itself. 
The potential for a split vote for Healy and Shipsey amongst West Cork’s All- 
For-Ireland ranks did not bode well for Healy’s candidacy, and says more about 
O’Brien’s political machinations than for the content of Healy’s electoral 
platform.24
Healy’s electoral platform was based on the supposition that, while he 
gloried and took pride in the achievements and heroism of Irish soldiers in the 
British Army, he wondered ‘was it fair for a man who boasts himself the leader 
of the Irish people to tell these men on their way to Flanders “I have blown the 
bugle for you, and when you come back your country will have shrunk from 32 
counties to 26.*”25 His brother, T.M Healy, campaigned on his behalf stating 
that ‘if they elected O’Leary it meant conscription for Ireland; if they elected
a /
Frank Healy it meant no conscription but amnesty for prisoners.’ The 
commander of the Cork section of the Irish Volunteers, incarcerated in Reading 
Jail was livid upon hearing that Healy was running under a Sinn Fein banner, 
and took out a newspaper ad stating that ‘neither Healy, nor any of the other 
candidates for Parliament in West Cork represented the views of either the 
interned prisoners or Sinn Fein.’27 One of the issues which had led to a radical 
nationalist rejection of Healy was his refusal to entertain running his campaign
22 Rees, 1998,223; Laffim, 1999, 73
23 Laffan, 1999,73
24 For a full description of this situation see Laffan, 1999.
25 Irish Independent 11 November 1916 cited in Kee, 1982
26 Cork Examiner 15 November 1916, cited in Laffan, 1999,74
27 Rees, 1998,223
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on a policy of abstention, to their mind implicitly meaning that his political 
orientation was towards a Westminster status quo.
The pro-Redmond Irish Party candidate, O’Leary won this by-election 
by 116 votes, with the number of votes for the other two candidates combined 
equalling more than those polled for O’Leary. This result was not disturbing to 
radical nationalists as there was hardly any political institutional infrastructure 
to express radical Irish nationalism. O’Brien had tried to capitalise on the 
transformation in the Irish nation and the anti-Redmond and anti-Irish Party 
sentiment which had resulted from the failures of the Lloyd George 
negotiations. However, this is evidence that radical nationalists, though in a 
state of organisational chaos and disarray, were making it known that they 
would not be drawn into status quo Irish politics, nor were such politics 
particularly attractive to the electorate.
Release of the Frognoch Internees
Two events of major significance would occur in December 1916 which 
would greatly change the institutional ineffectiveness of radical nationalism in 
Ireland. First of all, Asquith was replaced as Prime Minister by Lloyd George. 
One of Lloyd George’s first actions was to release the 560 internees who had 
been detained and held without trial in the aftermath of the Rising. Lloyd 
George not only publicly stated that a solution to the Irish situation was one of 
his chief objectives, but, as was shown in the last chapter, there were many 
external pressures which made finding a solution attractive. If the situation in 
Ireland could be sorted out, it would, generally speaking, unlock Irish 
manpower, adding as many as 150,000 new soldiers to the British Army, release 
the division ‘locked up’ in Ireland, and releasing the internees would help to 
‘facilitate’ recruiting in the Dominions and ‘favourably influence’ US opinion
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towards the allies. Therefore the release of the internees held without trial was 
part of a strategy to allay American fears over Ireland, and to further entice 
them into supporting the allies in the War.29 The second significant event, as 
was discussed in some detail in the last chapter, was Lloyd George’s convening 
of the Irish convention, to allow Irishmen to solve Irish problems, and again to 
address American and Dominion concerns about the situation in Ireland. To 
facilitate these negotiations, Lloyd George ordered the release of all remaining 
Irish ‘1916 Prisoners’ in June, 1917.30
The release of the Frognoch internees had an immediate impact on the 
organisation of radical nationalism in Ireland. The British Government had 
assumed that to restore Irish confidence, and to return Ireland to its status quo 
ante required little more than appeasement i.e. the release of the remaining
^  I
prisoners and the resumption of negotiations over Home Rule. However upon 
their release, the prisoners were received with open enthusiasm, and 
‘Everything began precisely where they had left off.*32 Whether or not their 
release actually meant a direct return to the way things had been, it definitely 
had a reinvigorating effect on the radical nationalist movement, from top to 
bottom. Before the release of the prisoners, one contemporary lamented that ‘the 
absence of all the leaders to whom the rank and file Sinn Fein party look for
'X'Xguidance was an insurmountable obstacle.’
The released internees did not return as the same men as those that had 
departed in the immediate aftermath of the Rising. As was shown in previous 
chapters, Frognoch had served as a kind of training ground for radical agitators
28 McDowell, 1970,68
29 Kee, 1982
30 Rees, 1998,158
31 O’Duibhgall, 1966,303
32 O’Duibhgall, 1966,323
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from all over Ireland, and it had given these men the chance to discuss strategies 
for their return. By being interned, disparate individuals were brought together 
to ‘receive one pattern of thought and to know one another and to learn of one 
another.’34 MacNeill, interned with the leadership of the Rising at Lewes Jail, 
described his time in jail as ‘a sort of school’ in which prisoners were learning
i f
Irish Language and History. Upon their release, these new ideas, contacts and 
skills were put into action by men like Michael Collins, who immediately threw 
themselves into institutions such as the Irish National Association and 
Volunteers Dependents Fund (INAVDF). This organisation was busy providing 
relief to released internees who found themselves unemployed, and provided 
assistance to the widows and families of those who were killed during Easter 
Week. The money for their activities came from both home and abroad, 
particularly from the USA and Australia. The INAVDF was viewed with 
suspicion by the British Authorities, and they gave strict orders that their 
activities were to be constantly monitored to ensure that they were not 
participating in Sinn Fein agitation.36 In fact, the opposite was the case, with 
newly opened branches of Sinn Fein and other ‘advanced nationalist* 
organisations sending contributions to the fund, raising it in their capacity as 
social clubs as much as through political agitation, through events such as 
sponsored dances, Irish poetry reading etc.37 In the immediate aftermath of the 
Rising, it had been apparent to some county inspectors that various nationalist 
organisations such as ‘the GAA and Gaelic League though nominally non­
political are in reality strongly Sinn Fein ...*38 What these organisations
34 Darrell Figgis in Laffan, 1999,65
35 Letter from MacNeill to Margaret MacNeill, 26 March 1917 cited in Laffan, 1999,65
36 Laffan, 1999,68
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provided was a network for radical nationalists to organise and keep in contact, 
a cover for the burgeoning radical nationalist political organisation.
The Roscommon By-Election
The first indication that radical nationalism was undergoing a process of 
reorganisation was its victory in the North Roscommon by-election of February 
1917. The by-election was contested by three candidates, though it was really 
only a two candidate race. The candidates included a pro-Redmond Irish Party 
candidate, Thomas J. Devine, an independent, Jasper Tully who was the 
publisher of the Roscommon Herald, and the radical nationalist candidate, 
Count George Noble Plunkett. Plunkett was the Father of one of the Easter 
Week ‘martyrs,’ Joseph Plunkett, a signatory of the Proclamation. His two other 
sons were imprisoned for their actions over Easter Week. In fact, when selected 
by Collins, Griffith and others to run for the seat, Plunkett was in England, 
himself having been deported there by the British authorities after the Rising. 
He only arrived back in the constituency two days before the election. His 
candidature was not an obvious choice for the radical nationalists, as prior to the 
events of the Rising he had been an intellectual who had run the National 
Museum of Science and Art in Dublin and had been president of the Royal Irish 
Academy on two occasions.39 Plunkett was even a member of the Royal Dublin 
Society, though he was expelled upon his selection for this seat, because of the 
activities of his family during Easter Week. These were not typical radical 
nationalist credentials. For most of the election Plunkett was in England, 
recovering from illness, but this did little to hamper Collins, Griffith and other 
radical nationalist agitators from running a vigorous campaign on his behalf in 
his absence.
39 Laffan, 1999,79
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Plunkett won this by-election by twice as many votes as his Irish Party 
competition. Archbishop Walsh believed that ‘there had been nothing like it 
since Butt’s victory in Limerick.’40 Plunkett benefited from the support of a 
discontented and disaffected electorate. These groups included Sinn Fein, the 
Volunteers, and the Irish Nations League 41 This broad umbrella of nationalist 
support would later play a crucial role in the organisational development of 
radical nationalism. Whereas there had been a transformation and radicalisation 
in the outlook of individuals in the Irish nation, lagging institutional 
representation meant there were a variety of potential outlets for this 
transformed outlook, none of which dominated the Irish political scene. This 
new support and energy was going politically unharnessed. Before this by- 
election victory, disparate groups, such as pre-Rising Sinn Fein, the Gaelic 
League, Volunteers, Cumann na mBan and the IRB were attempting to focus 
their efforts to regroup and reorganise the greater project of radical nationalism 
-  but they lacked a coherent structure and strategy 42
Plunkett’s campaign reflected this, as he asked that the people of 
Roscommon should vote for him because he was ‘father of his dead boy and his 
two sons were suffering penal servitude.’43 His entire platform was based on an 
appeal for sympathy, and on highlighting the incompetence and failure of the 
Irish Party.44 Laurence Ginnell, a rebel MP who would eventually come to fully 
support Sinn Fein in the Summer of 1917, campaigned on Plunkett’s behalf, and 
claimed that ‘If elected Count Plunkett would prevent the young men of Ireland
40 Walsh quoted in Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, 
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being forced into the British Army.’45 For Ginnell, the fear of serving in the 
British Army formed the basis of his campaigning on behalf of Plunkett again. 
At one meeting he stated that ‘Redmond promised Home Rule to the Irish 
people and thereby got 150,000 men to fight for England but now these men 
were feeding the worms in Gallipoli’ and reiterated this message at another 
meeting stating that ‘As a result of Redmond’s action thousands of Irishmen are 
buried to-day at the bottom of the Dardanelles, in Sulva Bay, and in the trenches 
of Flanders who ought to be at home breaking up the ranches of Roscommon.’46 
This was highly indicative of the issues which the radical activists 
identified as appealing to the voters. But at this point, a unified radical 
nationalist policy was in such disarray that Plunkett even refused to submit to 
Griffith’s request that he pledge to abstain from Westminster should he be 
elected. Officially Plunkett was running without any party affiliation, though it 
had been made clear from the start that he represented Sinn Fein.47 One jibe 
accused all those who were canvassing on Plunkett’s behalf) as really being 
Irish Volunteers rather than Sinn Feiners.48 In fact, Sinn Fein was at this point 
nominally a defunct political organisation in Ireland, a condition due, in large 
part, to the incarceration and only recent release of its leaders, organisers and 
activists.
In Roscommon, however, it was the efforts of the newly freed radical 
nationalists combined with local agitation that actually helped to get Plunkett’s 
campaign off the ground.49 Local agitation in Roscommon was masterminded 
by a radical priest, Father Michael O’Flanagan. O’Flanagan had been elected to 
the Sinn Fein executive in 1910, had given a funeral oration for O’Donovan
45 Report on meeting for Count Plunkett, 19 January, 1917CO 904/23 PRO Kew
46 Report on meeting for Count Plunkett, 20 and 28 January, 1917CO 904/23 PRO Kew
47 Rees, 1998,224
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Rossa in 1915, and had often been chastised for his political involvement by his 
Bishop, Dr. Coyne of Elphin. He would go on to play a major role in the 
Republican movement, becoming Vice President of Sinn Fein in 1917.50 
O’Flanagan made a variety of speeches on Plunkett’s behalf during the by- 
election, making statements such as ‘the rotten policy of Redmond and his Party 
caused the rebellion in Dublin’ or that ‘only for the Dublin Rising the Irish 
Party would be inducing their unthinking followers to give their very lives for 
England ... in exchange for sweet words and false promises of British 
ministers.’51 In fact the role of clergymen, especially young clergymen, in this 
and the following Sinn Fein by-election victories was to prove crucial, despite 
the fact that it often meant defying their ecclesiastical superiors. The 
radicalisation of the younger clergymen was apparent before the Rising, and 
especially so from 1916 onwards.
This combination of local agitation, and the budding institutional 
organisation of radical nationalism made images such as the carrying of elderly 
voters over snow drifts on the shoulders of young Irish Volunteers to reach the 
polling booths one of the ‘most enduring images of the campaign.*54 Images like 
this served to reinforce the ‘saintly’ and ‘fastidious’ portrayals of the radical 
nationalists which had begun in the aftermath of Easter Week. After North 
Roscommon, radical nationalism had a new group of leaders, and a new strategy 
-  dependent on a mix of centralised organisation and local agitation -  that 
worked, and as a movement it also began to develop an agreed programme for 
policy and action. This process of reorganisation would eventually come to 
form Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein grew like a shoot from the diverse roots of cultural
50 See beginning of chapter 3 for a quote Pearse’s famous oration at this same funeral.
51 Report on Meeting for Count Plunkett, Elphin, 29 January, 1917 CO 903/23 PRO Kew
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nationalism, and that was part of the reason that on the ground at this time, in 
the by-elections, it appeared as a conglomeration of disparate organisations, the 
GAA, Gaelic League, etc.55 Radical nationalism, as a political movement, had 
been able to camouflage itself in the garb of cultural nationalism, and this 
allowed it to grow, culturally and institutionally, under the noses of those who 
had disapproved of this movement before 1916.56 It also allowed for the popular 
dissemination and consolidation of the myths, memories and symbols of the 
Irish nation. The final step in the ascendancy of Sinn Fein would be its 
reconstitution as a unified electorally representative body, to replace the 
increasingly disgraced Redmond and the Irish Party, and fill the vacuum.
At the rally to celebrate his victoiy, Plunkett declared that he could not 
bring himself to represent the people of Roscommon in a foreign parliament, but 
that rather he would remain in Ireland where ‘the battle for Irish liberty was to 
be fought.*57 As was shown in chapter 3, abstention was one the earliest of Sinn 
Fein policies, and it featured prominently in Dolan’s 1908 campaign. He had 
asserted that abstention went against the Irish Party’s ‘politics as usual* and 
status quo relationship with the British authorities. In December 1916, Sinn 
Fein’s policy was one of passive resistance to foreign aggression, the 
development of national natural resources, and the ‘fostering of national
fO
characteristics.’ The only ‘tangible’ element of its policy was its commitment 
to abstention. This now became a particularly potent and resonant idea. This 
policy of abstention -  the refusal to send elected representatives to Westminster 
- was predicated on the belief that for the 116 years that Ireland had been 
sending representatives to Westminster it had suffered two famines, four open
55 See Larkin, 1976
56 Larkin, 1976; Hutchinson, 1987
57 Kee, 1982,23
58 Phillips, 1923,114; Coogan, 1993; Kee, 1982
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insurrections, ‘long periods of partly suppressed insurrections, wholesale 
evictions, abnormal emigration, scores of Coercion Acts, ever-increasing 
taxation, destruction of industries, decrease of tillage, and “mind-stupefying’ 
methods of education.’59 Abstention, as a policy, was in part justified on this 
basis that it could prevent another potentially imminent ethnocidal famine.60 As 
a policy and symbol of the rejection of status quo politics, abstention helped to 
underpin the organisational evolution of Sinn Fein in Ireland.
In its institutional form, as it was being reconstituted Sinn Fein appeared 
very much like the Irish Party. However, it differed from what preceded it in so 
far as its attachment to the policy of abstention meant that it was attempting to 
turn the de facto difference of an Irish nation, as recognised by nationalist 
ideology and by British negotiations over Home Rule, into a de jure  form of 
state.61 They were, however, forced to do this through the traditional 
mechanisms of recognition and legitimacy throughout Irish society.62 Prior to 
the reorganisation of radical nationalists, O’Brien had been able to exploit the 
lack of cohesion amongst radicals in West Cork the previous autumn. Plunkett’s 
by-election victory now provided a blueprint for radical nationalist electoral 
success, and Plunkett’s victory helped to unify the disparate forces of radical 
nationalism.
The Reorganisation of Sinn Fein
For Father O’Flanagan, newly flushed with Plunkett’s triumph in 
Roscommon, Sinn Fein was ‘an old policy under a new name, the policy of ’48, 
or Robert Emmet and Wolfe Tone, it was the 1500 Volunteers that saved you
59 Hennessey, 1998, 164
60 See Chapter 6 for further references to the Famine at this time.
61 Larkin, 1976,1268
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from conscription.’63 While it was clear that a ‘Sinn Fein’ movement had been 
victorious in North Roscommon, it was unclear what it stood for, as it had 
brought together a variety of nationalist groups under one banner. While there 
was a sense that it brought together those disaffected with British rule, there was 
no agreement on how to solve this disaffection. When these differences became 
increasingly obvious, the shine quickly wore off Plunkett’s victory. Plunkett’s 
leadership was also terribly divisive; he had a ‘dogmatic and unbending’ 
character, and poor political judgement, lacking basic diplomatic political 
ability. 64 He alienated Irish Nations League supporters, who had worked to get 
him elected, and he began feuding with its members and representatives.65 
Flushed with his own success, Plunkett now proposed to disband the entire Sinn 
Fein organisation in favour of his self styled ‘Liberty League,’ a proposal which 
upset Griffith, and brought the two into conflict, and had the potential to divide 
and wreck the entire radical nationalist project.
Plunkett called for a conference to be held in the Mansion House in 
Dublin, on the 19th of April, 1917, to which he wished to invite representatives 
of all aspects of advanced nationalist opinion in Ireland. Plunkett called this 
convention because he felt that the duty had been ‘cast’ on him as the deliverer 
of advanced nationalist politics by virtue of his victory in North Roscommon.66 
While only 68 of 277 invited public bodies attended, the conference had over 
1200 attendees, including Sinn Feiners, priests, and students. After a great deal 
of debate and action, Plunkett’s proposal to disband Sinn Fein was rejected. A 
major split was ultimately avoided, by fitting a loose collar around all of the 
disparate radical nationalist groups in the guise of the Mansion House
63 Report on Speech in Elphin, 13 February, 1917 CO 903/23 PRO Kew
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Committee.67 The Mansion House Committee’s main aim was ‘to deny the right 
of any foreign parliament to make laws for Ireland.’
A major split had been averted, and the path was now clear for the 
emergence of Sinn Fein as the dominant nationalist political organisation in 
Ireland. It has been suggested that the British Government misnomer for the 
Rising -  the Sinn Fein Rebellion -  helped to ensure the prominence of the Party 
in the institutional reorganisation of radical nationalism, and that this in part 
helped to ensure its survival.69 At the Mansion House Convention, a Sinn Fein 
representative also commented that it ‘would be a pity to lose a name which had 
so distasteful a flavour in the mouth of their Saxon friends.’70 Eventually the 
Liberty League was subsumed into Sinn Fein, and the party would begin 
growing rapidly, from 11000 members in July of 1917 to 200000 in 1200 Sinn 
Fein clubs by October of the same year.71 The County Inspectors* reports put 
these figures closer to 66,000 members in 1917 and 112,000 in 1918, but 
regardless the movement was clearly growing.72 In Kilkenny, for example, the 
effect of Sinn Fein’s momentum was quite apparent, in so far as there were six 
more Sinn Fein clubs at the end of December, 1917, than there had been in June 
of that hear, rising from 15 to 21, and an increase o f600 members, from 1290 to 
1869 over the same period.73 Whereas only a handful showed up for the 
Manchester Martyr Celebrations in Ennis, Co. Clare in November 1916, the 
growth of Sinn Fein clubs in the same county a year later was ‘killing the 
Ancient Order of the Hibernians.’74 Indeed after April 1917, Sinn Fein’s rise
67 Rees, 1998,225
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was meteoric, and by July there were some 336 affiliated Sinn Fein clubs, 
compared to the 41 that had attended the Manor House Convention.75 The 
expansion was, in some cases, the result of Sinn Fein organisers travelling from 
Dublin throughout the countryside, something which was duly noted by British 
observers.76 In other cases, however, there are examples of groups of 
individuals spontaneously founding local Sinn Fein clubs, and as a result of 
their foundation meeting writing to the central executive to affiliate themselves, 
and to receive literature and membership cards.77 It was as though Sinn Fein 
served as a mechanism to facilitate the expression of the radicalised Irish nation.
The South Longford By-Election
In May 1917, there was another Sinn Fein by-election victory. This time 
the victorious candidate was Joe McGuinness, a republican and a prisoner in 
Lewes Jail. McGuiness and his companions in Lewes Jail believed that his 
candidature was inappropriate, in part fearing the potential cost of defeat. South 
Longford had not appeared to be a particularly fertile location for advanced 
nationalist opinion before the Rising, so if Sinn Fein were to win, it was 
recognised that it would take a great deal of effort.78 Furthermore McGuinness* 
electoral platform could not use the ‘sympathy’ card in the same way as 
Plunkett’s campaign, and given the infighting in the Mansion House 
Committee, coming up with an agreed, unified and appealing platform would 
not be easy. If the radical nationalists lost this by-election, it would not only be 
a political setback but could have signalled a rejection of the participants in the 
Rising themselves, sullying the power of the myths, memories and symbols
75 Laffan, 1999,94
76 IO’s report cited in Laffan, 1999,95
77 Laffirn, 1999,95
78 Coleman, 2002, 53
271
attached to them. Despite these concerns, choosing McGuiness as the candidate 
indicated a new found confidence in the radical nationalist movement.79
The formula which had proved successful in North Roscommon was 
used in South Longford, with the harnessing of local agitation and a loose 
coalition of radical nationalist institutional organisations, though in this case it 
was nearly defeated. McGuinness defeated the pro-Redmond Irish Party 
candidate by around only thirty votes, and needed a recount to do so. Despite 
this close call, Sinn Fein’s institutional organisation was now much healthier 
than it had been in Roscommon, though it was still far from perfect. It 
weathered the internal divisiveness that could have tom it apart the month 
before, and now possessed the organisational know-how to bombard South 
Longford with motor cars, petrol to run the cars, organisers, pamphlets, posters 
etc. The rhetoric of the campaign centred on cries to ‘put him in to get him out.’ 
More significantly, however, the stump speeches indicated a shift in rhetoric to 
reminding people of the tragedies of the Irish past and the revolutionary 
tradition. In one speech, it was stated that it was ‘men like Joe McGuinness that 
prevented the men of Ireland from being tom away from their lands to fight for 
England’ and that ‘we will see that the crops which you planted to feed 
yourselves and your children will not be taken away from the county as they 
were in ’46 and ’47 ...’80 In another speech it was asserted that ‘Ireland stands 
for complete freedom; it is a separate nation ...’81
The most significant aspect of the South Longford by-election was, 
however, Archbishop Walsh’s support for McGuinness. While the Church had 
supported the foundation of the Irish Nations League, it had remained silent
79 Laffan, 1999,98
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over the emergence of a radical nationalist alternative. In fact it was doctrine for 
the Church and its priests not to get involved in politics. An ‘instruction’ had 
been sent out to remind priests that it was forbidden by the National Synod ‘to 
speak of politics of any kind in Church.’82 The ‘instruction’ also happened to be 
sent by Cardinal Logue, who was vehemently opposed to Sinn Fein, and by the 
Bishops of Cloyne and Ross who were staunch Irish Party supporters. Walsh, 
however, went ahead and wrote a letter to the Evening Herald the night before 
the by-election in which he attacked the Irish Party, and their acceptance of the 
policy of exclusion. Walsh finished his statement by saying ‘I am fairly satisfied 
that the mischief has already been done, and that the country is practically 
sold.*83 On its publication, this statement was telegraphed to Sinn Fein activists 
who immediately had it printed on a pamphlet which was distributed on the day 
of the election, with the additional statement that ‘This is a clear call from the 
great and venerated Archbishop of Dublin to vote against the Irish Party traitors 
and vote for Joe McGuinness.*84 With the narrow margin of McGuinness 
victory, a great deal of importance has been ascribed to Walsh’s intervention. 
Walsh’s actions damned him among Irish Party supporters, but young radicals 
had found a new hero from the old guard.85
The East Clare By-Election
In June the leaders of the Rising were released from Lewes Jail, as a 
gesture of goodwill on the part of Lloyd George, a contribution to the 
auspicious beginning of the Irish convention, and an action intended for an 
American audience.86 Bonar-Law, in announcing their release in the Commons 
stated that it was done so that ‘the convention may meet in an atmosphere of
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harmony and good will.*87 For Sinn Fein, however, their release seemed more 
like an expression of fear rather than goodwill on the part of the British
flO
Government. If the released Frognoch internees had been greeted with 
enthusiasm on their return, these men were feted like heroes and treated like 
living saints. The arrival of one hundred released prisoners in Dublin was 
celebrated by a procession in which Sinn Fein flags were displayed, and in Cork
fiQtheir release brought on a riot against the British forces. Eamonn De Valera 
was chosen to stand for a seat in East Clare, as he had emerged as one of the 
leaders of the prisoners in Lewes Jail. Redmond’s brother, Major Willie 
Redmond had volunteered to serve in the British Army, and his death at the 
front led to the by-election in East Clare in July, 1917. Whereas there had been 
concern about South Longford as fertile ground for Sinn Fein’s attention, there 
were no such concerns about East Clare.90 Since 1909, Clare had had the third 
highest number of fully paid up members of Sinn Fein.91 The pattern of this by- 
election was similar to that of the others, in that it was a combination of the 
efforts of increasingly seasoned Sinn Fein campaigners and local agitators. In 
this case, the role of the Church, in the guise of the Bishop and especially the 
younger clergy was apparent. They were observed as ‘moving heaven and hell’ 
to secure a Sinn Fein victory.92 The imagery used in this campaign also 
changed, in so far as there were increasing references to ‘the enemy,* to 
fighting, to arming and to revolutionary methods.93 In his victory speech, de 
Valera proclaimed ‘You are worthy descendants of the Claremen who fought 
under Brian Boru, with the spirit in your hearts and body that your fathers had a
87 Phillips, 1923, 124
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thousand years ago.’94 There were also references to the British exploitation of 
Ireland through the burden of over-taxation.95 The by-election was won by de 
Valera, by almost 3000 votes. From Curran’s perspective in the Archbishop’s 
residence it seemed that ‘a huge landslide is carrying away the Irish Party 
supporters into the Sinn Fein camp.’96 In the aftermath of his victory, a banner 
hung from Birr Castle, proclaiming ‘Irish Party wounded at North Roscommon, 
Killed in South Longford, Buried in East Clare. R.I.P’97 If East Clare was the 
burial, than Kilkenny in August 1917 represented the raising of the headstone. 
W.T. Cosgrave, the Sinn Fein candidate, defeated the Irish Party candidate by 
over 300 votes in the Kilkenny City by-election. This by-election fell into the 
same pattern as East Clare, given the constituency’s pre-existing Sinn Fein 
orientation, and the ease for Sinn Fein supporters to canvass in the constituency.
The Content o f Sinn Fein
As the moral stock of radical nationalism rose, that of British rule and 
the Irish Party’s brand of constitutional nationalism fell. One sign of this was 
that wives of Irish soldiers serving in the British Army, called ‘separation 
women* because of their dependence on the separation allowance paid by the 
British authorities, became increasingly portrayed as ‘drinking blood money’ 
and as facing an ‘awful reckoning* on judgement day.98 This was linked 
explicitly in Sinn Fein political posters to alcoholism and sexual depravity so 
that there were ‘dishevelled hoydens shown swilling porter and bearing Union 
Jacks and banners for the Irish Party candidates.’99 In the same vein, British 
culture, especially in the form of dance hall music, was a particular target for
94 Cork Examiner cited in Kee, 1982, 28
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nationalist propaganda, as something which promoted drunkenness and sexual 
immorality.100 Count Plunkett’s wife was particularly concerned about public 
advertisements asking for ‘Irish girls’ to offer themselves for employment in 
England because of the ‘appalling state of immorality amongst the men in 
England’ where ‘seduction is not a punishable offence if the culprit is in the 
Army.’101 She was making a protest on behalf of these ‘poor Irish girls without 
the faintest idea of what they have to face once they leave Ireland... it is as well 
as one might look on a flock of innocent sheep driven into the wolves*
1 fi*}stronghold.* The pervasive themes of cultural and religious nationalisms -  
the organic distinctiveness of the Irish nation, and the inherent distrust of and 
hatred for the Anglo-Protestant other -  were also further promoted by this turn 
of events. In the nationalist imagination the Irish Party, associated as it was with 
British politics, constituted an internal threat to the organic, innocent, and pure 
moral character of the Irish nation.103
Other speeches over the course of 1917 emphasised the role of the 
‘saintly Rising martyrs’ with the words ‘I accept your cheers ... for the men 
who fell in Easter Week and who he in Glasnevin, but also for my comrades 
who were executed in Kilmainham Gaol, and who lie in Barrack Yard at Arbour 
Hill and the only prayers that reaches their sacred bones are the blasphemous 
oaths of the British soldiery ... *104 These themes had been echoed in de Valera’s 
victory speech and stump speeches by Ginnell and O’Flanagan. The Bishop of 
Limerick proclaimed that the events of the Rising had served to ‘galvanise the 
dead bones in Ireland and created the spirit with which England now has to
100 Novick, 2002
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reckon ...,105 This was in marked contrast to the initial reactions to the Rising, 
and demonstrated the extent to which attitudes towards the Rising had become 
changed. A great deal of importance was continually attached to the memories 
of the Easter Week dead. It had, after all, been their executions that sparked the 
first actions of public defiance, such as the saying of requiem masses in their 
honour. A year on and their deaths were still being commemorated. Before the 
anniversary of their deaths, the families of the executed approached Archbishop 
Walsh about masses of commemoration, and according to Curran ‘Numerous 
Requiem Masses were held ... Republican flags were hoisted ...’ and ‘Cumann 
na mBan placed wreathes on the graves of the Rebellions victims.’106 In the 
countryside, in places like East Down, Sinn Fein flags were flown on the 
anniversary of Connolly’s execution.107 On August 5th, on the anniversary of 
Casement’s execution, there was, for example, a large march in Co. Kerry to 
‘Casement’s Fort* during which ‘Sinn Fein tricolours were worn and waved, 
and it was noted that large numbers of Volunteers appeared in uniform.’108 New 
heroes were added to these ranks as well. Thomas Ashe, a popular and powerful 
figure in the burgeoning Sinn Fein movement had been rearrested after his 
release in June and interned under the DORA in Mountjoy Jail. Ashe was a 
heroic figure, his leadership of an action against British forces at Ashbourne 
was one of the only military successes during Easter Week. He died when being 
force fed during a hunger strike to protest his treatment. His death ‘made a vast 
public impression.*109 He was immediately ‘canonised’ in the nationalist 
propaganda, and his funeral was a massive occasion at which tens of thousands
105 Proclamation of Bishop of Limerick, Dr. O’Dwyer, 30 April 1917 Walsh Papers Special 
Papers/Political Papers
106 Walsh Papers 379/5 and Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military 
History, MS. 27728, NLI
107 Gallagher, 1986,100
108 Phillips, 1923, 133
109 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
277
of mourners filed past his coffin.110 In fact, over 150 priests attended and in its 
size, power and overall status it was compared to O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral in 
1915.111
Other imagery included that of Sinn Fein as protector of the Irish nation 
against conscription. In all of the various by-elections, Sinn Fein had attempted 
to get across the message that a vote for Sinn Fein had meant a vote against 
conscription. O’Flanagan and Ginnell had used this line in Roscommon, 
Longford and Clare. Other examples of this tactic include a priest who was 
campaigning on behalf of de Valera, stating that if it weren’t for Sinn Fein, ‘the 
bones of the young men of Ireland would be bleaching today in the blood 
sodden soil of France.*112 In October, de Valera, now an MP, made a speech 
referring to the Famine, stating ‘Your fathers could tell you of the Famine of 
black *46 and *47 when a million and one half of our people died by the 
roadside. If those who died of starvation had only turned with pitchforks a 
quarter as many would not have died ... if I had a million and a half soldiers of 
the Irish Volunteers I would drive every one of the English out of Ireland.’113 
The imagery of the Famine was used constantly during this period. In part this 
was a result of agitation against the system of food control being imposed by the 
British authorities in reaction to the U-Boat blockade of Britain. Regardless of 
its root cause, the use of the call ‘The clutching hand is out to capture your 
food’ was clearly popular beyond any current sense of injustice.114 In February 
1918, Sinn Feiners seized pigs as they were driven through the streets of Dublin 
to Kingstown to be shipped to England, and butchered them, distributing their
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meat amongst the population of Dublin.115 The effect was to force the British 
authorities into banning the export of pigs thereafter. There are a variety of 
similar reports of speeches and protests in the Dublin Metropolitan Police 
Special Branch files, with regular references being made to *47 and the 
Famine.116 In May 1917, a proclamation from the King was read to the 
Protestant Churches in Dublin enjoining their parishioners to be economic with 
bread and flour. It was ignored in all the Catholic Churches, bar one in Coolock, 
where the Priest publicly remarked that ‘the people of Dublin should keep then- 
own supplies in Ireland.’117 Sinn Fein even approached Archbishop Walsh to 
gain the Church’s support in establishing local committees to ensure the
1151‘security’ of Irish food. This concern had even led to a policy of cattle driving 
and forcible land reclamation, especially in the West of Ireland to ensure that 
there was more arable land, and to settle old scores, much to the disapproval o f 
the Sinn Fein executive who thought that these actions were too radical.119 All 
of these were actions which the nation thought it should have taken in retrospect 
of the events of the 19 century. On the one hand, the Famine afforded a useful 
and resonant political banner which could be used by Sinn Fein to mobilise the 
nation. On the other hand, the fears of Famine, as a result o f the myths, 
memories and symbols of the Irish nation, still rang true for individuals in the 
nation.
de Valera’s Rise to Prominence
By late October 1917, the re-organisation of Sinn Fein as the 
representative political movement in Ireland was complete, when a Sinn Fein 
Ard-Fheis elected de Valera as President and Arthur Griffith Vice-President. On
115 Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
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the next day, de Valera was elected president of the Irish Volunteers. Over the 
course of the spring of 1917 the National Volunteers had severed their ties to 
Redmond and the Irish Party, and had sought and gained a reunion with the Irish 
Volunteers.120 The institutional rubric of radical nationalism in Ireland had now 
been completely formed and united. From Curran’s perspective, it seemed that 
‘The old order has yielded, giving place to the new ...,121 As part of this 
exercise, ‘departments’ which were responsible to ‘ministers’ were now set up 
within Sinn Fein, and they were responsible for matters such as military 
organisation, political organisation, education and propaganda, foreign relations, 
and finance.122 County inspector reports all make reference to the outward 
appearance of calm, but refer equally to a ‘spirit of unrest’ prevailing, and that 
this was combined with ‘a spirit of disaffection ... ready to breakout if a
1 7 1suitable opportunity occurred.’ Part of this was due to ‘the Sinn Fem 
movement making considerable strides’ along with increased activities on the 
part of the Irish Volunteers.124 While there was outward calm in some locations, 
in others such as Clare there was what was described by the British authorities 
as ‘utter anarchy’ -  a state of affairs that entailed illegal cattle drives, land 
seizures, illegal drilling, and the general obstruction of policing.125 Similarly in 
Cork, the RIC reported that ‘since the police are regarded as the great obstacle 
to the realisation of their political aims, they are confronted in the discharge of 
their duties by an organised conspiracy ...’126 This resulted in the county being 
put under martial law, the first place to which it had been applied since the 
Rising.
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The Conscription Crisis
Though the expression of radical nationalist agitation was beginning to 
get more heated in various spots in Ireland, Sinn Fein faced three by-election 
setbacks between February and April, 1918. The first by-election defeat to the 
Irish Party occurred in February in South Armagh, which had been controlled 
by Devlin and the Ancient Order of the Hibernians, and it proved a difficult 
constituency to crack. A Sinn Fein victory was highly unlikely, because this was 
an Irish Party stronghold, and because while there was a great deal of support by 
the young for Sinn Fein, it was almost exclusively ‘the older generation* that 
were listed on the electoral roles.127 The next defeat occurred in March in 
Waterford City. It was the by-election for John Redmond’s vacated seat. The 
seat had become vacant on Redmond’s death in March, and his son now ran for 
this seat. In feet Redmond’s death itself indicated how transformed the Irish 
political scene had become: the local Bishop refused permission for a requiem 
mass to be said in his honour.128 There was no hope of a Sinn Fein victory in 
this constituency. William Redmond campaigned dressed in his Irish Guards 
uniform, a particularly useful prop in what was historically, and continued to be 
a British Army garrison town. This, along with the sympathy for his father, and 
the patronage attached to the Redmond family name meant that he handily won 
this seat. William Redmond won by 478 votes, but given the conditions it was 
not considered a decisive defeat.129 Redmond had been the MP for East Tyrone, 
and so this third seat now became vacant. Sinn Fein initially had not even 
considered contesting this seat, but there was a grass-roots movement in East 
Tyrone for a Sinn Fein candidate, and despite their initial hesitation and the
127 McConnell, 2004
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Irish Party’s head start, the Sinn Fein candidate nearly defeated the Irish Party 
candidate in April, 1918.130
The negative impact of these events on the fortunes of Sinn Fein, and the 
positive impact on the fortunes of the Irish Party were partially mitigated by the 
conscription crisis. The introduction of the Military Service Bill and 
conscription crisis in Ireland delivered the final blow to constitutional 
nationalism in Ireland, and secured Sinn Fein’s place in the upcoming years. Its 
introduction created a massive public outcry. From Curran’s perspective, it ‘Set 
Ireland ablaze’ and ‘exhibited the blind hatred of the English people for 
Ireland.’131 Conscription ‘came as a thunderbolt to the leaderless masses of the 
Irish people for while the majority had lost their faith ... in the Parliamentary 
Party, many of the older generation were slow to commit themselves to the 
revolutionary policies of Sinn Fein.*132 Therefore the crisis, from Curran’s point 
of view, was ‘the brutal shock that woke them to the political realities and 
unreliability of the Party.’133 The immediate reaction of all Irish nationalists was 
to ratify a Sinn Fein sponsored pledge at the ‘Mansion House Conference’ on 
the 18th of April. This pledge, modelled on the Solemn League and Covenant of 
the Ulster Unionists in reaction to Home Rule, declared that there was no right 
of the foreign parliament of Westminster to impose conscription on Ireland, and 
that the participants in the conference would ‘solemnly ... resist conscription by 
the most effective means at our disposal.’134 The day before, the Irish Party had 
withdrawn from Westminster, in what appeared to be the ultimate vindication of 
the Sinn Fein’s policy of abstention. The Catholic Bishops also supported this 
effort, releasing a statement that directed ‘the clergy of Ireland to celebrate a
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public mass of intercession ... in every church in Ireland to avert the scourge of 
conscription’ and furthermore backing the pledge to resist conscription as 
agreed upon at the Mansion House Conference. As early as the 9th of April, the 
Standing Committee of the Catholic Bishops had released a statement which 
said ‘... we feel bound to warn the Government against entering upon a policy 
so disastrous to the public interest, and dangerous to all order, public or 
private.’135 The anti-conscription movement brought together all elements of the 
Irish nation, secular and religious, in the guise of organised Labour and the 
Catholic Church, radical and moderate, in Sinn Fein and the Irish Party. Sinn 
Fein had already manoeuvred itself into being the anti-conscription party, and it 
had the track record of consistently not trusting or negotiating with the British 
Government. Curran claims that he and de Valera had hatched the alliance of 
Sinn Fein and the Church at the surreptitious request of the Archbishop. They 
concocted a plan by which Sinn Fein would propose a bold and popular way 
forward on this issue, and that the sympathetic Bishops would move right away 
to support them. In this way they could outmanoeuvre some of the more 
conservative and worried Bishops, such as Cardinal Logue. That the Irish Party 
had been involved in the Irish Convention immediately prior to this crisis 
rendered them even more vulnerable to attacks that they had misjudged and 
miscalculated the politics of the Union.
The conscription crisis was a moment that also benefited Sinn Fein by 
bestowing upon it the vestiges of institutional legitimacy that it had not yet 
acquired. By working so closely with the Church in the anti-conscription 
movement, and by gaining the approval of many Bishops and other clerics who 
had previously been so hostile to its rise, Sinn Fein had now gained recognition
135 Statement of Standing Bishops found in Statement of Monsignor Michael J. Curran to 
Bureau of Military History, MS. 27728, NLI
283
as the most powerful and the legitimate political force in the Irish nation. The
Bishops had decreed that masses of intercession should be said everyday so that
conscription would not be implemented, stating that ‘The Irish people have a
1right to resist by every means that are consonant with the laws of God.* 
Hundred of thousands of Irishmen signed the anti-conscription pledge, drafted 
by Sinn Fein and organised by the Church, and it was these actions which 
ultimately forced the British Government to abandon their immediate intentions 
to implement conscription over the Summer of 1918, thought the British 
authorities did not revoke their right to do so anytime in the future -  thereby 
assuring conscription was a constantly looming which Sinn Fein could turn into 
an important politically mobilising issue.137 Indeed, regardless o f how the 
alliance between Sinn Fein and Church came about over the issue of 
conscription, its effect was to mobilise the entirety of the Irish nation. Curran 
reported that as a result ‘scenes were witnessed the length and breadth of Ireland 
that were never seen before ... a million hitherto divided, unorganised, 
demoralised rallied ... and signed the pledge’ and that the ‘press reported that 
the Dublin Churches were thronged to overflowing, revealing in a remarkable 
way the spiritual unity and exultation of the nation.*138 In several o f the county 
inspector’s reports, the central role of Sinn Fein in the organisation of the anti­
conscription movement was apparent, especially in contrast to the little or no 
mention of the Irish Party’s role in this movement.139 It was also thought that 
‘the fear of conscription increased [Sinn Fein’s] power and members more than 
anything else and now Sinn Fein is regarded as the power which saved the
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country from compulsory service.*140 The threat of conscription had loomed so 
large in Sinn Fein’s electoral imagery before this crisis that this turn of events 
only seemed to vindicate their warnings and helped to inspire their ever 
increasing popularity. New members where joining it as ‘a means of resisting 
conscription’ and even if they had been previously unsure of the movement, 
now joined so ‘in the belief that it would be the means of staving off
*141conscription.
Epilogue
In the wake of the conscription crisis there was a recognition on the part 
of the British authorities in Westminster and in Dublin that the republican 
movement was now growing so strong as to pose a real threat to their power. A 
new administration was put in place in Dublin, with ‘stronger’ men than those 
that had made up the previous regime. Within six days of their arrival, in early 
May, the ‘German Plot’ was ‘uncovered’ by the Castle authorities. This was the 
apparent discovery of a plot, organised by de Valera and Sinn Fein to ally with 
the Germans to overthrow British rule in Ireland. Its veracity is strongly 
doubted. Regardless, by the 20th of May, de Valera, Griffith, Phinkett and others 
had been arrested. It was an eventuality that the Sinn Fein executive had already 
considered, and they had already made plans to ensure that they were able to 
turn this situation to their advantage -  for example that all the relevant leaders 
were arrested en masse to gain the maximum impact and exposure for the 
‘injustices’ of these arrests. At this time, the Irish administration in Dublin 
Castle approached Archbishop Walsh about the possibility of having a 
memorial mass said for the War dead. Walsh rejected this request on the 
grounds that in light of ‘recent events it would probably be regarded as a
140 Co. Meath Inspector’s Report CO 903/19 PRO Kew
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directly provocative challenge’ thereby making its occurrence ‘injudicious.’142 
In feet, Walsh thought the whole situation to be an ‘outrage, in sending off a 
number of Dublin Catholics, prisoners, not only untried, but not even charged 
with any crime, to prisons in England where they have no possibility of even 
hearing Mass on Sundays.’143 The arrests were meant to strike a surprising and 
crippling blow to Sinn Fein, but their effect was only to consolidate its position 
as the dominant political force in Ireland. As the prisoners were being driven 
through the streets to the Kingstown docks, thousands lined the streets to 
support and cheer them.
The effects of the Rising as a cultural trigger point are blatantly apparent 
when one considers the institutional growth of Sinn Fein and radical nationalism 
after Easter Week, 1916. The rise of radical nationalism was without precedent 
from the Irish point of view before the Rising. In the General Election of 
December 1918, after the end of the War, Sinn Fein would win 73 of the 105 
Westminster seats in Ireland. This was 67 more than those gained by the Irish 
Party. For the County Dublin Inspector, while the General Election was carried 
out in a peaceable manner, it revealed that ‘Sinn Fein is a highly organised and 
efficient organisation.’144 The Irish Party had even been forced to abandon 25 
seats which had been ‘safe seats* in the previous election of 1910. The 
organisational structure of the Irish Party could not organise or muster enough 
support to put forward candidates for these seats. This defeat though was also 
particularly galling as it had been the first where the franchise had been 
extended to all men over 21, and all women over the age of thirty through the
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Representation o f the People Act o f 1918,145 This had the effect of tripling the 
electorate, and empowering Sinn Fein’s younger supporters.146 The next step 
would be violent agitation on behalf of the Irish nation, a phenomenon that 
would become increasingly apparent in the records of crimes kept by the British 
authorities between 1917 and 1919.147
Conclusion
There are ultimately two points in this chapter which help to explain the 
rise of institutional radical nationalism in Ireland. These are 1) the change 
engendered by the release of the internees after the Rising, and their ability to 
agitate for a particular type of radical nationalism amongst a transformed Irish 
nation who now found their message highly attractive, a changed indicated in 
the gain of political momentum made by Sinn Fein with the victories in the 
Roscommon, Longford and East Clare by-elections, and 2) the consolidation of 
this new found momentum and support after the conscription crisis in the spring 
of 1918, and the eventual landslide victory of Sinn Fein in the General Elections 
of December 1918. These developments were made possible because of the end 
of the hope of repairing and/or restructuring an Imperial relationship with the 
failure of the Irish convention of 1917-18, especially over the question of the 
implementation of conscription to Ireland. Whereas previous chapters described 
the ‘grass-roots’ groundswell of support for and participation in radical 
nationalism amongst the masses of the Irish nation, this chapter charted the 
effects that this process had at an elite and institutional level. The last chapter 
revealed that the elite and institutional levels of Irish nationalism were initially 
dragged along by this transformation, despite the best efforts of Redmond and
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Westminster to put a positive spin on the changing Irish scene, but that in the 
wake of their failure to adjust, a new representative political organisational 
structure was put in place in Ireland. Radical nationalism had now become the 
popular form of nationalism in Ireland -  a turn of events virtually unimaginable 
some four years previously.
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Conclusions
Irish historians have done an excellent job of charting the broad social 
and structural changes in the Irish nation, demonstrating the various effects of 
the long 19th century on Irish nationalism, and the pressures it brought to bear 
on the political institutions created by the Act of Union in 1801. Such works go 
hand in hand with several of the more important contributions to theories of 
nations and nationalisms, such as notions of periphery versus centre conflicts, 
theories of relative deprivation, the processes of modernisation (as 
industrialisation was more or less absent from Ireland save several notable 
examples such as Belfast), and the sweep of the ideology of the nation and
tHnationalism in the 19 century. These theoretical approaches, given their 
various strengths, directly relate to aspects of the growth of the Irish nation and 
its expression in nationalist movements.
The argument in this study has concentrated not on these broad factors, 
as important they are. Instead I have attempted to explain why a population, so 
content with a moderate form of nationalism during one period of time should 
subsequently support a previously unpopular and radical position. For too long, 
historians of the Rising have taken this moment of transformation for granted. 
In response, this thesis has proposed a mechanism to explain this moment of 
transformation, and to map out the process by which the Irish nation became 
radicalised in response to a specific and time-limited series of events. From the 
moment that the Proclamation of an Irish Republic was read in front of the 
Dublin GPO, through to the application of martial law, the courts-martial, and 
the executions of the leaders of the Rising, perspectives on nationalism amongst 
individual members of the Irish nation were transformed and radicalised. This 
change of perspective within the Irish nation ultimately served to ‘translate’
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these broader social, structural, ideological and institutional factors into a 
radicalised form of Irish nationalism.
In order to explain how this process works, the thesis began with the 
examination of the cultural trigger point. The cultural trigger point, as a series of 
events that triggered a radicalisation in identity, sense of injustice and 
perception of agency which accounted for the shift in popularity from moderate 
to radical nationalism, was the Easter Rising. It was informed by the myths, 
memories and symbols of the Irish nation. From the outset, it has been 
established that two major themes lay at the core of these national myths, 
memories and symbols:
1) The sense of the organic distinctiveness of the Irish nation, especially 
from the ‘Anglo-Protestant other.’ The sense of distinction also had 
other implications, such as the inherent morality and spiritual purity of 
the Catholic, as opposed to Protestant, Irish nation.
2) The memories of historical injustices perpetrated against the moral 
Irish Catholic nation, at the hands of the Anglo-Protestant other, in the 
guises of Protestant proselytisers and the British authorities, and through 
their institutions such as the Irish administration, Westminster, soldiers 
and police force.
These factors were present in the Irish nation before the Rising, before the CTP 
took place, and before the transformation in and radicalisation of Irish 
nationalism was even contemplated. In fact, these factors were clearly present 
during the Home Rule crisis in 1914. Irish nationalists, strongly and popularly 
committed to the constitutional methods of the Irish Party, only armed 
themselves after the Ulster Volunteers. These factors were also present when 
Redmond committed the National Volunteers to the War effort, and when this 
call was responded to by Irishmen who enlisted in their tens of thousands. These 
factors were present when the response to the outbreak of the War was not an
29 i
upsurge in the popularity of Sinn Fein, but rather steady support in the Irish 
Party. So how do these factors explain the impact of the Rising?
The Rising itself was demonstrated to be an unpopular event. Its leaders 
were demonised, the participants labelled as fools, and the destruction which 
they had caused highlighted. However, in the moment of high anxiety and 
drama, while there was a vacuum of information and rumours ran wild, it was in 
fact this sense of organic Irish distinctiveness and injustice which began to 
creep in and colour the reporting of events. This alone would not have been 
enough to radicalise the nation. When combined, however, with events such as 
Sheehy-Skeffington’s murder and the subsequent persecution of his wife, the 
execution not so much of Patrick Pearse, but of his brother ‘Willy*, the 
draconian implementation of martial law and the courts-martial in general, all 
the national myths, memories, and symbols of the persecution of the Irish nation 
at the hands of the Anglo-Protestant other were unleashed. Yeats* ‘sixteen dead 
men* were stirring the boiling pot of cultural imagery, and through a 
combination of cultural and religious myths and symbols, these men were 
rehabilitated, indeed resurrected, as saints and martyrs for the Irish nation. The 
process of their ‘beatification’ in the pantheon of Irish heroes was a grass-roots 
one -  there were no radical institutions or organisations to propel this process as 
they had been destroyed or broken up after the Rising. Therefore this process 
came as a result of individuals in the Irish nation trying to make sense of these 
events using the already present and popular building blocks of national myths, 
memories and symbols. This grass-roots process fuelled the radicalisation of the 
Irish nation ex post facto and forced institutions and elites to change their 
behaviours and attitudes in its wake.
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The Anglo-Protestant other, in the guise of the Unionists and the British 
Authorities, seemed to reinforce Irish national myths, memories and symbols. 
For the Irish nation, the sense of organic distinction and injustice was clearly 
apparent. For the Irish nation, it seemed as though the system had been 
constantly stacked in favour of the Unionists. The Ulster Volunteers had been 
albwed to land arms, with the authorities turning a blind eye, whereas the 
landing of arms by the Irish National Volunteers had culminated in deaths 
resulting from the Bachelor’s Walk incident. The British Army had mutinied 
when it was rumoured they were about to be ordered to disarm the Ulster 
Volunteers, but there was never a lack of calls for the disbandment of the 
National Volunteers, let alone the Irish Volunteers. Kitchener and the British 
Army failed to establish a National Volunteer division to mirror that of the 
Ulster Volunteer 36th Division. Unionists had key seats in the Cabinet. 
Unionists wrecked the Irish Convention by limiting the proposed power of the 
Irish Parliament. Constant political manipulation of the British political 
establishment by the Unionists only seemed to prove that the organic distinction 
of the Irish nation needed political expression in independence to ensure the 
ultimate security of the Irish nation. At the same time, the British Authorities 
failed to adequately address any of the changes brought about by the Rising in 
the Irish nation, and their attempts at appeasement only served to strengthen the 
radical nationalist position. The pursuit of retribution on the part of the military 
regime in the immediate aftermath of the Rising, and the continuing draconian 
implementation of martial law and the DORA further served to reinforce this 
viewpoint.
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Those institutions of the Irish nation that did not adequately alter their 
perspectives and actions in light of this popular transformation, and that found 
themselves ‘unrepresentative’ of the Irish nation, either quickly changed or were 
replaced. Examples of this were the Irish Party, and elements of the Catholic 
Church. The fell of the Irish Party was accelerated by the double failure of the 
Home Rule negotiations after the Rising. While it was clear that the cultural 
trigger point of the Rising had effected a change in the masses of the Irish 
nation, it was equally clear that it had failed to make any deep impact on the 
political thinking of the Party, as evidenced by their readiness to accept 
partition. This was a compromise that a radicalised Irish nation was simply not 
willing to swallow, and as the negotiations were dashed against these same 
rocks twice, with Redmond willing the Party on to this compromise each time, 
its power, efficacy and legitimacy were lost. The Church, though always 
divided, was able to manoeuvre its way through this period successfully because
1) it was at the cultural centre of the Irish nation, and was a natural outlet 
for expression of the Irish nation, as evidenced through the requiem 
masses said for the ‘Easter Week martyrs’ and the praying for ‘St. 
Pearse* and
2) because its institutional splits allowed it to pursue more than one policy 
at the same time, thereby always allowing it to appear to be on the 
‘winning’ side.
The conscription crisis cemented the institutional transformation reflecting the 
radicalised Irish nation. The crisis created the conditions under which the 
Church was able to bestow upon the newly reorganised and representative 
institution of Sinn Fein the sense of legitimacy and power. This shift in the 
political fortunes of the Irish Party and Sinn Fein served to further the process 
of the radicalising of the nation, providing efficient and popular institutions by
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which to express this popular brand of radical nationalism. By the General 
Elections of December 1918, this process was complete.
What came after this process, in terms of the Irish War for 
Independence, the Black and Tan War, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
and the subsequent Civil War have been successfully covered elsewhere and 
these events are outside of the scope of the cultural trigger point, and of this 
thesis. However, there can be no doubt that the myths, memories and symbols 
which radicalised the Irish nation in the wake of the Easter Rising also had an 
impact on these events, and that the Rising itself became an Irish national myth 
and symbol, which would influence the interpretation of these subsequent 
events. It is important, however, to remember that the Rising was unique in 
comparison to these subsequent events, as it was a moment of popular 
transformation. As the dust was settling and the smoke was clearing from the 
shelling of central Dublin, there was no set of radical institutions such as Sinn 
Fein to organise a popular response, and those leaders who could have rallied 
such a response were either dead or imprisoned. In the moment of crisis, and in 
the vacuum of political leadership, widely resonant Irish national myths, 
memories and symbols, resonant were released, providing a framework for the 
interpretations of and reactions to these events.
The effects of the transformation engendered by the Rising as a cultural 
trigger point, both in terms of the myths, memories and symbols of the Irish 
nation, and its effects on political events, institutions and structures is apparent 
throughout the island of Ireland even today. Given the relatively recent peace 
process in the North of Ireland, it seems gratuitous, but nonetheless relevant to 
highlight the role that these myths, memories and symbols play in every deeply
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held ethnic and/or national identity. Just as when the Military regime assumed it 
was putting down a treacherous German plot which was a threat to the British 
State, serving to stimulate a strong reaction in the Irish nation, the unintentional 
or clumsy manipulation of myths, memories and symbols can have dramatic 
results, often antithetical to those intended. It therefore seems clear that the 
more that theorists of ethnicity and nationalism and practitioners of subjects 
such as ethno-national conflict regulation are able to understand about the 
power and importance of the role played by national myths, memories and 
symbols, the more likely, perhaps, that a more lasting peace can be achieved.
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Appendix I: 
Timeline
1916 Pre-Rising
January-
3 April -
19 April -  
20-22 April-
23 April -
24 April-
25 April -
26 April -
27 April -
28 April -
29 April-
Executions
3 M ay-
4 M ay-
5 M ay-
6 M ay-
8 M ay-
9 M ay-
10 M ay-
11 May -
12 M ay-
17 May-  
26 June -
20 July-
24 July -  
3 August -  
23-31 August
29 September 
November -  
6 December -
Rejection of conscription as Derby Act not 
applied to Ireland.
Plans published for Irish Volunteer manoeuvres 
Easter Weekend.
Castle Document Circulated 
German arms shipment to Irish Volunteers 
intercepted, Casement arrives and arrested, 
MacNeill countermands orders for Rising.
Split in leadership of Volunteers whether or not to 
go ahead with Rising.
Easter Rising commences 
Martial Law proclaimed.
Francis Sheehy-Skeffington murdered. 
Engagement with Sherwood Foresters 
Redmond denounces Rising.
General Maxwell arrives in Dublin.
Pearse orders surrender.
P. Pearse, MacDonagh and Clarke are executed. 
Plunkett, Daly, O’Hanrahan, and Willy Pearse 
executed.
MacBride executed.
Clemency appeals, Countess de Markievicz and 
others have sentences commuted.
Ceannt, Colbert, Heuston and Mallin executed. 
Kent executed
Military conscription motion introduced, Irish 
Party statement on insurrection.
Dillon denounces the executions.
Connolly and MacDermott executed, Asquith 
arrives.
Bishop O’Dwyer denounces executions.
Royal Commission on Irish Rebellion (sitting 
since 18 May) delivers findings. Trial of Roger 
Casement.
Home Rule proposed by Lloyd George, but 
includes the permanent exclusion of the six 
counties of Ulster.
Home Rule is rejected.
Casement hanged.
Royal Commission on shootings of Francis 
Sheehy-Skeffington sits.
Commission reports.
West Cork By-election 
Fall of Asquith
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22-23 December - Internees freed and returned to Ireland.
3 February - Plunkett wins North Roscommon by-election on
Sinn Fein ticket.
16-19 April - National Convention.
M ay- Lloyd George discusses a settlement to the ‘Irish
question.’
9 M ay- Sinn Fein wins South Longford By-Election
June - Lewes Jail detainees released.
10 July- De Valera wins Longford by-election.
October - Sinn Fein and IRA re-organised.
April - Conscription enacted.
December - General elections, Sinn Fein landslide
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Appendix II: 
Crime Statistics
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